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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters that each study one applied microeconomic theory problem. In the
first chapter, I consider the problem a social planner faces in constructing a criminal justice system which
addresses two needs: to protect the innocent and to punish the guilty. I characterize the socially optimal
criminal justice system under various assumptions with respect to the social planner's ability to commit. In the
optimal system, before a criminal investigation is initiated, all members of the community are given the
opportunity to confess to having committed the crime in exchange for a smaller than socially optimal
punishment, which is independent of any future evidence that might be discovered. Agents who choose not to
confess might be punished once the investigation is completed if the evidence gathered is sufficiently
incriminatory. In this paper's framework, leniency for confessing agents is efficient not because it saves
resources or reduces risk, but because there are informational externalities to each confession. When an agent
credibly confesses to be guilty, he indirectly provides the social planner additional information about the
other agents: the fact that they are likely to be innocent. \par
In the second chapter, I present a theory which shows how the influence of others may generate
overconfidence. The argument is built on the idea that the more help an agent receives when performing a
task, the less informative the score on that task will be relative to the agent's ability to perform it.
Overconfident agents, who tend to benefit from more cooperation opportunities simply because they are
perceived to be more skilled, will remain overconfident because the future signals they will observe will
contain very little information regarding their ability. On the contrary, the scores on tasks that underconfident
agents receive will be more informative, which will help them learn their true ability faster. \par
Finally, in the third chapter, I compare two different systems of provision of discrete public goods: a
centralized system, ruled by a benevolent dictator who has no commitment power; and an anarchic system,
based on voluntary contributions, where there is no ruler. If the public good is binary, then the public good
provision problem is merely an informational one. In this environment, I show that the anarchic system can
always replicate any outcome of the centralized system. However, as the number of alternatives available
increases, the classical free riding problem described in Samuelson (1954) emerges. As the classical free riding
problem becomes more important relative to the informational free riding problem, the centralized system
becomes the preferred system of the two.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMIC THEORY
Francisco Silva
Andrew Postlewaite
This dissertation consists of three chapters that each study one applied microeconomic
theory problem. In the first chapter, I consider the problem a social planner faces in
constructing a criminal justice system which addresses two needs: to protect the innocent
and to punish the guilty. I characterize the socially optimal criminal justice system under
various assumptions with respect to the social planner’s ability to commit. In the optimal
system, before a criminal investigation is initiated, all members of the community are given
the opportunity to confess to having committed the crime in exchange for a smaller than
socially optimal punishment, which is independent of any future evidence that might be
discovered. Agents who choose not to confess might be punished once the investigation is
completed if the evidence gathered is sufficiently incriminatory. In this paper’s framework,
leniency for confessing agents is efficient not because it saves resources or reduces risk, but
because there are informational externalities to each confession. When an agent credibly
confesses to be guilty, he indirectly provides the social planner additional information about
the other agents: the fact that they are likely to be innocent.
In the second chapter, I present a theory which shows how the influence of others
may generate overconfidence. The argument is built on the idea that the more help an
agent receives when performing a task, the less informative the score on that task will be
relative to the agent’s ability to perform it. Overconfident agents, who tend to benefit
from more cooperation opportunities simply because they are perceived to be more skilled,
will remain overconfident because the future signals they will observe will contain very little
information regarding their ability. On the contrary, the scores on tasks that underconfident
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agents receive will be more informative, which will help them learn their true ability faster.
Finally, in the third chapter, I compare two different systems of provision of discrete
public goods: a centralized system, ruled by a benevolent dictator who has no commitment
power; and an anarchic system, based on voluntary contributions, where there is no ruler. If
the public good is binary, then the public good provision problem is merely an informational
one. In this environment, I show that the anarchic system can always replicate any outcome
of the centralized system. However, as the number of alternatives available increases, the
classical free riding problem described in Samuelson (1954) emerges. As the classical free
riding problem becomes more important relative to the informational free riding problem,
the centralized system becomes the preferred system of the two.
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CHAPTER 1 : If we Confess our Sins
1.1. Introduction
In this paper, I study how to design a criminal justice system in order to most efficiently
collect the necessary information to identify and appropriately punish those who are guilty
of committing a crime. I consider a scenario where there is a community of N agents and
a principal who is thought of as some kind of planner of benevolent decision maker. She
is responsible for administering criminal justice, which means that, whenever there is a
suspicion that a crime has been committed, it is her responsibility to select whom to punish
and the extent of that punishment. In a perfect world, she would punish only agents who
are guilty of committing the crime but, of course, the problem is that the principal does
not know who is guilty and who is innocent. And, knowing that the principal is interested
in punishing those agents who are guilty makes them reluctant to announce their guilt. I
study the principal’s problem of creating a mechanism that, to the extent that is possible,
punishes those who are guilty while protecting the rights of the innocent.
The traditional solution for this problem is a ”trial system”. In a trial system, if the
principal suspects the crime has been committed, she initiates an investigation aimed at
obtaining evidence. Based on the evidence, the principal forms beliefs about the guilt of
each agent and chooses punishments accordingly. Only agents whose evidence strongly
indicates guilt are punished - agents are punished if they are found to be guilty beyond
”reasonable doubt”. The merit of this system is that the evidence is more likely to point to
guilt if the agent is indeed guilty than if he is not.
In this paper, however, I argue that trial systems are not optimal. There are other
systems which generate a larger social welfare, which will be understood as a weighted
average between society’s desire to punish those who are guilty and to protect those who
are innocent. In particular, the optimal system will be a ”confession inducing system”
(CIS). A CIS has two stages. In the first stage, before the investigation begins, all agents
are given the opportunity to confess the crime, in exchange for a guaranteed punishment
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independent of any evidence which might be gathered in the future. In the second stage, if
necessary, the principal conducts an investigation, and, based on the information gathered,
chooses the punishments, if any, to apply to agents who chose not to confess in the first
stage. It essentially is a trial system preceded by a confession stage. Variants of this
system exist already in American law. The closest system to the one this paper suggests
is ”self-reporting” in environment law. The idea behind self-reporting is that firms which
infringe environmental regulations are able to contact the corresponding law enforcement
authority and self-report this infringement in exchange for a smaller punishment than the
one they would have received if they were later found guilty. Another similar system is
plea bargaining in criminal law, where defendants are given the chance to confess to have
committed the crime in exchange for a reduced sentence.
These type of systems have received quite a lot of attention in the literature on the
economics of crime and law enforcement, which has highlighted some of its advantages.1
This paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, in its approach. Unlike most
of the literature, which performs pairwise comparisons between the trial system and an
alternative system (like plea bargaining or self-reporting), I use some of the techniques from
mechanism design to find the optimal system.2 I believe this is an important contribution in
that it makes unnecessary the pursuit of a better system, at least in the context of my model.
Second, I highlight advantages of these systems which have not been yet been accounted for.
There are two main arguments in favor of CIS’s that are prevalent in the literature. First,
they require less resources - for example, with plea bargaining, which is how more than
97% of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved (Dervan and Edkins (2013)), it
is not necessary to pay all the lawyers, judges and jurors one would have to pay otherwise.3
And second, they reduce risk - for example the risk of seeing those who are guilty escape
unpunished (Grossman and Katz (1983)). I argue that, even if there are no costs and even
1See the related literature section for an overview.
2In an independent work, Siegel and Strulovici (2015) follow a similar approach, which I discuss in more
detail in the related literature section.
3The United States Supreme Court has explicitly encouraged this practice, for example, in Santobello v.
New York (1971), precisely on these grounds.
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if everyone is risk neutral, there are still two advantages to CIS’s. First, in a CIS, the
principal is able to threaten agents who refuse to confess with a harsher punishment than
they would have received in a trial system in the event of a conviction. Second, and most
importantly, CIS’s explore the correlation between the agents’ innocence in that, when an
agent confesses to be guilty, he is also indirectly providing the principal with information
relative to other agents. The following example illustrates these two advantages.
Imagine that, in a small town, there has been a fire which damaged a local forest. The
principal suspects that it might not have been an accident. She has done some investigative
work and has narrowed down her list of suspects to a single agent - agent 1. However, she
remains unsure of whether the agent is indeed guilty, or if the fire was simply an accident.
As a result, she requests that a modern device be sent to her from a different country, which
will allow for the analysis of the residues collected from the forest and will shed light on
what has happened.
Let the continuous random variable θ1 ∈ [0, 1] represent the evidence collected from
analyzing the residues and assume that larger values of θ1 are relatively more likely if agent
1 is guilty. Formally, assume π(θ1|t1=g)π(θ1|t1=i) is strictly increasing, where π (θ1|t1) represents the
probability density function of θ1, conditional on the agent being either guilty (t1 = g) or
innocent (t1 = i). This means that the larger θ1 is, the more likely it is that the fire was
not an accident and that the agent is guilty. For example, if the principal is able to identify
agent 1’s footprint from the collected residues, then θ1 should be large.
In a trial system, the principal waits for the new device to arrive, collects and analyzes
the residues (i.e. observes θ1), forms beliefs about the guilt of the agent and then chooses
whether to punish him. In particular, it seems natural to expect that, in such a system, the
agent receives some normalized punishment of 1 if the principal is sufficiently convinced he
is guilty, and is acquitted otherwise. Therefore, there is going to be a threshold θ1 such that
the agent is convicted if and only if θ1 > θ1 - see Figure 1. This threshold θ1 is endogenous
and represents the standard of proof the principal uses to make his decision. It depends
very much on how concerned the principal is about wrongly punishing innocent agents.
3
Figure 1: The trial system
For concreteness, assume that π
(
θ1 > θ1|t1 = g
)
= 34 and π
(
θ1 > θ1|t1 = i
)
= 12 , which
implies that the expected punishment agent 1 receives, conditional on him being guilty
(denoted by Bg1), is equal to
3
4 , and, conditional on him being innocent (denoted by B
i
1), is
equal to 12 .
Now, assume that the agent is risk neutral and that the principal can commit to punish-
ments, and consider the following alternative. Imagine that, before the new device arrives,
the principal approaches the agent and gives him the opportunity to confess in exchange for
a punishment of 34 . If the agent refuses, then everything is as before - the principal waits
for the device to arrive and punishes the agent in 1 if and only θ1 > θ1. The punishment
of 34 is chosen exactly to make the agent indifferent when guilty, giving him just enough
incentives to confess, while, if innocent he prefers not to. Therefore, in this alternative CIS,
the agent’s expected punishment is the same as in the trial system regardless of whether
he is innocent or guilty. This equivalence is what led Kaplow and Shavell (1994) to argue
for the superiority of CIS’s with respect to trial systems on the grounds that the latter uses
less resources - if the agent confesses the crime there is no need to collect evidence. In this
paper, because I assume there are no costs of any nature, these two systems are considered
equivalent.
I now show that it is further possible to create a new CIS which reduces the expected
punishment of an innocent agent (reduces Bi1) while keeping the guilty agent’s punishment
constant (Bg1 =
3
4). I do this by increasing the standard of proof from θ1 to θ̂1, where θ̂1 is
such that π
(
θ1 > θ̂1|t1 = g
)
= 12 and π
(
θ1 > θ̂1|t1 = i
)
= 14 , so that if the agent chooses
not to confess, he is less likely to be punished. The problem with this change is that, when
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the agent is guilty, he no longer prefers to confess. So, one must increase the second stage
punishment, in order to provide him with just enough incentives to confess. It follows that,
if θ1 > θ̂1, the agent should receive a punishment of
3
2 (because
3
2 ∗
1
2 =
3
4) if he has not
confessed in the first stage - see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Second stage punishments of the new CIS
In this new CIS, Bgn =
3
4 because the agent is confessing the crime when guilty, but
Bin =
3
8 <
1
2 , i.e. the agent is made better off only when innocent. This happens because of
the monotone likelihood ratio property of θ1. When one increases the threshold from θ1 to
θ̂1, the relative impact of this change is higher if the agent is innocent than if he is guilty.
In particular, the probability of conviction if the agent is innocent is reduced by 50% (from
1
2 to
1
4), while if the agent is guilty it is only reduced by 33% (from
3
4 to
1
2). Therefore,
when the second stage punishment is increased to make the agent indifferent when guilty,
it is small enough for the agent to be made better off when innocent.
Notice that this method is only possible if the principal is allowed to ”overpunish”, i.e.
to punish an agent in more than the maximum punishment administered in the trial system.
However, it seems questionable to me whether it is desirable or even possible to construct
a system which enforces arbitrarily large punishments. Take, as an example, the crime of
arson. If the fire in question did not injure anyone and only caused material damage, it
does not seem reasonable to me to expect that a system which inflicts a punishment of, say,
50 years of imprisonment or worse on the agent is going to be accepted by society. This
is even more true for crimes of lesser importance, like minor theft. Suppose one does not
allow the principal to overpunish and imposes an upper bound of 1 to all punishments. Is it
still the case that there are CIS’s that are strictly preferred to any trial system? In general,
the answer is yes, provided there are at least two agents.
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Consider the same arson example, but at an earlier stage. In particular, imagine the
principal has just witnessed the fire. At this moment, the principal cannot rule out anyone
from the community as being guilty as she has yet to collect any evidence. She simply
believes that there is some probability a crime has been committed and that each agent in
the community might be guilty.
If the principal implements a trial system, she collects all the available evidence, and
then chooses how to punish all agents. Consider the following alternative. Before initiating
the investigation, the principal gives agent 1 the opportunity to confess in exchange for a
constant punishment which, if guilty, leaves him indifferent between confessing and refusing
to confess. After agent 1 has chosen to either confess or not, the principal initiates an
investigation aimed at producing evidence, which is used to select the punishments of all
other agents (as well as agent 1 if he has chosen not to confess). As described above, in this
new mechanism, agent 1 only confesses when guilty, and his expected punishment is kept
intact, regardless of whether he is guilty or not. But now consider what happens to the
remaining agents. When judging each of the other agents, the principal will have collected
the same evidence as under the trial system, but now, will also be informed of whether agent
1 is guilty or innocent - he is guilty if he chose to confess and innocent otherwise. Therefore,
the decision the principal makes with respect to the other agents is more accurate, as she
has more relevant information. For example, imagine that, by the nature of the crime,
the principal believes that there is at most one guilty person. In this case, a confession by
agent 1 leaves the principal very certain that the other agents are innocent, and so she is
less likely to make the mistake of punishing them. In other words, there are informational
externalities to an agent’s confession. By reporting to be guilty an agent is not only making
a statement regarding his own guilt, but he is also saying that the other agents are likely
to be innocent. Even though this is not the optimal alternative - in the optimal CIS every
agent is given the opportunity to confess - it illustrates the shortcomings of the trial system
and highlights the informational benefits of allowing agents to confess to have committed
the crime before an investigation has been initiated.
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Implicit in this argument is that the information each agent holds (whether they are
innocent or guilty) is important in evaluating others’ guilt - the agents’ innocence is corre-
lated. This assumption is usually well accepted for a certain set of crimes, which are likely
to be committed by an organized group - for example, in anti-collusion legislation, because
each cartel member is likely to have information about the other cartel members, it is often
possible for them to confess their guilt in exchange for a smaller punishment. What the
example illustrates is that the same argument can be used for the majority of the ”normal”
crimes, because, in each of these, the knowledge that a given agent is guilty is likely to
be informative with respect to the innocence of others. While for most crimes the guilt of
the agents is negatively correlated (so that, if the principal knows that one of the agents
is guilty, she is more likely to believe that the other agents are innocent) it is also easy
to think of crimes where there is positive correlation. For example, a firm’s confession of
having reported a smaller profit when filling out the previous year’s tax returns, in order to
pay less taxes, might inform the principal that other firms in the same sector might have
followed a similar practice. Therefore, I believe this informational argument is quite broad
and applies to most crimes. Notice also that, for such an argument to follow, it is necessary
that there are multiple agents - multiple people who could have conceivably committed
the crime. This is always going to be the case if the opportunity to confess is given early
enough in the criminal process, when everyone is a suspect, which is something that a sys-
tem like self-reporting accomplishes by granting the initiative to confess to the agents. By
contrast, in plea bargaining, it is the prosecutor who, further along in the criminal process,
approaches the generally single agent to seek a confession, which negates this informational
advantage, as there cannot be information externalities if one is considering a single agent.
In the first part of the paper, I conduct my analysis under the assumption that the
principal has commitment power. In the optimal CIS, the principal uses her commitment
power to i) impose small punishments on knowingly guilty agents (the ones who confess),
and ii) punish knowingly innocent agents (the ones who refuse to confess). Assumption ii) is
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particularly problematic to me in that it causes a disconnection between what the principal
would prefer to do at the trial stage and what the mechanism asks her to do. In particular,
simply by observing the agent has chosen not to confess, the principal is able to infer he is
likely to be innocent. And yet, the mechanism requires the principal to ignore this belief
and punish the agent if the evidence is sufficiently high. Because of this, in the second part
of the paper, I consider the principal’s problem when she has limited commitment power.
I consider two cases.
First, I consider the class of renegotiation proof mechanisms, where only i) is permitted.
I call these mechanisms renegotiation proof because if the principal is supposed to punish an
agent she knows is innocent, both her and the agent would have an incentive to renegotiate
such punishment, as they would both prefer a smaller one. In this setup, I show that CIS’s
are still optimal - they are preferred to any other renegotiation proof mechanism. However,
this new CIS is markedly different than the one with commitment power in that it no
longer completely separates guilty from innocent agents. If only innocent agents refused
to confess, then the principal would know they were innocent and would choose to acquit
them. But, in that case, there would be no reason for guilty agents to confess. Hence, the
optimal renegotiation proof CIS will be semi-separating: a fraction of guilty agents refuses
to confess so that it is possible that either innocent or guilty agents end up convicted at the
second stage trial. Nevertheless, even though the principal has less commitment power, it
is still the case that this CIS is strictly preferred to the trial system, which shows that the
superiority of CIS’s with respect to trial systems does not depend on assumption ii).
Second, I consider sequentially optimal mechanisms, where the principal has no com-
mitment power and so neither i) nor ii) are permitted. In this setup, I show it is not possible
to improve upon the trial system as confessions are no longer sustainable because an agent
who is revealed to be guilty is shown no leniency.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I analyze the related literature.
In section 3, I present the model. In section 4, as a benchmark, I formalize the trial
system. In section 5, I analyze the second best problem: I look for a Bayes-Nash incentive
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compatible allocation which maximizes the principal’s utility when the agents’ innocence is
private information and the principal has commitment power. In section 6, I restrict the
set of possible allocations to the ones which can be implemented through a) a renegotiation
proof mechanism and b) a sequentially optimal mechanism. In section 7, I consider four
extensions to the model. In the first one, I allow for risk averse agents and show that CIS’s
are still optimal even when innocent agents are more risk averse than guilty agents. In
the second extension, I allow for a richer information structure which takes into account
the fact that guilty agents might be a part of a conspiracy. In the third extension, I allow
for some additional privately observed heterogeneity among the agents. And, finally, in the
fourth extension, I consider a change in the timing of the model and assume the principal
is only able to propose a mechanism after gaining knowledge about the evidence. In section
8, I conclude.
1.2. Related Literature
There is a considerable amount of literature in economics that argues for the use of variants
of CIS’s in law enforcement. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) add a stage, where agents can
confess to be guilty, to a standard model of negative externalities and argue that this
improves the social welfare because it saves monitoring costs. By setting the punishment
after a confession to be equal to the expected punishment of not confessing, the law enforcer
is able to deter crime to the same extent as he was without the confession stage, but without
having to monitor the confessing agents.
Grossman and Katz (1983) discuss the role of plea bargaining in reducing the amount
of risk in the criminal justice system. The argument is that, by letting guilty agents confess
and punishing them with the corresponding certainty equivalent punishment of going to
trial, the principal reduces the risk of acquitting guilty agents.
In an independent work, Siegel and Strulovici (2015) consider a setting with a risk averse
principal and a single risk averse agent and analyze alternatives to the traditional criminal
trial procedure, where agents are either convicted or acquitted. The authors demonstrate
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that there is a welfare gain in increasing the number of verdicts an agent can receive: so,
for example, a verdict of ”not proven” in addition to the traditional verdicts of ”guilty”
and ”not guilty”. The paper also considers plea bargaining, interpreting a guilty plea as a
special type of a third verdict that agents can choose, and show it is uniquely optimal in
such a setup.
The main difference between these papers and mine is that the argument I make about
the optimality of CIS’s does not depend on the agents or the principal being risk averse
(as, at least in main text, these are assumed to be risk neutral) nor on them being cheaper
(as there are no costs in my paper), but, rather on the fact that CIS’s a) explore the
correlation between the agents’ innocence and b) provide the opportunity for the principal
to overpunish in order to induce confessions.4
A feature common to these papers is that they have assumed that the law enforcer has
commitment power. There have been different articles, particularly in the plea bargaining
literature, that have discussed the implications of limiting that commitment power. Baker
and Mezzetti (2001) assume that the prosecutors are able to choose how much effort to
put into gathering evidence about the crime, after having given the opportunity for the
defendant to confess. Given that the prosecutors have no commitment power, in equilibrium,
only some guilty agents will choose to confess, while the remaining ones (alongside the
innocents) will not. This is because, if all guilty agents confessed, there would be no incentive
for the prosecutor to exert any effort, which, in turn, would induce the guilty agents not to
confess. This type of equilibrium is a common occurrence when limited commitment power
is assumed - see for example Kim (2010), Franzoni (1999) or Bjerk (2007). In section 6, I
consider the implications of reducing the principal’s commitment power and find that the
4Grossman and Katz (1983) mention a related effect associated with plea bargaining that they call
”screening effect” - given that only guilty agents plead guilty, the prosecutor is able to distinguish them
from the innocent agents. However, such distinction ends up being irrelevant in their model as this effect
has no welfare impact when there is only one agent (as I show in section 5). Even though the guilty agents
are identified, they are still punished as harshly as they would have been if there was no interaction between
them and the principal. The only welfare effect that exists in the environment of Grossman and Katz (1983)
is due to the relation with risk that both the principal and the agents have.
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optimal mechanism has this same feature: in equilibrium a fraction of guilty agents prefers
not to confess.
A key aspect of my argument has to do with the fact that the principal deals with
different agents whose types (their innocence) may not be independent. There are a few
articles on law enforcement which have also considered multiple defendants, but the em-
phasis is not on distinguishing the innocent agents from the guilty ones, but rather to find
the optimal strategy in order to achieve maximum punishment for the defendants, as they
are all assumed to be guilty - for example Kim (2009), Bar-Gill and Ben Shahar (2009)
and Kobayashi (1992). There is also a literature on industrial organization that considers
the design of leniency programs in Antitrust law which also considers multiple agents - see
Spagnolo (2006) for a literature review.
In terms of the methodology, the environment studied in this paper is characterized
by the fact that there is a single type of good denominated ”punishment”. The allocation
of that good has implications not only to the agents but also to the principal’s expected
utility. There is some literature on mechanism design which considers similar environments
by assuming that the principal cannot rely on transfer payments. In these environments,
because the principal is deprived of an important instrument in satisfying incentive com-
patibility, it is necessary to find other ways of screening the different types of agents. One
such way is to create hurdles in the mechanism that only some types are willing to go
through. For example, Banerjee (1997), in solving the government’s problem of assigning a
number of goods to a larger number of candidates with private valuations, argues that, if
these candidates are wealth constrained, it is efficient to make them go trough ”red tape”,
in order to guarantee that those who value the good the most end up getting it. In Lewis
and Sappington (2000), the seller of a productive resource uses the share of the project it
keeps in its possession as a tool to screen between high and low skilled operators which are
wealth-constrained. Another approach is to assume the principal is able to verify the report
provided by the agents. This is the case, for example, of Ben-Porath, Dekel and Lipman
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(2014) and Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk (2014), where it is assumed that this verification
is costly but always accurate. This paper’s approach is the latter. The principal is able to
imperfectly and costlessly verify the agents’ claims through evidence and by combining the
reports from multiple agents.5
1.3. Model
There are N agents and a principal. Each agent n randomly draws a type tn ∈ {i, g} ≡
Tn, which is his private information - each agent n is either innocent (i) or guilty (g) of
committing the crime. Let T = {Tn}Nn=1 be the set of all possible vectors of agents’ types
and T−n = {Tj}j 6=n be the set of all possible vectors of types of agents other than n, so that
if t ∈ T , then t−n = (t1, ..., tn−1, tn+1, ..., tN ) ∈ T−n. The ex-ante probability that vector t
is realized is denoted by π (t) > 0 for all t ∈ T and assumed to be common knowledge.
This description implicitly assumes that each agent knows only whether he is innocent
or guilty, and has no other relevant information about other agents’ innocence. Thus, it
rules out crimes which are likely to have been committed by an organized group of agents
(conspiracy crimes). For example, imagine that agents 1 and 2 rob a bank together. It
would be very likely that agent 1 would know that both him and agent 2 are guilty of
committing the crime. In section 7.2., I extend the model in order to consider this type
of information structure and show that the same intuition carries through. In particular,
the optimal system can be interpreted as an ”extended” CIS, where each agent is given the
opportunity to incriminate other agents when confessing.
After t has been drawn, each agent n is randomly assigned an evidence level θn ∈ [0, 1].
Let Θn = [0, 1] and Θ = {Θn}Nn=1 denote the set of all possible evidence vectors, while Θ−n
denotes the set of all possible evidence vectors that exclude only agent n’s evidence level.
5Midjord (2013) also considers a setup without transfers where the principal is able to imperfectly and
costlessly verify the agents’ reports through evidence. The main theoretical difference to this paper is
that the author does not investigate the optimal mechanism under the assumption that the principal has
commitment power.
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The evidence vector θ is made of exogenous signals correlated with the agents’ guilt and is
interpreted as the product of a criminal investigation.
I assume that each θn only depends on agent n’s innocence - θn|tn is independent of
t−n - and denote the conditional probability density function (pdf) of θn by π (θn|tn), while
the joint conditional pdf of θ given t is denoted by π (θ|t) =
N∏
n=1
π (θn|tn). (For expositional
purposes, I have abused notation by using π to represent probability measures over different
spaces, but this will lead to no confusion).
Even though I have assumed that each agent n generates its own signal θn, this does not
mean that every agent in the community is personally investigated. For example, gathering
evidence can be checking for fingerprints near the crime scene. Even if the fingerprints of
agent n are not found, this information is still contained in θn. Also, the assumption of
conditional independence of θn|tn is mostly made out of expositional simplicity as no result
depends on it. In particular, notice that it does not imply that θn is independent of θ−n.
Let l (θn) =
π(θn|tn=g)
π(θn|tn=i) be the evidence likelihood ratio. I assume that l is differentiable
and strictly increasing. This implies that the larger the realized θn is, the more likely it is
that agent n is guilty. I also assume that limθn→0 l (θn) = 0 and limθn→1 l (θn) =∞, which
means that, as long as the principal is not completely certain of agent n’s guilt, there is
always some evidence level θn that changes his mind - there is always some θn such that
the posterior probability of guilt can be made arbitrarily close to either 0 or 1.
I assume that each agent n’s utility is given by ua (xn) = −xn, where xn ∈ R+ rep-
resents the punishment agent n receives - it could be time in prison, community service
time, physical punishment or a monetary fine. Each agent simply wants to minimize the
punishments inflicted upon him. I make the assumption that agents are risk neutral in
order to distinguish my argument from the one, for example, of Grossman and Katz (1983)
(which I discuss in the related literature section), where the advantage of CIS’s relative to
trial systems comes from the fact that agents are risk averse. In one of the extensions, in
section 7.1, I analyze the case where agents are allowed to be risk averse and show that
CIS’s are still optimal, even when innocent agents are more risk averse than guilty ones.
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As for the principal, she is thought of as a sort of social planner or benevolent deci-
sion maker and her preferences are supposed to represent society’s preferences. Her utility
depends not only on the punishment she inflicts but also on whether the agent who re-
ceives it is innocent or guilty. I assume that the principal’s utility function is given by
up (t, x) =
N∑
n=1
upn (tn, xn) for all t ∈ T and x = (x1, .., xN ) ∈ RN+ , where u
p
n (tn, xn) = −αxn if tn = i− |1− xn| if tn = g with α > 0.
If agent n is innocent, the principal prefers to acquit him, while if he is guilty, the
principal prefers to punish him to the extent of the crime, which I normalize to 1. In either
case, deviations from the preferred punishment induce a linear cost to the principal.6 This
punishment of 1 that ”fits the crime” is exogenous to the model and is likely to be influenced
by the nature of the crime - the punishment that fits the crime of murder is larger than the
punishment that fits the crime of minor theft. As it will be become clear in section 4, this
will be the punishment imposed in the trial system when the agent is found guilty. The
parameter α captures the potentially different weights that these interests may have - α is
large if the principal is more concerned with wrongly punishing innocent agent and is small
if she is more concerned with wrongly acquitting guilty agents.
Notice that, at first blush, it might appear as though the assumed principal’s preferences
are too restrictive, in that they apparently ignore one of the most important goals of any
criminal justice system: to deter crime. In particular, if the goal of the principal was to
deter crime, she should want to maximize
{
Bgn −Bin
}
- the difference between the expected
punishment when the agent is guilty and when he is innocent. In section 5, I address
this observation in detail and argue that these deterring preferences can be thought of as a
special case of the preferences I have assumed, by considering a particular α which is chosen
in an appropriate way.7
6Grossman and Katz (1983) also assume that there is a punishment that fits the crime. The only
difference is that they assume a strictly concave cost upon deviations rather than a linear one. An alternative
assumption would be to have the principal simply maximize the punishment imposed on guilty agents rather
than having a bliss punishment, in which case my main results would still hold.
7See Figure 4 and the subsequent discussion.
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Finally, notice that, under complete information and for any α, the first best allocation
xFB =
(
xFB1 , ..., x
FB
N
)
is given by
xFBn =
 1 if tn = g0 if tn = i for all n
1.4. Trial System
I define the trial system as a system where there is no communication between the principal
and the agents. The principal simply makes punishment decisions after having collected
all the evidence, and imposes those punishments upon the agents, who do not have any
active role. Let XTr =
{
x : Θ→ RN+
}
be the set of all possible allocations which are
implementable through a trial system. In the optimal trial system, the principal chooses an
allocation from XTr in order to maximize her ex-ante expected utility, which is given by
V (x) =
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t∈T
π (t, θ)up (t, x) dθ
where π (t, θ) = π (θ|t)π (t).
Notice that V (x) =
N∑
n=1
Vn (xn) where
Vn (xn) =
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t∈T
π (t, θ)upn (tn, xn) dθ
Therefore, it follows that the choice of the optimal x ∈ XTr consists of N independent
choices of xn that each maximize Vn (xn). Realizing that a punishment higher than 1 is not
optimal and further simplifications allows for writing Vn (xn) as
∫
θ∈Θ
(π (tn = g|θ)− απ (tn = i|θ))π (θ)xn (θ) dθ − k (1.1)
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where k is some constant, independent of xn, π (θ) =
∑
t∈T
π (t, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ and represents
the marginal pdf of θ and π (tn|θ) is the conditional probability of agent n being of type tn
given the realized evidence vector θ.
Condition (1.1) displays the simple basis for the principal’s decision in a trial system.
If π (tn = g|θ) > απ (tn = i|θ), the principal is convinced enough that agent n is likely to
be guilty, given the evidence presented, and will prefer to inflict a punishment of 1 upon
him. If not, the principal believes agent n is likely to be innocent, and will acquit him. In
this context, parameter α is a measure of the standard of proof - if α is large, the evidence
must be largely indicative of guilt for the agent to be convicted.
Denote the optimal trial solution by xTr. Given the monotone likelihood ratio property
assumed on the evidence, it is possible to describe xTr as
xTrn (θ) =
 1 if θn > θ
Tr
n (θ−n)
0 otherwise
for all n
where θTrn (θ−n) is completely characterized in Proposition 1. The principal follows a thresh-
old rule, where she convicts the agent if and only if his evidence level θn is above such
threshold.
Proposition 1 θTrn (θ−n) = l
−1
α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π(i,t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π(θñ|tñ)∑
t−n∈T−n
π(g,t−n)
∏
ñ6=n
π(θñ|tñ)

Proof. See appendix.
The threshold θTrn (θ−n) depends on θ−n and so the decision about the conviction/acquittal
of agent n is not independent of the evidence of other agents. This is because agents’ types
might be correlated and each agent’s evidence level is informative of that agent’s type.
1.5. Second Best Problem
In this section, I analyze the problem the principal faces of constructing an optimal system,
under the assumption that she has commitment power. I assume that, before any evidence is
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generated, but after agents have gained knowledge of their own type, the principal proposes
a mechanism. So, in terms of the example, I analyze the principal’s problem when she first
witnesses the fire, and has yet to gather any evidence.8 From the revelation principle (see,
for example, Myerson (1979)), it follows that it is enough to focus on revelation mechanisms
that induce truthful reporting in order to maximize the principal’s expected utility.
In this context, an allocation is a mapping from the agents’ types and their evidence
level to the punishments that each of them will be given. Let XSB =
{
x : T ×Θ→ RN+
}
be
the set of all such allocations. An allocation x ∈ XSB is (Bayes-Nash) incentive compatible
if and only if, for all tn ∈ Tn, for all t−n ∈ T−n and for all n,
−
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t∈T
π (t, θ|tn)xn (tn, t−n, θ) dθ ≥ −
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t∈T
π (t, θ|tn)xn
(
t′n, t−n, θ
)
dθ for all t′n ∈ Tn
(IC)
where π (t, θ|tn) represents the conditional joint pdf of (t, θ), given tn.
The condition states that, prior to the discovery of the evidence and given allocation
x, the expected utility of type tn of agent n is higher if he reports truthfully than if he
misreports, when all other agents are also reporting truthfully.
I impose an additional condition on the incentive compatible allocations: an upper
bound of φ ≥ 1 on each punishment, i.e.
xn (t, θ) ≤ φ for all t, θ and for all n (UB)
This upper bound is meant to complement the principal’s preferences stated above.
What the condition means is that it is so undesirable for a society to punish agents too
harshly that it just will not allow it. Imagine the crime that one is referring to is theft
and that society finds that a one year of imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for
guilty agents. It is not reasonable to expect that society will accept that any agent accused
of theft ends up convicted by, say, ten years. In fact, an argument can be made that the
8In one of the extensions, in section 7.4, I consider a different time frame, where the principal only
proposes the mechanism after privately observing the evidence.
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highest punishment a society is willing to accept in such cases is exactly one year. With
this last observation in mind, I give special attention to the case of φ = 1 below.
The problem I wish to solve is that of selecting an allocation from XSB that maximizes
V , subject to (IC) and (UB). As in the previous section, because it is possible to write
V (x) =
∑
n=1
Vn (xn), the problem of finding the optimal allocation can be made into N
independent problems where, for each n, xn is chosen to maximize Vn (xn), subject to agent
n’s incentive and upper bound constraints.
There are two earlier remarks that are important to characterize the optimal allocation.
First, the innocent’s incentive constraint does not bind and, therefore, can be disregarded.
To see this, consider the problem where the innocent’s incentive constraint is disregarded.
The solution of that problem must still satisfy the disregarded incentive constraint for if
it did not, the principal could set the punishments that follow an innocent report to equal
those which follow a guilty report. This new allocation would be incentive compatible (as
it would not depend on the agent’s own report) and would strictly increase the expected
utility of the principal (because it would strictly decrease the expected punishment of the
innocent agent).
Second, punishments imposed on guilty agents never exceed 1. Increasing the punish-
ments on guilty agents to more than 1 decreases the principal’s expected utility and does
not give more incentives for guilty agents to report truthfully, quite the opposite.
These two remarks allow Vn to be written as
π (tn = g)B
g
n − απ (tn = i)Bin − k (1.2)
where π (tn) =
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (tn, t−n) is the probability that agent n is of type tn and B
tn
n
represents the expected punishment of agent n, when he is of type tn.
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The remaining incentive constraint can be written as
Bgn ≤
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
xn (i, t−n, θ) dθ (1.3)
From (1.2) and (1.3), it follows that it is optimal to set xn (g, t−n, θ) = B
g
n for all
t−n ∈ T−n and θ ∈ Θ - if the agent is guilty, he is to receive a constant punishment. This
is because both (1.2) and (1.3) only depend on Bgn and not on how the guilty punishments
are distributed.
There is one last remark that simplifies the problem. In any solution, the guilty agent
is indifferent between reporting his guilt and lying and reporting to be innocent. The
reason is that if he is not indifferent and strictly prefers to report truthfully, the principal
could reduce the punishments imposed upon innocent reports and still have an incentive
compatible allocation. Therefore, in an optimal solution, (1.3) must hold with equality. By
plugging (1.3) into (1.2), it is possible to write the new objective function of the principal
solely as a function of the punishments to be imposed on the innocent type. In particular, the
principal’s simplified nth agent problem is to choose xn (i, t−n, θ) ∈ [0, φ] for all t−n ∈ T−n
and θ ∈ Θ, in order to maximize
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t−n∈T−n
(π (g, t−n, θ)− π (i, t−n, θ))xn (i, t−n, θ) dθ − k (1.4)
subject to ∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
xn (i, t−n, θ) dθ ≤ 1 (1.5)
Condition (1.5) simply states that Bgn, which is equal to the left hand side of (1.5) by
(1.3), does not exceed 1, given that it is not optimal to overpunish guilty agents.
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The case of φ = 1
I believe the case of φ = 1 deserves special attention. If φ > 1, this means that it
is possible for the principal to impose punishments that are above what she would deem
appropriate if she knew the agent was guilty. As I discuss in more detail below, the principal
will be able to use this ability to overpunish in order to improve the quality of the allocation.
However, it is highly debatable whether the principal is (or should be) able to impose such
high punishments. This practice is reminiscent of alleged prosecutor strategies of inflating
the severity of the accusations to persuade defendants to accept plea deals in criminal
cases. Such a practice has been widely condemned (see White (1979) or Scott and Stuntz
(1992)) precisely on the basis that punishments above what are deemed appropriate are
not acceptable. This case is also interesting because, as I show below, when the principal
has limited commitment power, she will no longer be able to impose punishments that are
larger than 1.
If φ = 1, constraint (1.5) does not bind. This is because, if all innocent punishments
are bounded by 1, its weighted average must also be bounded by 1. Therefore, it follows
directly from (1.4) that the optimal punishment to be inflicted upon an innocent agent is 1
if
π (tn = g|t−n, θ) > απ (tn = i|t−n, θ) (1.6)
and 0 otherwise, where, for simplicity, I assume ties are broken in favor of an acquittal.
As for the punishments to be imposed on guilty agents, the only condition necessary
is that the expected punishment of a guilty agent leaves him indifferent to misreporting.
If φ = 1, there are several allocations that accomplish this. The particular allocation this
paper is interested in is one where, if an agent reports to be guilty, he receives a constant
punishment. This allocation is important because it can be implemented by a CIS as follows.
In the first stage, all agents are simultaneously given the opportunity to confess. If agent
n confesses, he is to receive a constant punishment of Bgn ∈ [0, 1]. If he refuses, he proceeds
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to the second stage, where he is to be punished according to condition (1.6). The optimal
allocation is implemented by having guilty agents confess and innocent agents refusing to.
Proposition 2 If φ = 1, there is a CIS that implements a second best optimal allocation.
CIS’s are appealing, within the set of optimal systems, for a number of reasons. First,
they are simple. The only requirement is that each agent has the opportunity to confess the
crime, which means that the majority of agents, who are likely to be innocent, have a passive
role in the system. Second, they are cheaper. In a CIS, if an agent confesses, his punishment
is independent of the evidence that might be collected, unlike in any other optimal system.
This means that the costs of collecting and analyzing the evidence are reduced. And finally,
variants of CIS’s already exist under a variety of forms, like self-reporting regulation in
environmental law and plea bargaining in criminal law.
Recall that, in a trial system, an agent has no other choice but to go to trial and be
punished if π (tn = g|θ) > απ (tn = i|θ), i.e. if, given the evidence, the principal believes he
is likely to be guilty. In a CIS, an agent may choose whether to go to (the second stage) trial
or not. If he chooses to go to trial, he is punished if π (tn = g|t−n, θ) > απ (tn = i|t−n, θ).
This means that the second stage trial that is a part of the CIS is more accurate than
the trial system. While in the trial system the principal only uses the evidence gathered to
evaluate the guilt of the agent, in a CIS, in addition to the evidence, the principal is informed
of whether other agents are guilty. This information is, in general, relevant. For example,
in a case where the principal is convinced that there is at most one guilty agent, observing
a confession informs the principal that all other agents are very likely to be innocent. If
all agents actually chose to go to the second stage trial in the CIS, this observation would
be enough to find it strictly preferred to the trial system. But that is not the case as,
in equilibrium, guilty agents choose to confess the crime. However, these guilty agents
are made indifferent between confessing and refusing to. So their punishment is indirectly
determined by those second stage trial punishments. In that sense, it is as if every agent’s
punishment is determined by the second stage trial, which leads to the conclusion that, in
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general, the trial system is not optimal.
Proposition 3 If φ = 1, the trial system is second best optimal if and only if the agents’
types are independent.
The following example illustrates the insufficiencies of the trial system when the agents’
types are not independent.
Example. Suppose that N = 2 and that the prior distribution of guilt is symmetric
and given by the following table:
Table 1: Prior Distribution of Guilt
tn = i tn = g
t−n = i
1+ρ
4
1−ρ
4
t−n = g
1−ρ
4
1+ρ
4
The parameter ρ ∈ [−1, 1] determines whether there is negative or positive correlation
between the agents’ types. In particular, if ρ < 0 then π (tn = g|t−n = i) > π (tn = g|t−n = g)
and so there is negative correlation, while if ρ > 0 the opposite happens and there is positive
correlation.
Assume further that π (θn|tn = i) = 2 (1− θn), π (θn|tn = g) = 2θn and α = 1.
In the optimal trial system, any given agent n is punished in 1 if π (tn = g|θ) > 12 and
is acquitted otherwise. It then follows that agent n is punished if and only if
θn > θ
Tr
n (θ−n) ≡
1
2
+ ρ
(
1
2
− θ−n
)
The impact that θ−n has on θ
Tr
n depends very much on how correlated the agents’ types are.
Suppose that θ−n is large. This means that it is likely that t−n = g. If there is negative
correlation ( ρ < 0) it follows that agent n is likely to be innocent and so θTrn is larger than
1
2 . If, on the contrary, there is positive correlation ( ρ > 0) then agent n is more likely to
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be guilty and θTrn is smaller than
1
2 . This implies that
Bin =
1
4
− 1
12
ρ2
while
Bgn =
1
12
ρ2 +
3
4
and so
V Trn =
1
12
ρ2 − 1
4
The trial solution is better if there is more correlation because, in that case, θ−n is more
informative and enables the principal to make more accurate decisions.
Now consider the optimal CIS. If agent n decides to go to trial, the standard of proof
will depend on the decision of the other agent. In particular, it will be the case that, if the
other agent chooses to go to trial, then agent n is punished if and only if
θn > θ
SB
n (t−n = i) ≡
1 + ρ
2
while, if the other agent confesses, then agent n is punished if and only if
θn > θ
SB
n (t−n = g) ≡
1− ρ
2
If the other agent is innocent and chooses to go to trial, then agent n is more likely to be
guilty if there is negative correlation ( ρ < 0). As a result, the standard of proof is reduced.
If, on the contrary, there is positive correlation ( ρ > 0), then the standard of proof is
increased. The opposite happens when the other agent is guilty and chooses to confess. This
implies that
Bin =
1
4
− 1
4
ρ2
while
Bgn =
3
4
+
1
4
ρ2
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and so
V SBn =
1
4
ρ2 − 1
4
Just like in the trial system, more correlation is beneficial for the principal, because it allows
her to select punishments that are more accurate. However, this benefit is magnified in the
CIS, because it is more effective in using the information provided by the other agent. In a
CIS, the second stage punishments are determined by the other agent’s type, while, in the
trial system, they are determined by the other agent’s evidence level. In particular, notice
that as ρ converges to either 1 or −1 (as the correlation becomes perfect), the expected
utility of the principal approaches the first best (V SBn converges to 0).
Figure 3 compares V Trn and V
SB
n for different values of ρ.
Figure 3: The orange and blue curves represent V Trn and V
SB
n respectively, as a function of
ρ
There is one interesting property of any optimal allocation that I believe is worth
emphasizing. Notice that condition (1.6) represents the optimal decision regarding agent n
that the principal is able to make, given the information provided by all other agents and the
evidence she is to collect. The principal obtains this information from the agents through
the promise that a confession does not increase the agent’s expected punishment. In other
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words, a guilty agent chooses to confess because he knows that this piece of information he
provides (the fact that he is guilty) will not be used against him when determining what
punishment he is to receive. So, in a way, the optimal allocation is in contrast with the
American criminal law practice of the Miranda warnings, or, at least, with the part where
an agent is told that everything he says might be used against him in court. According to
this analysis, the principal should be doing the exact opposite: she should be providing a
guarantee that she will not use this information against the agent, which, ironically enough,
in the current legislation, is actually achieved by purposefully not reading the Miranda
warnings. This feature is even more important when agents have additional information
about the crime, which I study in section 7.2.
For each α, let xSB (α) denote the optimal second best allocation that is implemented
by a CIS. In Figure 4, I display how the parameter α influences the expected punishment of
any given agent under xSB. Recall that α measures how important it is for the principal not
to punish innocent agents, relative to her desire to punish guilty agents. If α = 0, there is no
concern with protecting innocent agents and, as a result, each agent is punished regardless
of evidence. As α becomes larger, the expected punishment of innocent agents becomes
smaller, which necessarily implies that the the expected punishments of guilty agents must
also become smaller, for, otherwise, they would prefer to misreport. If α becomes large
enough, the expected punishment of the agent converges to 0, regardless of whether he is
innocent or guilty.
One of the differences from this paper to others in the Law and Economics literature
is that I do not explicitly model the agents’ decision of committing the crime.9 In my
analysis, I assume the crime has been committed already and the randomness of the agents’
innocence (vector t) simply reflects the fact that the principal does not know the identity of
the criminals. This description might leave the reader with the impression that my analysis
does not consider the deterrence role that a criminal justice system is supposed to have. In
9See Garoupa (1997) for several of these examples.
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Figure 4: The green and red lines represent the expected punishment of a given agent when
innocent and guilty respectively as a function of α.
particular, the assumed utility function of the principal does not directly take into account
the concern the principal should have of deterring crime. Figure 4 is particularly useful in
that it allows me to address these concerns in a clear way.
Notice that Figure 4 identifies the set of ”second-best efficient” points: for each expected
punishment of the innocent agents (Bi), Figure 4 identifies the highest possible expected
punishment the guilty agents might be given in any allocation (Bg). So, for example, if the
principal’s goal is to find an allocation that maximizes Bg subject to Bi ≤ B̂i, the answer is
xSB (α̂), which results in Bg = B̂g. This is because, if there was some other allocation with a
higher Bg but the same Bi, that would be the optimal allocation under the preferences that
I have assumed in this paper, when α = α̂. Therefore, all preferences of the sort ”maximize
Bg subject to Bi” can be mapped into a given α and fall under my analysis. But now
consider what the best way of deterring crime would be. If the principal wants to decrease
the incentives to commit a crime, she should maximize the difference between the expected
punishment that a guilty agent is to receive and that of an innocent - it should maximize{
Bg −Bi
}
. It then follows, from Figure 4, that the allocation that maximizes
{
Bg −Bi
}
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is xSB (α). Therefore, the case of a principal with deterrence concerns is a special case of
my model, characterized by α = α.10
The role of φ
Recall that the optimal punishment the principal wishes to impose on a guilty agent is
1. Therefore, the parameter φ can be interpreted as measuring the ability the principal has
to ”overpunish” the agent. It is easy to see that this ability increases the expected utility
of the principal, as a larger φ constrains the problem less.
Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal allocation xSB for a general φ.
Proposition 4 For all n, for all t−n ∈ T−n and θ ∈ Θ,

xSBn (i, t−n, θ) =
 φ if θn > θ
SB
n (t−n)
0 otherwise
xSBn (g, t−n, θ) = φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π(g,t−n)
π(tn=g)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = g) dθn
where
θSBn (t−n) = l
−1
(
α
1− λn
π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
)
and the constant λn ∈ [0, 1) is completely characterized in the proof.
Proof. See appendix.
The type of solution is the same as with φ = 1: all agents are given the opportunity to
confess to have committed the crime in exchange for a constant punishment. Guilty agents
10Another way to see this is by realizing that, when φ = 1 and for each agent n, the objective function of
the principal can be written as
π (tn = g)B
g
n − απ (tn = i)Bin
and so, if α = α, where
α =
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
it becomes proportional to
{
Bgn −Bin
}
.
Notice that it is possible that the value α that maximizes deterrence is not the same for all agents. But,
that is resolved if one assumes that, for each n, there is a potentially different αn. Given that the N problems
are independent, all results are exactly the same.
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choose to confess the crime, even though they are indifferent, while innocent agents prefer
to proceed to the second stage, where they are to be punished if and only if the evidence
level is sufficiently large.
There are three differences with respect to the case of φ = 1. First, if an agent is
punished at the second stage trial, he is to receive a punishment of φ and not 1, i.e. he is
to receive a punishment that is greater than the one that fits the crime. The intuition for
this result is similar to that of the example of the Introduction. Because a guilty agent is
relatively more affected by a reduction of the standard of proof than an innocent agent, it
is always better to punish agents as harshly as possible at trial and then select the standard
of proof (the threshold over the evidence level) as a function of the principal’s preferences.
The second difference has to with the threshold θSBn . The constant λn is proportional to
the lagrange multiplier associated with condition (1.5). Hence, if φ = 1 then λn = 0. But if
φ is sufficiently large (bigger than φn > 1, which is characterized in the proof of Proposition
4), then λn becomes positive and the threshold θ
SB
n becomes larger. Finally, the third
difference is that if φ ≥ φn then allocation xSB is uniquely optimal.11
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the solution as φ increases for some arbitrary agent.
If φ is close to 1 - in Figure 5, if φ ≤ φn - constraint (1.5) does not bind and λn = 0.
Therefore, the standard of proof used at the second stage trial is equal to the one when
φ = 1. This means that increases of φ do not impact the likelihood an agent is punished at
trial but increase the punishment itself, in the event of a conviction. Hence, the innocent’s
expected punishment is increased, because he chooses to go to trial, and the guilty’s expected
punishment is also increased, because, even though he does not go to trial, he is made
indifferent. As φ increases, the expected punishment of the agent when guilty reaches 1,
which happens at φ = φn. For φ > φn, the constraint begins to bind. Because the expected
punishment of the agent must be 1 when he is guilty, and the punishment at trial is growing
11Recall that the simplified problem does not depend on guilty punishments. The only requirement is that
the expected punishment for the guilty agent is equal to Bgn. If it is optimal to set B
g
n = 1, the only way
this happens is if all punishments are equal to 1, because it is not optimal to punish guilty agents in more
than 1 in any event.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the agent’s expected punishment as a function of φ. The red and
green curves represent the expected punishment when the agent is guilty and innocent
respectively.
with φ, it must be that the probability of conviction at trial is becoming smaller - so λn is
strictly increasing for all φ ≥ φn. So much so that the innocent’s expected punishment is
becoming smaller - recall the example in the Introduction where it was possible to decrease
the expected punishment of the agent when innocent, while keeping it constant when guilty,
by continuously increasing the second stage punishments. Proposition 5 shows that, for all
n, this process of increasing φ leads to the first best solution.
Let Btnn
(
xSBn
)
denote the expected punishment of agent n when his type is tn under
allocation xSB.
Proposition 5 For all n, limφ→∞
(
Bin
(
xSB
)
, Bgn
(
xSB
))
= (0, 1).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 5 states that, as long φ is sufficiently large, it is possible to build an incentive
compatible mechanism that approximates the first best allocation. This result is reminiscent
of Cremer and McLean (1988), where it is shown that, if an agent’s type affects his beliefs
about other agent’s types, then, under some conditions, it is possible to implement the
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principal’s preferred outcome. In Cremer and McLean (1988), an agent’s type affects his
beliefs because agents’ types are not independent. In this paper, however, even if agents’
types are independent, Proposition 5 holds. The reason is that each agent’s type is also
correlated with the evidence. The idea is that the principal can simply punish in 1 all
guilty reports, and set a sequence of punishments that simultaneously gives an expected
punishment close to 0 to innocent agents that report truthfully and an expected punishment
of 1 to guilty agents that choose to misreport. The principal is able to do this by setting
a very high (close to 1) standard of proof at the trial stage, but imposing arbitrarily large
punishments in the event of a conviction. The result follows because guilty agents are
infinitely more likely than innocent agents to generate an evidence level that is close to 1.
The problem of excessive commitment power
The CIS which implements xSB is based on the assumption that the principal is able
to commit to a set of allocations, even after observing agents’ reports and evidence. That
assumption allows the principal i) not to punish guilty agents in 1 once they confess, and
ii) to punish innocent agents even with the knowledge they are indeed innocent.
As for i), only guilty agents confess the crime in equilibrium. Hence, upon hearing a
confession, the principal would prefer to renege his promise and punish the agent in 1.
Of course, knowing this, a guilty agent would not confess. Is it reasonable to believe the
principal can commit not to punish more harshly the confessing agents? Currently, there
are several examples where the law protects agents that confess a crime in exchange for
a softer punishment.12 It seems that, by regulating these confession inducing contracts
through law, the principal is able to credibly commit to leniency towards confessing agents,
and breaches to these contracts by the principal are deemed unacceptable.
Implication ii) seems more unreasonable. In the mechanism described, all innocent
agents choose not to confess to have committed the crime. However, the principal will still
12See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) for a description of some of the regulations in environmental law like, for
example, the Compreehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; and, with respect
to plea bargaining, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regulates the process under which
the prosecutor and the defendants reach a plea deal.
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punish some of them in some circumstances to deter guilty agents from misreporting. Hence,
the principal must be able to commit to punish knowingly innocent agents. This is harder
to accept as, not only does the principal prefer to go back on his promise of punishment,
but also the agent prefers he does, i.e. both parties prefer to renegotiate the confession
inducing contract, once an agent has not confessed. Knowing this, guilty agents would not
confess, in the hopes that the promise of punishment would be reneged by the principal.
Even if the principal employed such a system through law it is still unlikely that a society
is willing to accept that knowingly innocent agents are to be punished, particularly given
the human element that is present in the appreciation of the evidence.
In the next section, I address the same problem but assume the principal has lim-
ited commitment power. I analyze the problem of constructing an optimal criminal justice
system under two different assumptions. First, I analyze renegotiation proof mechanisms:
mechanisms that principal and agents do not wish to renegotiate, which eliminates im-
plication ii). Second, I analyze sequentially optimal mechanisms, where the principal has
no commitment power and is free to decide punishments without being restricted by any
promise, which not only eliminates implication ii) but also implication i) - knowingly guilty
agents are punished in no less than 1.
1.6. Limited Commitment Power
In this section, I analyze the problem the principal faces in constructing a criminal justice
system, when he has limited commitment power. I first analyze renegotiation proof mech-
anisms and then sequentially optimal mechanisms. In either case, the revelation principle
no longer holds, which means that, in general, it is not enough to consider only revelation
mechanisms.
The timing is as in the previous section. Before any evidence is generated, the principal
selects a mechanism. Given the mechanism, each agent n simultaneously chooses to send a
message mn from the message set Mn, prior to knowing the evidence. Let M = M1×...×MN
and refer to m as a generic element of M . I also give the usual interpretation to m−n and
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M−n.
A mechanism x : M×Θ→ RN+ is a map from the agents’ messages and from the evidence
to punishments. Each agent’s strategy is a probability distribution over his message space
Mn for each type, which I denote by σn (tn, ·) for tn ∈ {i, g}. Vector σ = (σ1, ..., σN )
represents the strategy profile of the N agents, while the set of all of strategy profiles is
denoted by Φ.
I call each profile (x, σ) a system and evaluate it according to the principal’s expected
utility. In particular, I denote by V̂ (x, σ) the principal’s expected utility of pair (x, σ),
where
V̂ (x, σ) =
∑
t∈T
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
m∈M
π (t, θ)σ (t,m)up (t, x) dmdθ
Strategy profile σ ∈ Φ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism
x if and only if, for all n, whenever σn (tn,mn) > 0 then
−
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
m−n∈M−n
πσ (m−n, θ|tn)xn (mn,m−n, θ) dm−ndθ (1.7)
≥ −
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
m−n∈M−n
πσ (m−n, θ|tn)xn
(
m′n,m−n, θ
)
dm−ndθ for all m
′
n ∈Mn
where πσ (m−n, θ|tn) represents the conditional joint density of (m−n, θ), given agent n’s
type tn and strategy profile σ. If condition (1.7) holds, I say that the system (x, σ) is
incentive compatible.
It is also convenient to formally define a concept which I have used throughout, in light
of the notation presented.
Definition 1 A CIS (x, σ) is such that, for all n,
i) In equilibrium, at most two messages are sent with positive probability by each agent:
a confessing message c and a non-confessing message c.
ii) If an agent confesses (sends message c) he receives a constant punishment: xn (c,m−n, θ)
is independent of all m−n ∈M−n and θ ∈ Θ.
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Finally, if (x, σ) constitutes a CIS, I refer to x as a confession inducing mechanism.
1.6.1. Renegotiation Proof Mechanisms
What defines a renegotiation proof mechanism is that, after observing any (m, θ), the
principal is unable to reach an agreement with any agent to alter the promised punishment
in a way that is mutually beneficial. Consider an arbitrary system (x, σ). Given strategy
profile σ and after observing (m, θ), the principal will form a belief about agent n’s type,
given by πσ (tn|m, θ). Let γσn (m, θ) be the optimal punishment the principal would like to
impose on agent n, given such beliefs, i.e.13
γσn (m, θ) =
 1 if π
σ (tn = g|m, θ) > απσ (tn = i|m, θ)
0 otherwise
If xn (m, θ) > γ
σ
n (m, θ) - if the punishment imposed on agent n is larger than the
punishment the principal would rather impose - both the principal and agent n have an
incentive to reduce the punishment at least to γσn (m, θ). However, if xn (m, θ) ≤ γσn (m, θ),
the principal is no longer willing to accept a smaller punishment.
Definition 2 The system (x, σ) is renegotiation proof if and only if, for all n,m and θ,
xn (m, θ) ≤ γσn (m, θ) (1.8)
If system (x, σ) is renegotiation proof, then I say that mechanism x is renegotiation
proof.
The first thing to notice is that condition (1.8) effectively imposes an upper bound
of 1 to all punishments, which prevents the principal from overpunishing. In particular,
proposition 5 no longer holds as the characterization of the optimal system is independent
of φ, provided it is (weakly) larger than 1. Notice also that the CIS described in the previous
13If there are multiple maximizers, γσn (m, θ) is defined to be equal to the smallest one.
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section, which implements xSB, is not renegotiation proof. The strategy profile considered
involves agents reporting truthfully - all guilty agents confess while all innocent agents do
not. This means that, upon observing that an agent has not confessed, the principal believes
he is innocent, and so will not be willing to punish him.
I start the analysis of the optimal renegotiation proof system by stating Lemma 1, which
delimits the message set of each agent.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality, it is possible to set Mn = R+ ∪ {c} for all n.
Proof. See appendix.
The meaning any message conveys is given by the belief the principal forms when she
receives it. In Lemma 1, I show that any two given messages that generate the same
posterior belief can be reduced to a single one. In particular, if, for any given agent n, there
are two messages m′n and m
′′
n such that rn (m
′
n) ≡
σn(g,m′n)
σn(i,m′n)
= σn(g,m
′′
n)
σn(i,m′′n)
≡ rn (m′′n), then it is
possible to construct an equivalent system with only one of those two messages. Hence, Mn
only has to be large enough to accommodate all elements of the range of rn (mn). Message
c is interpreted as a confession and is only sent by guilty agents in any given incentive
compatible system (x, σ), and so rn (c) =∞.
I characterize the optimal renegotiation proof system
(
xRP , σRP
)
in two steps. First, in
Lemma 2, for all σ, I characterize the optimal allocation xσ so that V̂ (xσ, σ) ≥ V̂ (x, σ) for
all x such that (x, σ) is incentive compatible and renegotiation proof. Then, in the second
step, in Proposition 6, I show that
(
xσ
RP
, σRP
)
constitutes a CIS.
Let mσn denote the message after which the principal believes agent n is more likely to
be innocent. More rigorously, let mσn be such that, for all n,
rn (m
σ
n) = inf {rn (mn) for all mn ∈ R+ : σn (i,mn) > 0}
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Lemma 2 For all n,
 x
σ
n (mn,m−n, θ) = γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) for all m−n, θ and for all mn ∈ R+
xσn (c,m−n, θ) = ϕn for all m−n, θ
where
ϕn =
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
m−n∈M−n
πσ (m−n, θ|tn = g) γσn (mσn,m−n, θ) dm−ndθ
Proof. See appendix.
One can think of xσ as a two stage mechanism, where, in the first stage, agents are given
the opportunity to confess (send message c) or not (and send one of the other messages). If
agent n confesses, he receives a constant punishment of ϕn, which leaves him indifferent to
sending any other message if he is guilty. If he does not confess, then his punishments are
determined in the second stage. In that case, if the agent has sent message mσn, the principal
is supposed to choose her preferred punishment conditional on what she has learned in the
first stage, and on the evidence, and so xσn (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) = γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ). If the principal
was to do the same when the agent sends other messages, these punishments would be larger
than those after mσn, which would not be incentive compatible. Hence, for these messages,
the principal chooses punishments that are as close to optimal as possible, which implies
that xσn (mn,m−n, θ) = γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) for all mn ∈ R+.
Notice that a CIS is a simplified version of this mechanism in that there is only one
non-confessing message sent by each agent.
Proposition 6 A CIS is optimal within the set of incentive compatible and renegotiation
proof systems.
Proof. See appendix.
In proposition 6, I show that it is optimal for agents to send at most two messages: the
confessing message c and a non confessing message c. The argument is as follows. Take any
strategy profile σ and label message mσn as c. Suppose that, without loss of generality, agent
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1 is sending a second non-confessing message m′1 in addition to message c. As mentioned
above, each message m1 is identified by its ”guiltiness” ratio
σ1(g,m1)
σ1(i,m1)
≡ r1 (m1). Suppose
that r1 (c) < r1 (m
′
1) < ∞. The idea of Proposition 10 is that by shifting weight v from
σ1 (g,m
′
1) to σ1 (g, c) enough so that
σ1(g,m′1)−v
σ1(i,m′1)
= r1 (c), it is possible to increase the
expected utility of the principal (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Shift from r1 (m
′
1) to r1 (c)
The expected punishment of agent 1 is unchanged regardless of whether he is innocent
or guilty, because message c is still available and the expected punishment of sending it
remains the same (given that ratio r1 (c) is unchanged). The difference, though, is that
the expected utility the principal is able to retrieve from any of the other agents is now
increased. The logic is similar to the previous section. In the event that agent 1 is guilty,
by confessing more often, he makes it more likely that the principal has more accurate
information when choosing the other agents’ punishments.
The conclusion of Proposition 6 is that a CIS is still optimal even when the principal
has reduced commitment power. It is a different CIS than the one of the previous section,
in that the second stage punishments are sequentially optimal. In the previous section,
the second stage punishments were chosen regardless of the perceived guilt of the agent.
In particular, when agents report truthfully and innocent agents refused to confess, the
principal was still supposed to punish them in the second stage. She was only able do this
because she was able to commit, which would mean having a set of laws and regulations
for judges, lawyers and jurors to follow, which would not necessarily be designed to assess
the agents’ guilt. But under this new CIS this is no longer necessary. Implementing such a
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CIS requires only the guarantee that the rights of confessing agents are protected.
Finally, notice that a trial system can be thought of as a CIS in which no agent chooses
to confess. In Proposition 7, I show that such a system is not optimal.
Proposition 7 The trial system is not an optimal renegotiation proof system, unless
agents’ have independent types.
Proof. See appendix.
Take a trial system and consider a marginal deviation from player 1 - suppose he
confesses with a very small probability, if he is guilty. The direct impact of this change
is that, when other agents are taken to trial and agent 1 is guilty, the principal is more
likely to be aware of it (because it is more likely that agent 1 confesses) and so is able to
choose more appropriate punishments. There is also an indirect impact in that the beliefs
of the principal are now slightly altered in the event that agent 1 does not confess, which
might decrease the expected utility the principal retrieves from agent 1. Proposition 7 shows
that, if the probability of confession is sufficiently small, it is possible to guarantee that the
direct impact dominates. I end this section by continuing the example of the previous one.
Example (continued) Assume now that the principal has limited commitment power
and is no longer able to commit not to renegotiate. In the optimal CIS that implements
xRP innocent agents do not confess, while guilty agents confess with probability τn ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the punishments of agents that choose not to confess. If the other agent does not
confess the crime (chooses to play c), agent n is punished if and only if
θn > θ
RP
n (c, θ−n) =
(1− ρ) (1− τ−n) θ−n + (1 + ρ) (1− θ−n) (1 + ρ) (1− τn) (1− τ−n) θ−n + (1− ρ) (1− τn) (1− θ−n)
+ (1− ρ) (1− τ−n) θ−n + (1 + ρ) (1− θ−n)

while if the other agent chooses to confess (chooses to play c), then agent n is punished if
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and only if
θn > θ
RP
n (c) ≡
1− ρ
(1 + ρ) (1− τn) + 1− ρ
Notice that if τ1 = τ2 = 0 this CIS becomes the trial system in that no agent confesses, and
threshold θRPn (c, θ−n) becomes equal to θ
Tr
n (θ−n). As for the connection with the second
best allocation, it follows that the first threshold is only equal to θSBn (t−n = i) if τn = 0
and τ−n = 1. This means that either θ
RP
1 (c, θ−n) 6= θSB1 (t−n = i) or θRP2 (c, θ−n) 6=
θSB2 (t−n = i) if ρ 6= 0. It then follows that, unless there is no correlation between the agents’
types, the principal is strictly worse off by having reduced commitment power. Figure 7 adds
the expected utility the principal gets from the optimal renegotiation proof allocation xRP
(denoted by V RP ) to Figure 3.
Once again, more correlation between the agents’ types, being it positive or negative,
Figure 7: The orange, yellow and blue curves represent V Trn , V
RP
n and V
SB
n respectively, as
a function of ρ
increases the expected utility of the principal because it makes the information each agent
provides more important, which means that there are larger information externalities to each
confession.
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1.6.2. Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms
CIS’s are based on the assumption that the principal is able to partially forgive a guilty
agent who confesses, precisely in order for him to confess. However, knowing only guilty
agents confess, it is not ex-post optimal for the principal to show leniency towards them.
Hence, if the principal does not have commitment power, she will be unable to implement
such confession inducing mechanisms. In this section, I analyze what mechanism should
the principal implement if he has no commitment power.
Recall that γσn (m, θ) denotes the optimal punishment the principal would like to impose
on agent n, given strategy profile σ, and after observing message m and evidence θ. If the
principal has no commitment power, he must act optimally for every (m, θ) he observes.
Definition 3 The system (x, σ) is sequentially optimal if and only if, for all n, m and θ,
xn (m, θ) = γ
σ
n (m, θ)
By eliminating the commitment power of the principal, one also eliminates her ability
to collect any information from the agents. Imagine that agent n is sending two distinct
messages a and b. For these messages to convey any information to the principal, it must be
that they are sent with different probabilities by the innocent and the guilty types. Suppose
a is more likely to have been sent by the innocent type than b. Knowing this, the principal
has no choice but to be more lenient towards agents that have sent message a. But then,
no agent would ever send message b. It follows that, if the principal is unable to recover
any information from the agents, all we are left with is the trial system.
Proposition 8 If the principal has no commitment power, a trial system is optimal.
1.6.3. How much commitment power does the principal have?
This paper characterizes the principal’s preferred mechanism under three different assump-
tions regarding her commitment power: full commitment power, no commitment power and
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an in-between assumption, where the principal is only unable to commit not to renegotiate.
But which of three assumptions is more reasonable?
One way to approach the problem of analyzing what an optimal criminal justice system
should look like is to imagine that society is ruled by a benevolent dictator who is granted
the exclusive responsibility of administering criminal justice and make her the principal in
the model. But if the benevolent dictator is the principal, she should be unable to commit.
To have the ability to commit is to be able to write contracts that some exogenous entity will
enforce. Parties follow the contract for, if not, that exogenous source of authority punishes
them heavily. But if the benevolent dictator is one of the parties, then, by definition, there
is no other source of authority that rules over her. So she is unable to write any contracts
in the sense that there is no entity that enforces them. Hence, it would follow that the
principal should not be able to commit and the trial system would be the only alternative.
However, looking at contemporaneous societies one can see that there are several ex-
amples where leniency is shown towards agents who confess to have committed a crime.
The method modern societies seem to follow, in order to commit to such leniency, is to use
law. For example, plea bargain deals are protected under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which ensures the prosecutor cannot go back on his word once he has
obtained the confession from the agent. But if societies can use law as a commitment device,
one could argue that the relevant analysis should be the one that assumes full commitment
power by the principal. The problem with this argument has to do with the human element
that is present in judging an agent’s guilt. Consider the optimal allocation under full com-
mitment power. This allocation requires that innocent agents are to be punished if their
evidence level is too low. By the nature of the mechanism that implements it, it is known
that the agents are innocent and yet the law would require the law enforcement institutions
to punish them. But these law enforcement institutions are the ones that collect (in the
case of the police) and assess (in the case of the judge or jury) the evidence. If they know
the agent is innocent (from observing he chose not to confess to have committed the crime),
it seems reasonable to believe they would always claim the evidence level is low to avoid
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convicting him.
In the American criminal justice system there are some examples of this phenomenon,
where there seems to be an attempt to condition the way jurors appreciate the defendant’s
guilt. One such example is the inadmissibility of plea discussions in court, according to Rule
410 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Another debated issue concerns the orders
given to jurors at criminal trials by the judge to disregard some prosecutorial elements of
the case - for example they are told they should not infer anything from the fact that the
agent chose not to testify. As Laudan (2006) points out, this practice precludes important
information from the trial and conditions how jury members assess the defendant’s guilt.
Whether these recommendations are indeed taken into account by the jurors is a matter
of discussion: Laudan (2006) cites Posner (1999) on this matter: ”Judges who want jurors
to take seriously the principle that guilt should not be inferred from a refusal to waive the
privilege against self-incrimination will have to come up with a credible explanation for why
an innocent person might fear the consequences of testifying”.
In my opinion, the proper assumption over the principal’s commitment power depends
very much on how one feels about these attempts at conditioning guilt assessment. If one
believes that police, judges and jurors always follow the law and enforce punishments they
know are unfair, then the relevant assumption should be of full commitment power and the
optimal allocation given by xSB. If not, then one accepts the principal has some limited
commitment power and is only able to implement xRP . Recall that both systems involve
two stages: a first stage where agents may choose to confess and receive an immediate
punishment, followed by a trial of the non-confessing agents. The key difference is precisely
that the second stage trial veredict only reflects the jurors true assessment of guilt under
xRP .
1.7. Extensions
The main purpose of this paper is to highlight how CIS’s are able to explore the correla-
tion between the agents’ innocence in order to provide a more efficient alternative to trial
41
systems. In the main text, I have presented the simplest possible model that made my
argument clear. There were, however, several simplifications that might leave the reader
wondering about the robustness of the results. In this section, I extend the original model
and the analysis of section 5 on the second best problem in order to address some of these
concerns.
I divide this section into four parts. In the first extension, I allow the agents and the
principal to be risk averse. In this case, one might think that CIS’s might no longer be
appealing, because it might be the case that agents confess not because they are guilty but
because they are risk averse. I show that this is not the case if the principal is aware of how
risk averse the agents are.
In the second extension, I consider a more general information structure, where each
agent might be a part of a conspiracy to commit the crime, and, consequently, be informed
about the identity of the other conspirators. In this case, the correlation between agents’
types is even more evident, which makes it more clear that the trial system is not optimal.
I show that, in this framework, the optimal system is an extended CIS in which agents who
confess are also requested to report what they know about the crime.
As discussed in section 5, one of the issues of the optimal CIS when the principal has
commitment power is that there is a perfect separation between those who are guilty, who
choose to confess, and those who are innocent, who choose not to. In section 6, by limiting
the commitment power of the principal, I have shown that such feature disappears and that
both guilty and innocent agents might refuse to confess. In the third extension, I argue
that, even if one still assumes the principal has commitment power, in general, it is not
the case that there is a perfect separation between those who are guilty and those who are
innocent. In particular, I argue that if one allows for privately observed heterogeneity in the
way agents perceive the evidence, it is either not possible or not desirable for the principal
to design a CIS that guarantees that all guilty agents confess and that all innocent agents
do not.
Finally, in the fourth extension, I consider a change in the timing of the mechanism
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selection by the principal. Rather than being able to select a mechanism before know-
ing the evidence, I consider the case where she can only do so after having observed it.
This particular problem is usually referred to in the literature as an informed principal’s
problem14.
1.7.1. Risk Averse Agents
One of the assumptions of this paper is that agents are risk neutral. This might lead the
reader to inquire on whether CIS’s would still be appealing if agents were risk averse. The
concern might be that agents choose to confess because they are risk averse and not because
they are guilty. In order to address this issue, in this section, I extend the analysis to consider
arbitrary levels of risk aversion for the agents and for the principal in a setup close to that
of the independent work of Siegel and Strulovici (2015). Proposition 9 corroborates that
paper’s result in arguing that enlarging the set of possible verdicts increases the expected
utility of the principal, while Proposition 10 can be understood as a special case of their
analysis where, given a specific functional form for the agents’ utility function, I show that
a CIS is still an optimal system.
Recall that ui (·), ug (·) denote the agent’s utility if he is innocent and guilty respectively
and upn (tn, ·) is the principal’s utility when the agent is of type tn. In this section, I assume
that ui (xn) = −xωin and ug (xn) = −x
ωg
n , where ωi > 1 and ωg > 1, so that each agent is
risk averse. Furthermore, I assume that, for all n, upn (i, ·) is strictly decreasing, upn (g, ·) is
single peaked around 1 and both are strictly concave and differentiable.
Let x̃Tr denote the optimal allocation that can be implemented by a trial system.
Proposition 9 For all n, if ∂u
p
n(i,0)
∂xn
= 0, then x̃Trn (θ) is continuous, strictly increasing with
θn and is such that, for all θ−n, limθn→0 x̃
Tr
n ((θn, θ−n)) = 0 and limθn→1 x̃
Tr
n ((θn, θ−n)) =
1.
14The classic references on the informed principal literature are Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole
(1990).
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Proof. See appendix.
In the trial system, punishments are determined only by the preferences of the principal.
If the principal is risk averse, then she prefers to smooth punishments rather than adopt
a ”bang-bang” solution like in the main text. In particular, the punishment the principal
imposes is strictly increasing with her belief about each agent’s guilt.
Let x̃SB denote the second best allocation.
Proposition 10 For all n, if upn (i, xn) = αu
i (xn) for all xn and for some α > 0, then
x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ) is independent of t−n and θ and equal to
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
ug
(
x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ)
)
dθ
Proof. See appendix.
Recall that, in this paper, the principal is interpreted as being benevolent - similar to a
social planner - and so, it seems reasonable to me to assume that, if the principal faces an
innocent agent, she would want to maximize his expected utility. Assuming that upn (i, ·) is
proportional to ui (·) implies precisely that - the principal has the same preferences of the
innocent agent when she knows him to be innocent. This assumption is convenient in that
it guarantees that innocents’ incentive constraints do not bind.
Proposition 10 implies that, if the agents and the principal are risk averse, the optimal
allocation is implemented by a CIS, where guilty agents confess the crime and receive a
constant punishment in return. The intuition for the result is as follows. In the optimal
allocation, guilty agents must be indifferent between reporting truthfully and reporting to be
innocent (for otherwise the principal could reduce the punishments innocent agents receive)
and must be receiving punishments that never exceed 1 (for otherwise those punishments
could be reduced to 1, which would increase the principal’s expected utility and give more
incentives for guilty agents to report truthfully). Suppose that, in the optimal allocation,
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a guilty agent receives a lottery of distinct punishments. Because the guilty agent is risk
averse, he would be willing to accept, as an alternative, a constant punishment larger than
the expected punishment of the lottery. The principal would strictly prefer this alternative,
as long as she is (weakly) risk averse.
Notice that, if agents and principal are risk averse, the case for CIS’s is even stronger,
because, even if there is only one agent (N = 1) and even if punishments cannot exceed 1,
it is still strictly better to have CIS’s than to have any other system. In particular, it is
not the case that, if agents are made more and more risk averse, they eventually confess
regardless of their guilt. That argument assumes that the principal is unaware of how risk
averse the agents are. If the principal knows the agents’ preferences, she is able to select
punishments in such a way that only guilty agents choose to confess, by using the fact that
guilty agents are more afraid that future evidence and other agents might incriminate them.
The following proposition characterizes how the optimal allocation depends on the risk
aversion level of innocent and guilty agents.
Proposition 11 For all n, if upn (i, xn) = αu
i (xn) for all xn and for any α > 0, then
i) If ωi > ωg (innocent agents are more risk averse than guilty agents) then
x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ) =
 φ if θn > θ̃
SB(i)
n (t−n)
ψSBn (θn, t−n) otherwise
where ψSBn (θn, t−n) is continuous and strictly increasing with θn.
ii) If ωi ≤ ωg (guilty agents are more risk averse than innocent agents) then
x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ) =
 φ if θn > θ̃
SB(g)
n (t−n)
0 otherwise
Expressions θ̃
SB(i)
n (t−n), θ̃
SB(g)
n (t−n) and ψ
SB
n (θn, t−n) are characterized in the proof.
Proof. See appendix.
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When the principal is determining the optimal punishments to impose on innocent
agents she faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she would like to select small punishments in
order to spare the innocents as much as possible. But on the other hand, those punishments
determine the punishment that guilty agents receive in equilibrium. So, the principal wants
to construct a lottery of punishments that is very appealing for those who are innocent but
very unappealing for those who are guilty. If innocent agents are more risk averse than
guilty agents, then smoothing punishments is relatively better for them, which is why, if
ωi > ωj , the punishments innocent agents receive are strictly increasing and continuous
until hitting the upper bound of φ. If, on the contrary, guilty agents are more risk averse,
following a similar strategy would be relatively better to guilty agents. Therefore, even
though agents are strictly risk averse regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty, if
ωi ≤ ωj , it is still better for the principal to impose a risky lottery of punishments, where
agents are punished very harshly only for very high levels of evidence, and are acquitted
otherwise.
1.7.2. Conspiracies
In the main text, I have maintained the assumption that each agent knows only whether
they are innocent or guilty and have no other information about the crime. By making
this assumption, I have implicitly ruled out criminal conspiracies. When a group of agents
commits a crime together, it seems reasonable to expect them to know the identity of the
remaining conspirators. For example, if a group of 3 agents robs a bank, it is very likely
that each of them will know the identity of the others. In this section, I extend the model
to accommodate for this possibility and investigate how the optimal mechanism changes if
the principal believes that a criminal conspiracy might be behind the crime.
I assume that, for each event t ∈ T , there is a commonly known probability p (t) ∈ [0, 1]
that each guilty agent knows the identity of the remaining criminals (and so knows vector
t). So, for example, if N = 3 and p ((g, g, i)) = 0.75, it means that, when the crime is
committed by agents 1 and 2, there is a 75% chance that the agents committed the crime
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together and know each other’s identity. Hence, in that case, agents 1 and 2 would know
that vector (g, g, i) had been realized. With 25% chance, agents 1 and 2 committed the
crime independently and do not know whether any of the other agents is also guilty. In
either case, agent 3 is innocent and forms beliefs about agents 1 and 2’s guilt as before.
In this setup, because agents’ beliefs do not depend only on whether they are innocent
or guilty, it is necessary to enlarge the set of types that each agent might have. Let t̂n ∈ T̂n
denote agent n’s extended type, where T̂n = {i} ∪ {ĝ} ∪ T . If t̂n = i, then the agent is
innocent; if t̂n = ĝ, then the agent is guilty but does not know t; and, finally, if t̂n = t ∈ T ,
then the agent is guilty and knows that vector t has been realized.
For simplicity, I consider only the case of φ = 1 and assume that the principal has
commitment power.
Let L ⊂ T̂ = T̂1 × ... × T̂N be the set of extended types that do not have a strictly
positive measure. For example, in the case of N = 2, t̂ = ((g, g) , i) ∈ L because if agent
1 is guilty and part of a conspiracy with agent 2, it must be that agent 2’s extended type
is (g, g).
Let allocation x̂SB : T̂ × Θ → RN+ be defined as follows. For all t̂ ∈ L, θ ∈ Θ and for
all n, x̂SBn (t, θ) = 1. For all t̂ ∈ T̂\L and for all t̂−n ∈ T̂−n (where T̂−n is defined as usual),
θ ∈ Θ, and for all n,

x̂SBn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
=
 1 if π
(
tn = g|t̂−n, θ
)
> απ
(
tn = i|t̂−n, θ
)
0 otherwise
x̂SBn
(
t̂n, t̂−n, θ
)
= ϕ̂n
(
t̂−n
)
for all t̂n 6= i
where ϕ̂n is characterized in the proof of Proposition 12.
Proposition 12 Allocation x̂SB is optimal within the set of incentive compatible alloca-
tions.
Proof. See appendix.
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If agents produce a report t̂ ∈ L, the principal realizes one of them is lying. So, in
order to induce truthful reporting, it is in her best interest to punish the agents as much as
possible. The rest of the allocation is constructed using the same principle as in the main
text. The principal is able to get agents to report to be guilty by guaranteeing that such
information will not be used against them but only against other agents. The allocation is
implemented by an extended CIS. In the first stage, and in the same way as in the standard
CIS, agents are given the opportunity to confess. However, they are also asked to report any
other information they might have, in particular, whether there are other guilty agents and
their identity. By construction of x̂SB, guilty agents are indifferent between confessing and
going to trial, while innocent agents refuse to confess. These proceed to the second stage and
are judged only with the information the principal can gather from other agents. Another
feature of this system is that agents who confess no longer receive a constant punishment.
With this information structure, guilty agents might have different beliefs about the guilt
or innocence of other agents. This means that a constant punishment which leaves a guilty
agent of extended type ĝ indifferent might not leave him indifferent if he has some other
extended type. However, these different extended types of guilty agents all have the same
beliefs with respect to the evidence the agent himself generates. Therefore, the punishment
an agent receives when he confesses only depends on the type of information that other
agents grant the principal (t̂−n) and not on the evidence.
I illustrate how this extended CIS works by continuing the previous example.
Example (continued) Consider the case where p ([i, g]) = p ([g, i]) = 0 and p ([g, g]) =
ς ∈ (0, 1) and, for ease of exposition, assume ρ = −12 . One can think of this scenario as
representing the fire example in the Introduction when the principal has 2 suspects. One
possibility is that only one of the agents committed the crime - t = (i, g) or t = (g, i). In this
case, it is assumed that the guilty agent does not know whether the other agent is also guilty.
The logic of this assumption is that if an agent individually decides to start the fire he does
not have a conspirator and so has no way of knowing whether, in some other location of the
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forest, the other agent is also starting a fire by himself. If both agents commit the crime,
while it is certainly possible that they act independently, it is also likely that they conspire
to commit the crime. So, the assumption is that there would be a probability of ς of the
latter scenario occurring. Notice that if ς = 0 we are back to the original assumption that
each agent knows only their type.
Without loss of generality take the case of agent 1. If agent 2 incriminates him (reports
he is of type (g, g)), agent 1 is bound to receive a punishment of 1. If he reports truthfully,
the principal knows that the report of agent 2 is valid and punishes agent 1 in 1. If he
chooses to lie, then the principal becomes aware that one of the two agents is not reporting
truthfully and punishes them both in 1. If agent 2 does not incriminate him, then, if agent
1 chooses to go to trial, he is punished only if the evidence is sufficiently incriminatory. In
particular, if agent 2 reports ĝ, agent 1 is punished if and only if
θ1 > θ̂
SB
1
(
t̂−1 = ĝ
)
≡ 3
4− ς
while if agent 2 reports i, agent 1 is punished if and only if
θ1 > θ̂
SB
1
(
t̂−1 = i
)
≡ 1
4
This leads to
V̂ SB1 =
1
8
ς+
(
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16ς − 64
− 1
2
ς − 1
(ς − 4)2
(
1
2 ς − 2
) (ς2 − 8ς + 7))(1
8
ς − 1
2
)
− 3
32
(ς − 1)2(
1
2 ς − 2
)2− 73128
which is strictly increasing with ς. Notice that limς→0 V̂
SB
1 = V
SB
1 .
There are a few commentaries in order. First, the fact that this extended CIS takes
into account that agents might have more information about the crime than merely whether
they are guilty makes it preferred to the standard CIS, because it allows the principal to
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select more accurate punishments. As the example illustrates, the more likely it is that
agents know the identity of their co-conspirators (the larger is ς), the more likely it is they
end up incriminating them, which is beneficial for the principal.
Second, all else the same, agents that commit a crime individually receive a lower
expected punishment than those who belong to a criminal group. Of course there are other
advantages to being part of a criminal organization - like benefitting from economies of
scale - so this is not to say that organized crime is inefficient when looked at from the eyes
of a criminal. It is rather to point out that my model’s conclusions are very much in line
with the intuition that agents who have committed a crime as part of a criminal group
face additional risk: that the other criminals incriminate them. The fact that the agents
themselves are aware of such risk only builds on the fear that someone else will confess
(an agent who knows his fellow criminal is thinking about confessing is likely to confess
himself), which is what makes the principal successful.
The third aspect that I believe is interesting is that members of a conspiracy are always
punished in 1, because they are always incriminated. Remember that the idea of this
mechanism is that the punishments that agents receive depend only on what other agents
report (in addition to their own evidence level). It then follows that any agent that is a
part of a conspiracy not only incriminates all other members but is also incriminated by
them.
One problem with this argument though is the presence of multiple equilibria. In
particular, in the case of the example, when both agents commit the crime together and
know each other’s identity they would both be better off if they simultaneously deviated and
reported to be innocent. This possibility of joint deviation seems even more plausible if we
think the deviating agents must have been in contact in order to commit the crime together
in the first place. However, it is easy to slightly alter the mechanism in order to eliminate this
alternative equilibrium without decreasing the expected utility of the principal. I illustrate
by continuing the previous example.
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Example (continued) Suppose that, in the event that both agents are guilty of
committing the crime and know the other agent is also guilty ( t̂n = (g, g) for n = 1, 2),
agent 2 decides not to confess. Under allocation x̂SB agent 1 would no longer wish to report
to be of extended type (g, g) as that would be understood as a lie ( t̂ = ((g, g) , i) ∈ L) and
would lead to a punishment of 1. In fact, agent 1 would have enough incentives to report to
be innocent. In order for him not to, it is necessary to reward him by granting him a smaller
punishment for confessing and incriminating agent 2 when agent 2 claims to be innocent.
However, if one lowers agent 1’s punishment unconditionally, then he would incriminate
agent 2 even when he does not know agent 2 is guilty. Hence, this reward should only be
granted if the evidence of agent 2 supports agent 1’s claim. In particular, let
x1 ((g, g) , i, θ) =
 1 if θ2 < d10 otherwise
where d1 ∈ (0, 1). Notice that, if agent 1 does not know whether agent 2 is guilty, it will be
less appealing to report (g, g) when agent 2 reports innocent. Therefore, it is possible to select
d1 to guarantee that only when agent 1 knows agent 2 to be guilty does he choose to incrim-
inate him. In particular, given the structure of the example, d1 ∈
(
16−4ς−
√
ς2−56ς+64
16−4ς ,
√
15
4
)
.
In this way, the truth telling equilibrium still exists and all punishments that occur with
positive probability in that equilibrium remain unchanged, which means that the principal’s
expected payoff remains the same.
In general, by making similar changes to the punishments after reports that contradict
each other (t̂ ∈ L), it is possible to transform the extended CIS in order to eliminate the
incentives that conspiracy members have in colluding in the report they submit to the
principal. This makes the mechanism more robust and more likely to effectively punish
conspiracy members.
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1.7.3. Heterogeneous agents
In the main text, I have assumed that the distribution of the evidence level of each agent
only depended on the guilt of that agent. However, it is likely the case that guilty agents
are better informed about the distribution of the evidence than the principal. It could be
that a given guilty agent is more skilled in the art of committing crimes and, so, is less
likely to produce incriminating evidence. It can also be that agents are unlucky and leave
some evidence behind - maybe someone who has robbed a bank has dropped their wallet in
the escape. Even innocent agents are likely to have some private information as to whether
the evidence is more or less likely to incriminate them. For example, it could be that, even
though an agent is innocent, he was at the crime scene only a few moments before the crime
and there is a considerable probability his fingerprints will be found. One way to extend
the model to allow for this type of heterogeneity is to assume that each agent n is privately
informed of a random variable βn ∈ [0, 1], which determines the distribution of the evidence.
In particular, let
π (θn|βn) = βnfg (θn) + (1− βn) f i (θn)
denote the conditional distribution of θn given the agent’s βn where
fg(θn)
f i(θn)
= l (θn) for all
θn. The idea is that βn and (1− βn) are the weights put on the distributions fg and f i
respectively. In the main text, the assumption was that, if agent n was guilty, then βn = 1
while, if he was innocent, then βn = 0 and this was commonly known. In this extension,
I assume βn is only privately known by each agent and its distribution depends only on
whether agent n is innocent or guilty. By assuming that π(βn|tn=g)π(βn|tn=i) is strictly increasing for
all βn ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to recover the idea that guilty agents are more likely to draw
worse evidence, because they are more likely to generate a larger βn. I also assume, for
simplicity, that π (βn|tn) has full support, is continuous and differentiable for tn = i, g.
Proposition 13 below characterizes how each agent acts in the optimal CIS when φ = 1
and the principal has commitment power.
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Proposition 13 For all n, there is
(
βin, β
g
n
)
∈ [0, 1]2 such that for all tn ∈ {i, g} and
βn ∈ [0, 1],
sn (tn, βn) =
 c if βn ≥ β
tn
n
c otherwise
where sn (tn, βn) ∈ {c, c} represents the action that agent n with type tn and βn chooses.
Proof. See appendix.
Agents that have a larger βn are more likely to generate more incriminating evidence.
Hence, they have a larger incentive to confess (and select action c) than those with a smaller
βn. If the agents’ types are not independent, it is easy to show that β
i
n > β
g
n - for a given βn
the agent has more incentives to confess if he guilty than if he is innocent. This is because
he is more afraid that the other agents’ reports and evidence might incriminate him.
If there are homogeneous types as in the main text, βin = 1 while β
g
n = 0 so that only
guilty agents confess. However, in general, it is not in the best interest of the principal to
do this if the agents are heterogeneous. Suppose the principal wants to guarantee that the
agent confesses if he is guilty no matter what βn he draws. For this to be possible, it must
be that the punishment upon a confession is small enough that even if the guilty agent
draws βn = 0, he still prefers to confess. But establishing such a small punishment leads
to innocent agents confessing. For example, if there is no correlation between the agents’
types (and so a guilty and an innocent agent have the same beliefs, conditional on drawing
the same βn), the agent also confesses when he is innocent, regardless of βn.
Finally, notice that a CIS might not be optimal in this setting. Consider a given set of
parameters for which the optimal CIS is such that βin = 1 for all n so that guilty agents
are the only ones who confess (the following argument could also be made if only a small
fraction of innocent agents confesses). Of these, only a small fraction is made indifferent
(which has a 0 measure) - the pair (g, βgn) for each agent n. This means that anytime a
guilty agent draws βn > β
g
n and chooses to confess, he is strictly better off than choosing
not to. Thus, a more successful mechanism would be to punish agents that confess as if
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they did not. The principal would still solicit a report from the agents on whether they
are innocent or guilty, and punishments that follow an innocent report would still be the
same as in the optimal CIS. The difference would be that agents who confess would also
face the same lottery of punishments as if they chose not to. They would still have enough
incentives to confess (because they would be indifferent), but their expected punishment
would be larger.
Of course, a problem with this system is whether it is robust enough. In this alternative
system, someone who is guilty receives exactly the same lottery of punishments regardless
of whether he confesses or not. So, the agent might be inclined to claim to be innocent in
the hope that, if is there is some error in the implementation of the mechanism, it would
favor those who claim to be innocent. In the CIS this is not a problem as only a small
fraction of agents are actually indifferent. And even when agents are homogeneous (when
guilty agents have βn = 1 and innocent agents have βn = 0) and the optimal CIS is such
that all guilty agents are made indifferent, it is easy to accommodate for these types of
concerns by simply decreasing the punishment that follows a confession in a small amount
so that guilty agents are no longer indifferent but rather strictly prefer to confess.
1.7.4. Informed Principal
I consider the same setup as in section 5 but now assume the principal selects the mechanism
after having observed evidence θ, which becomes his own private information. In this case,
and based on the revelation principle, given each θ, the principal selects a mechanism
yθ : T × Θ → [0, 1]N , which maps the agents’ types and evidence to punishments. A
strategy y for the principal is a specification of yθ for all θ. Knowing y, the agents are now
able to infer about the realized θ through the principal’s specific proposal yθ. The principal
will then face a dilemma. She would prefer to tailor her proposal yθ to the evidence gathered
θ but doing so runs the risk of allowing the agent to infer θ from the proposal itself, which
might be detrimental to her.
The relevant solution concept in this framework is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
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where i) given their beliefs, each agent prefers to report truthfully after the principal’s
proposal and given that all other agents do so; ii) after each θ and given the agents’ beliefs,
the principal prefers to select yθ and not some other mechanism ỹθ : T × [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N
for which it is a (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium for agents to report truthfully given their beliefs;
and iii) agents’ beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule. For simplicity, I assume that φ = 1.
Notice that any y that is a part of a PBE implements an allocation xy : T ×Θ, where
xy (t, θ) = yθ (t, θ). I say that allocation x is incentive compatible when the principal acts
after observing the evidence if there is a y that is part of a PBE such that x = xy.
Proposition 14 Any allocation x : T × Θ that is incentive compatible when the principal
acts after having observed the evidence is also incentive compatible when he acts before
having observed the evidence.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If xy is incentive compatible when the principal
acts after having observed the evidence, then y is a part of a PBE. This implies that after
each θ, when the principal selects mechanism yθ, all agents prefer to tell the truth than not
to. But if that is the case, then it must be that the expected utility of telling the truth
is also larger than not to, where the expectation is taken with respect to the realized θ.
Hence, the original set of incentive constraints (IC) would necessarily be satisfied.
The implication of proposition 14 is that, if the principal is able to, she should act
before she observes θ (or before θ is realized) and commit not to alter the mechanism upon
observing it.
The opposite statement is not true. There are allocations that are incentive compatible
when the principal acts before the evidence has been realized that would not be incentive
compatible if he had acted afterwards. One such example is xSB. Recall that xSB specifies a
constant punishment for the guilty agent, independent of evidence and other agents’ reports.
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Suppose the principal chooses to act after having observed the evidence and that, for some
n, the realized θn happens to be very small. In that case, the principal will be convinced
that agent n is guilty with a high probability and so, it will be in his best interest to punish
him in more than what is specified by xSB.
Even though xSB is not implementable if the principal acts after having observed the
evidence, it is still possible for the principal to implement somewhat appealing allocations.
Consider allocation xIP where, for all n, xIPn (tn, t−n, θ) = x
SB
n (i, t−n, θ) for all t−n ∈ T−n
and θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 15 xIP is incentive compatible when the principal acts after the evidence.
Proof. See appendix.
Recall that, from section 5, when φ = 1, allocation xIP is second best optimal, as
the punishments imposed on innocent agents are optimal by definition and the expected
punishments of guilty agents make them indifferent to misreporting. The principal is able
to implement this allocation by proposing it regardless of the θ she observes. In particular,
her strategy is given by yIP where yIP
θ̂
(t, θ) = xIP (t, θ) for all t and θ, and for all θ̂. This
result implies that it is still possible for the principal to attain the same expected utility as
in the second best solution, even though CIS’s are no longer optimal.
1.8. Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to argue for the virtues of CIS’s. The idea that I
explore in the paper is that there are information externalities to each confession: when an
agent confesses to be guilty he is providing the principal with the information that other
agents are likely to be innocent. It then follows from my analysis that all members of the
community should be allowed to confess the crime in exchange for a constant punishment,
even before any investigation has been initiated. Even though this might appear as a
radical suggestion, there are variants of CIS’s already in American law. Self-reporting in
environmental law works in very much the same way, even though it is mostly motivated
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by an attempt to reduce monitoring costs. In that context, agents are firms which are able
to confess to have broken environmental regulations in exchange for smaller punishments.
And even in criminal law, plea bargaining also allows agents to confess. In this case, agents
are defendants and, typically, the bargaining occurs only when there is a single defendant,
which largely defeats the purpose of having agents confessing, according to my analysis. A
confession produces no information externalities if there are no other agents to consider. In
that sense, this paper can be seen as providing an argument for plea discussion to occur
earlier in the criminal process, at a time when there are several suspects of committing the
crime.
There are, however, a few problems with expanding the policy of self-reporting to crim-
inal cases which are not directly studied in the text. One such problem is that innocent
agents might be given enough incentives by guilty agents to confess. For example, someone
who is guilty might pay someone else who is innocent to take his place, or even worse, he
might coerce him to. A related problem is the possibility of agents confessing to lesser
crimes, rather than the ones they have committed. In this case, an innocent agent would
still be confessing a crime he did not commit, but the difference is that he is guilty of
committing a similar crime. For example, someone who has committed first degree murder
might be tempted to confess to manslaughter, as presumably the latter crime would render
a smaller punishment. The implementation of a CIS in criminal law would then depend on
whether it is possible to resolve these type of problems in a satisfying manner. A way to,
at least, mitigate them would be to ”validate” the confession of any given agent only if the
evidence supports the claim.
A second problem with implementing such a system is that it is not clear how large
punishments that follow confessions should be. In the model, punishments are a function
of preferences, which are assumed to be observable. In reality though, preferences are not
observable. Hence, the implementation of a CIS would necessarily have to rely on the
existing and future research on defendants’ preferences (see, for example, Tor, Gazal-Ayal
and Garcia (2010) or Dervan and Edkins (2013)). I believe the careful analysis of these and
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other problems is essential to be able to convincingly argue for the introduction of this type
of system in criminal law.
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CHAPTER 2 : Inducing Overconfidence
2.1. Introduction
Overconfidence is a phenomenon which has been widely researched in a variety of subjects
including economics. There have been several papers which claim to provide evidence in
support of the idea that people are overconfident with respect to their own ability (see, for
example, Svenson (1981), Guthrie et al. (2001) and Buehler et al. (1994)). While there
have been other papers which have not found any evidence of overconfidence (see Clark
and Friesen (2009) and Moore and Healy (2008)), there is, at the very least, a justifiable
suspicion that, in various settings, people are overconfident.
I believe the phenomenon of overconfidence is interesting because of the puzzle it
presents. It is no surprise that people are confused about their ability. After all, abil-
ity is unobservable, so each person is limited to observing signals related to it. What is
puzzling is the more or less systematic bias toward overconfidence. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to understand why overconfidence arises, as it may have serious consequences in
people’s lives. Overconfidence can be good - there is some evidence that confidence in one’s
ability improves performance (see Taylor and Brown (1988)). It can also be tremendously
bad. People who overestimate their ability will likely make poor decisions - for example,
overconfident managers may be too willing to invest in risky projects (Malmendier and Tate
(2005)); overconfident entrepreneurs will start businesses they should not have (Camerer
and Lovallo (1999)); even overconfident researchers will immerse themselves into solving
unsolvable mysteries.
Several theories have been presented to try to explain this phenomenon. In the majority
of them, a person becomes overconfident only because of her own decisions.1 In this paper,
I examine the link between overconfidence and the actions that other people take. There
is a vast literature, mainly in applied psychology, that has documented external influences
on people’s expectations - Glasgow et al. (1997) and Smith and Powell (1990), among
many others, highlight the impact of parents on their children’s expectations; Meyer and
1Bénabou and Tirole (2003) is one notable exception, which I discuss below.
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Gellatly (1988) argue that setting external goals increases students’ self-confidence; Hattie
and Timperley (2007) discuss the influence that feedback provided by teachers or parents
may have on one’s confidence; and Klassen (2004) argues that the actions of one’s peers may
have a considerable impact on self-confidence. The traditional explanation for the influence
of others’ actions on self-confidence relies, at least to some extent, on the assumption that
agents interpret the information they collect at face value. For example, imagine that some
agent’s father decides to take over his son’s science project and the son ends up receiving
an ”A” for it. If the son is ”näıve” he might become overconfident about his skill simply
because he does not take into account that most of the work was performed by his father.
While arguments of this nature might sometimes be reasonable, one has to wonder whether,
if this type of interaction happened often, the son would eventually realize that the only
reason he was getting ”A”’s was because of the help he was receiving and not because of
his skill. I provide a theory of induced overconfidence where the agent properly discounts
any outside influence on his performance.
As an example, consider the relationship between a graduate student and his academic
adviser. Upon arrival at the university, the graduate student usually has to go through a
series of tests and examinations during his first year. Once his scores are revealed, both
he and his adviser use them to update their beliefs about the student’s ability. It seems
reasonable to assume the adviser will be more willing to provide guidance and advice to
the student if she believes the student to be of high ability. Therefore, a student who has
performed well in his first year will receive a substantial amount of help, unlike the student
who has not.
The key to my argument is the way I model the impact of the adviser’s help on the
signals that arrive after the first year. Certainly, more help means that the scores the
student obtains in future assessments will probably be higher. However, the downside of
receiving help would be that these future signals would also be less informative. If the
student performs a task on his own and has a good score, he must think that his ability
is high. Likewise, if his score is low, he will think his ability is low. However, when the
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student receives substantial help, he will be unsure whether the score he obtained was a
product of his own ability or of the help he received. Therefore, he will not be as accurate
in inferring his ability from the score he observes.
Take two students who happen to have the same ability but different scores in their
first year. The one who received a high score will receive more help and will therefore place
relatively little weight on future scores. This means that he will be overconfident because
his initial score was high. By contrast, someone who has received a low score during his first
year will not receive as much help and, as a consequence, will place considerable weight on
future scores. Given that the first score was low, the student is likely to improve. Therefore,
he is underconfident immediately after the first year but that underconfidence is likely to
disappear after future signals. The same does not happen with the overconfident students,
who will remain overconfident for longer. It is this asymmetry that causes overconfidence.
There are a number of papers based on this same insight that, while underconfident
people will quickly leave that state, overconfident people will not. Zábojńık (2004) argues
that the opportunity cost of further investigating one’s ability increases with ability and
so overconfident agents will likely stop investigating sooner than will underconfident ones.
Köszegi (2006) states that overconfident people will sometimes obtain less information out
of fear that a bad outcome may make them think their ability is low, which has a direct
impact on their well-being. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show that, with time-inconsistent
preferences, an overconfident agent may prefer not to acquire costless information. Brocas
and Carrillo (2009) argue that overconfident agents require less evidence to support their
investment decisions, which may help explain why so many new businesses fail. What dis-
tinguishes this paper is that I employ a similar logic in a setup where there are two agents (a
father and a son, an adviser and an advisee, etc.) and where one of them strategically tailors
his actions to influence the confidence of the other. Benabou and Tirole (2003) consider a
setup similar to this, in that they also consider an external figure who influences the agent’s
beliefs. However, their model does not generate a systematic bias toward overconfident
beliefs, which is a contribution of this paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the model. In Section
III, I discuss the conditions under which the agent becomes overconfident, based on the
assumption that the more able the agent believes he is, the more help he receives. In
Section IV, I discuss why this assumption is intuitive in various settings. In Section V, I
conclude.
2.2. The Model
There are two actors in the model: the agent and the person who provides help to the
agent, whom I will call the adviser, following the story in the introduction. The agent is
endowed with an ability level y which neither he nor the adviser observes. I assume that
y ∼ N
(
0, σ2y
)
. There are two periods in the model. In the first period, the agent performs
a task for which he receives a score s1. This score will be a function not only of his ability
y but also of some independent random variable ε1. In particular, I assume that
s1 = y + ε1
where ε1 ∼ N (0, 1). Score s1 is publicly available so the adviser is assumed to observe it.
In the story in the introduction, the score s1 represents the grades the graduate student
receives during his first year.
At the end of period 1, there will be some interaction between the agent and the adviser,
which will result in the agent receiving some level of help h ≥ 0, which the agent is assumed
to observe. In Section 4, I discuss this interaction in more detail; for now, I simply assume
that the help the agent receives is a function of s1. In particular, there is Ψ : R→ R+ such
that h = Ψ (s1).
In period 2, the student performs a second task which returns score s2, where
s2 = y + hx+ ε2
I assume that x ∼ N
(
µx, σ
2
x
)
, ε2 ∼ N (0, 1) and that x and ε2 are independent random
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variables. This second score still has the same two components as the first one (i.e., the
agent’s ability and “noise”) but there is a third element, which depends on the help the
agent receives. The random variable x is interpreted as the ability of the adviser. The
idea is that the help the agent receives determines whether the score depends more on the
agent’s ability or on the adviser’s ability. If h is small, then s2 will depend mostly on the
agent’s ability; if h is large, what matters the most is the adviser’s ability.
2.3. Induced overconfidence
I am interested in studying the circumstances under which the agent will be overconfident
about his own ability y at the end of the second period. Given the structure of the signals
the agent observes and by simple Bayesian updating, it follows that
y|s1, s2 ∼ N
(
µ̂y, σ̂
2
y
)
for some µ̂y and σ̂
2
y . The issue now is how to define ”overconfidence”.
One of the most common methods employed by the experimental literature on over-
confidence is to ask people whether they believe they are better than the average (or more
accurately the median).2 If more than 50% of the subjects respond ”yes”, this is taken
as evidence of overconfidence, as it is not possible that more than 50% of the people are
actually better than the median. In my model, recall that y is symmetric around 0, so
there is no distinction between the mean and the median. Furthermore, the agents in my
model also reach the end of period 2 believing their own ability is symmetric around µ̂y.
So, when asked whether they believe their ability is greater than the mean/median, they
would say ”yes” if µ̂y ≥ 0 and ”no” otherwise, simply because µ̂y represents the conditional
expectation, median and mode of their ability.3
2See Dunning, Heath and Suls (2004) for a review.
3For simplicity, I have assumed that ties are solved in favor of the ”yes”. This assumption has no impact
because the event where µ̂y = 0 has a 0 measure.
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Proposition 16 If Ψ is increasing, then
Pr {µ̂y ≥ 0} ≥
1
2
The inequality is strict if Ψ is not constant.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 21 says that, if the help an agent receives is an increasing function of the
first score, the probability that the agent believes his ability is greater than the median is
larger than 50%. The intuition is the following. Let
ŝ2 = s2 − hµx
so that
ŝ2|y, s1 ∼ N
(
y, V ar (y|s1) + h2σ2x + 1
)
It follows that the agent’s conditional expectation µ̂y is simply a weighted average of s1 and
ŝ2 (and the prior mean 0). However, the weights depend on the help the agent receives.
In particular, if help is increasing with s1, the variance of the second signal ŝ2 is larger,
which makes it less informative. As a result, the weight of s1 is larger when s1 is larger and
smaller when s1 is smaller. In other words, if an agent draws a large s1, he is more likely to
end up with a conditional expectation close to it than if he draws a small s1. Notice also
that, if Ψ is constant, the weights on s1 and ŝ2 are also constant and so there is no bias.
Furthermore, if Ψ is decreasing, the opposite happens and the probability that an agent’s
conditional expectation is below 0 is larger than 50%.
Benoit and Dubra (2011) have criticized the previous method of documenting overcon-
fidence. They argue that the fact that most of the population believes that they have a
greater ability than the median is evidence of ”apparent” overconfidence. The approach
taken by those authors is that ”real” overconfidence only exists when agents do not have
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rational expectations. Given that there are models with agents who have rational expec-
tations where the same result is possible (such as this model), observing that most people
believe they have a greater ability than the median is not indicative of overconfidence.
This type of criticism raises the question of whether there is a better, more accurate,
way of defining overconfidence. Taken literally, when someone is overconfident, he is too
confident with respect to something, in this case his own ability. So, whether an agent is
overconfident or not will depend on some comparison between the agent’s beliefs and his
true ability. Of course, the challenge is to compare a distribution (the agent’s beliefs) and
a number (the agent’s ability). However, in this model, the posterior belief of an agent
will be a normal distribution with mean µ̂y, which is also the median and mode. Hence,
it seems natural to think of µ̂y as the agent’s response to the question: ”What do you
think your ability is?”. In this sense, it seems appropriate and intuitive to say that an
agent is overconfident if µ̂y > y and underconfident otherwise. Using this definition and
maintaining the assumption that the agent indeed has rational expectations does preclude
any systematic bias. In particular, if one defines o to be such that
o ≡ µ̂y − y
it follows that E (o) = median (o) = 0. Therefore, if one is of the opinion that overconfidence
exists if and only E (o) > 0 or if and only median (o) > 0, then it must be the case
that overconfidence and rational expectations are incompatible, just as it is understood by
Benoit and Dubra (2011). However, it is not the case that overconfidence (defined as either
E (o) > 0 or median (o) > 0) is incompatible with Bayes’ updating.
The rational expectations assumption can be thought of as three assumptions put to-
gether: first, the agent knows the prior distribution of his own ability y; second, the agent
knows the distributions of scores s1 and s2; third, the agent updates his beliefs about his
own ability by Bayes’ rule. The first of these assumptions is particularly controversial. The
assumption that the agent knows the distribution of his own ability is made mostly out of
convenience and not because there is a particularly compelling reason to think that agents
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are magically born knowing such a thing. In this context, I believe that an equally (if not
more) compelling way to model the agent’s behavior is to assume that he has an uninfor-
mative prior rather than the correct one. In particular, it seems reasonable to think that,
while y ∼ N
(
0, σ2y
)
, the agent will believe y ∼ N
(
0, δ2y
)
, where δy > σy, so that, in a way,
the agent is more confused about his ability than he would be if he actually knew its prior
distribution. Notice in particular that, as δ2y increases, the prior belief of the agent becomes
more and more uniform.
Assuming that the agent’s prior belief about y is distributed according to N
(
0, δ2y
)
,
after having observed scores s1 and s2, the agent will believe
y|s1, s2 ∼ N
(
µ̃y, σ̃
2
y
)
Finally, let
õ = µ̃y − y
so that õ represents the overconfidence of the agent under this new prior.
Proposition 17 If Ψ is increasing and δy > σy, then
E (õ) ≥ 0 and median (õ) ≥ 0
Both inequalities are strict if Ψ is not a constant.
Proof. See appendix.
By simply removing the assumption that the agent knows the prior distribution of
ability and instead assuming that the agent has a prior with a larger variance (and, in the
limit, an uninformative prior), it is possible to have overconfidence in the most intuitive
of definitions. Not only is this definition of overconfidence intuitive, but there are also
examples of empirical papers which document the existence of ”expected overconfidence”
(where E (õ) > 0). For example, in Smith and Powell (1990), a survey of college seniors
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was conducted, in which they were asked their best guess about their own future earnings
as well as the earnings of the rest of their cohort. The results were that the average of the
answers regarding one’s own earnings was higher than the average of the answers regarding
the rest of their cohort - a clear indication of expected overconfidence. I believe that it is
important to highlight that, even though the assumption of rational expectations must be
removed for Proposition 22 to hold, this does not imply the agent is ”irrational”. He is not
endowed with any bias and does Bayes’ updating as before. It is simply the case that he
does not know about his prior distribution of ability and, as a result, relies less on his prior
beliefs and more on the signals he observes.
2.4. Why is help increasing?
In the previous section, I have argued that, if the help an agent receives is an increasing
function of the initial score s1, there will be overconfidence as I have defined it. The purpose
of this section is to discuss several circumstances where such an assumption is reasonable
and intuitive. I provide three separate models that result in an increasing help function.
The common thread in all of them is that a large initial score s1 leads to a public belief
that the agent has high ability. As a result, in the different settings considered, there will
be a desire on the part of others to help/cooperate with that agent for their own benefit.
2.4.1. Adviser/Graduate Student
Consider the story from the introduction where a graduate student is completing his Ph.D.
The student has some unknown ability y and, after the first year, receives score s1. At the
end of the first year, the student is assigned to an adviser who must choose how much help
h ∈
[
0, h
]
to provide to the student. The help the student receives impacts his future score
s2 as in the previous section.
Suppose the adviser’s utility is given by g (s2) − ch, where g′ (s2) > 0 for all s2 and
c > 0. Assume µx > 0 so that the adviser’s help, at least on average, does not harm the
student, and let Ψ (s1) denote the optimal help choice made by the adviser.
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Proposition 18 If g′′ (s2) > 0, then Ψ is increasing.
Proof. See appendix.
By providing help, the adviser incurs a marginal cost c and causes a constant marginal
increase of x of the score s2. However, the adviser is impacted more from the constant
increase in the score if the score is large. Thus, providing help to the student gives more
benefits to the adviser if she believes the score is likely to be larger, which is why she is
more willing to provide help if she believes the student is of high ability.
There are several different reasons why an adviser would have such preferences. Maybe
the adviser receives recognition only for her better students, rather than for their mean
quality. Or perhaps the adviser benefits only from cooperating with the students perceived
to be better, so that there would be an added benefit associated with skilled students. Or
it might even be that the adviser believes that highly skilled students are more likely to
be in a position of influence in the future, which might benefit the adviser indirectly. As
a result, the adviser might be particularly interested in developing a high-ability student’s
career by providing help in obtaining high scores. What is important for the argument to
hold is that the desire to help those students who appear more skilled is greater than the
desire to help those who appear less skilled.
2.4.2. Child/Parents
Consider the interaction between a child and his parents. In particular, think of how parents
choose how to help their children succeed. Typically, the choice parents make is not so much
whether to help their child but rather how to allocate such help.
Imagine that there are N different activities or skills for which an individual is endowed
with an ability level yn, where n = 1, ...N . Assume that yn ∼iid N
(
0, σ2y
)
. In the first
period, the child performs N tests for which she receives the corresponding public scores
{sn1}
N
n=1, where s
n
1 = y
n + εn1 . As in the previous section, for all n, ε
n
1 ∼iid N (0, 1) and is
independent of all other random variables.
In the second period, the child performs another set of N tests. However, the parents
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are able to help the child in each of these. In particular, for each task n, the score the child
receives is given by sn2 = y
n + hnxn + εn2 , where h
n ≥ 0 is the amount of help the parents
provide for task n and xn is the parents’ ability to help the child perform activity n. As
before, xn ∼iid N
(
µnx, σ
2
x
)
, is independent of all other random variables and µnx > 0 for all
n, while εn2 ∼iid N (0, 1) and is independent of all other random variables.
Finally, the parents’ utility function is given by
u
(
{sn2}
N
n=1
)
=
N∑
n=1
g (sn2 )
where g′ (sn2 ) > 0 for all s
n
2 ∈ R. The parents’ problem is to choose {hn}
N
n=1 such that
N∑
n=1
hn ≤ h
where h > 0, in order to maximize their expected utility.
Finally, let Ψn
(
s11, ..., s
N
1
)
denote the optimal help level allocated to task n, given the
set of scores from the first period.
Proposition 19 For all n, if g′′ (z) > 0 for all z ∈ R, then Ψn
(
s11, ..., s
N
1
)
is increasing
with sn1 for all
{
sn̂1
}
n̂6=n.
Proof. See appendix.
The idea behind the argument is the following. Any of these N different skills could be
the basis of a career for the child. For example, the variable y1 could refer to the child’s
musical ability, variable y2 could refer to athletic ability and so on. By obtaining a large
score in the second period on a given task n, this might increase the chances of a successful
career using skill n. So, for example, s12 can be the score of an entry audition for the
Juilliard music school, or s22 can be the performance of the child in his high school football
competition. Naturally, parents would care about these signals because they are positively
correlated with the child’s future success.
The assumption that g is convex simply means that parents prefer the child to be very
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good at one activity than average at all activities. The parents’ motivation is that, if one
thinks of these activities as precursors of future careers, a successful career depends on
having only one very good skill (if the child becomes a professional musician, his athletic
ability is pretty irrelevant in terms of his career). The consequence of this assumption is
that the more convinced the parents are that a child’s skill yn is large, the more they will
be willing to help the child in performing activity n.4
2.4.3. Matching
In most circumstances, most of the influence exerted on an agent comes from his coworkers.
However, the type of coworkers an agent has is likely to depend on the agent’s perceived
ability. In particular, the more skilled an agent is perceived to be, the more cooperation
opportunities he is likely to attract.
Consider a similar scenario as before, where there is a community of I agents all endowed
with some ability level yi, where yi ∼iid N
(
0, σ2y
)
. In the first period, each agent i observes
public signal si1 = y
i + εi1, where ε
i
1 ∼iid N (0, 1) and is independent of all other random
variables. In the second period, agents randomly form pairs and must decide whether to
cooperate. Say a pair (i′, i′′) is formed. If the agents cooperate, they receive a joint single
signal s2 = y
i′ +yi
′′
+ ε̃2, where ε̃2 ∼ N (0, 1) and is independent of other random variables.
If they do not, each of them receives his own signal si2 = y
i + εi2 for i = i
′, i′′, where
εi2 ∼iid N (0, 1) and is independent of other random variables.
I model the second period game between the two matched agents as follows. One of
them is chosen with 50% probability to be given the opportunity to ask the other agent
whether he wants to cooperate. If he has chosen to ask for cooperation, the other agent
must choose whether or not to accept. Cooperation only occurs when the first agent chooses
to ask for it, and the second agent accepts. Finally, I assume that each agent i’s utility is
equal to s2 if there is cooperation and equal to s
i
2 otherwise.
4Even though propositions 21 and 22 do not follow directly, given that Ψ was assumed to be a function
of only one variable, it is easy to show the same exact results hold. Basically, what follows directly from
these is that there is overconfidence at activity n (according to the respective definitions of propositions 21
and 22) conditional on the scores of all other activities
{
sn̂1
}
n̂ 6=n. By integrating out these other scores one
obtains the unconditional overconfidence results of propositions 21 and 22 applied to each activity n.
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Notice that, after period 1, the public belief about any agent i’s ability is that
yi|si1 ∼ N
(
σ2y
1 + σ2y
si1,
σ2y
1 + σ2y
)
,
which then implies that each agent is only willing to cooperate with a partner for whom
the first period’s signal was positive.5
Proposition 20 For any match (i′, i′′),
i) If si1 > 0 for i = i
′, i′′, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is to have
cooperation.
ii) If si1 < 0 for either i = i
′ or i = i′′, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
is not to have cooperation.
Proof. Notice that each agent prefers to cooperate if he believes the other agent’s expected
ability is positive and prefers to refuse to cooperate if he believes it is negative. Hence,
if the conditions of i) hold, the respondent strictly prefers to accept the cooperation offer
and the proposer strictly prefers to propose cooperation. If the conditions of ii) hold and if
a) the proposer’s expected ability is negative, then the respondent will refuse cooperation,
while if b) the respondent’s expected ability is negative but the proposer’s is positive, then
the proposer refuses to propose cooperation.
Agents only wish to cooperate if their match is skilled because only then does the
match bring value to the project. Therefore, agents who receive a high initial score will
have more cooperation opportunities than those who receive a low score. In particular, from
the perspective of some agent i′, it is as if the second period score is equal to
yi
′
+ hx+ ε2
for some independent ε2 ∼ N (0, 1), where x ∼ N
(
σ2
σ2+1
si
′′
1 ,
σ2
σ2+1
)
and denotes the ability
of the agent’s match i′′ and where h is increasing with si
′′
1 (and not a constant in the case
5Notice that the same would be true even if the agents had an uninformative prior. In that case, the
conditional expectation of yi would be exactly equal to si1.
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of si
′′
1 > 0). As a result, the overconfidence results follow from the previous section.
2.5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a theory of induced overconfidence. I have argued that,
in many circumstances, an individual’s opportunities to cooperate and receive help are
positively correlated with past signals of achievement. I gave the example of an academic
adviser who prefers to help students she perceives to be more skilled, parents who prefer to
help their children with the skills where they already distinguish themselves and coworkers
who prefer to cooperate only if they believe their partner is skilled. Overconfidence will
then arise simply because those who are overconfident attract cooperation and, as a result,
receive less informative signals relative to their ability when compared with those who
are underconfident. The asymmetry in the cooperation opportunities is what causes the
overconfidence bias in the agents’ beliefs.
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CHAPTER 3 : Should the Government provide public goods if it cannot commit?
3.1. Introduction
The question of who should provide public goods is an old question in the economic lit-
erature. In a seminal work, Samuelson (1954) argues that, in a world with complete in-
formation, the market will typically be unable to provide an efficient allocation of public
goods due to what I refer to as the ”classical” free riding problem - each agent disregards
the positive impact that his private contribution to the provision of public goods has on
other agents. Hence, if a benevolent dictator (BD) exists, he should be able to solve all
inefficiencies simply by imposing socially optimal contributions on the agents. This line of
reasoning seems to point to the superiority of the government provision of public goods.
One of the assumptions made in this argument is that this BD has complete information
about the agents’ preferences. Some authors, most notably Hayek (1945), see in this an
argument in favor of the market. In a free market, agents make decisions based on prices,
and prices contain information. Therefore, the market outcome will be more efficient as it
will be a function of the agents’ private information while, according to Hayek, a centralized
alternative will not.
The development of the literature of mechanism design applied to the provision of public
goods has analyzed the general problem of constructing mechanisms that elicit reports from
the agents in order to retrieve their private information. The famous revelation principle
(see, e.g. Myerson (1979)) states that one can restrict attention to revelation mechanisms,
where agents simply report their private type to a mediator, which then maps those reports
into allocations. By thinking of the mediator as a BD we see that the revelation principle is
the answer to Hayek’s argument. Any mechanism outcome (including a market mechanism)
can be replicated by a BD using a revelation mechanism. However, this argument assumes
that the BD is able to commit to a particular allocation of public goods even if such
allocation is not optimal, given the agents’ reports. In this paper, I revisit the question
of who should provide public goods but assume the BD is no longer able to commit. I
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specifically model the BD and assume he has preferences over the agents’ utilities. In
particular, I assume the BD’s utility function is W (u) where u = (u1, ..., uN ) is the vector
of individual utilities each agent n = 1, ..., N has. I also assume W is strictly increasing
with each un, symmetric (so that all agents are cared for equally) and strictly concave. The
strict concavity makes the BD prefer to impose higher transfers on the agents that value
the public good the most.1
In the typical mechanism design approach to the problem of public good provision, the
mediator (which we interpret as the BD) maps the agents’ truthful reports to units of the
public good to provide and to transfers each individual must make. If he has commitment
power, this mapping is chosen to maximize the BD’s ex-ante expected utility E (W ). Typ-
ically, however, such mapping will not be ex-post optimal for the BD, i.e. after he receives
the truthful reports from the agents he would prefer to provide a different level of public
goods and/or select different transfers to impose on each the agent. The optimal mapping
chosen by a BD that is able to commit has two features that are important for this dis-
cussion: for some truthful reports, the BD will prefer to i) provide a higher quantity of the
public good and, ii) alter the transfers each agent is making in order to guarantee that the
agents who have a stronger desire for the public good are the ones that pay for it the most.
Hence, if the BD is unable to commit to that mapping, agents will be reluctant to reveal
their private information out of fear that the public good will not be provided if they do,
or that they will be charged too high of a transfer.
My analysis is predicated on the assumption that the BD cannot commit. When a par-
ticular agent or institution has commitment power, it is usually understood that that agent
or institution is able to write a contract. Thus, it is assumed that some other exogenous
entity enforces the contract. That means that, if one of the parties breaks the contract, that
outside entity will impose a harsh punishment which would make such breach undesirable
- that entity is the source of authority. Hence, if a BD or a government are defined to have
this authority, the contracts they write cannot be enforced by some other institution. It is
1Some of the results I present also hold if W is linear. I will point out when they do not in the text.
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possible, however, that the BD acts as if he can commit. For example, we see that most
countries have written constitutions in what appears to be an attempt from governments
to gain such commitment power. However, all constitutions are changeable and many are
altered quite frequently. We also constantly see promises made by governments that are
quickly broken. For these reasons, it seems relatively clear to me that, at the very least,
there are some limitations to the commitment power of the government.
The goal of this paper is to compare two alternative ways of providing the public good.
The first one is through a BD who is unable to commit, while the second one is through the
voluntary provision of public goods where the BD is absent. Given the absence of the BD in
the second alternative, I label it as ”Anarchy”. I model these two alternatives in a similar
way. I consider a model where there are two periods. In the first period, the communication
period, each agent simultaneously sends a public message out of an arbitrarily large message
set. The second period is where decisions about contributions are made. In the BD system,
the BD imposes the contributions each agent makes as a function of the reported messages.
In the anarchic system, individual agents simultaneously and voluntarily select their own
private contribution as a function of their own private information as well as of the reported
messages.
I make two main assumptions that are more or less standard in the public good lit-
erature: i) agents’ utility functions are quasilinear, and ii) the BD must guarantee that
all agents have an ex-post utility that is (weakly) higher than if the public good was not
provided at all, i.e. I assume the BD faces ex-post individual rationality constraints.2
There are two main results from my analysis. The first result is that if the public good
is binary - g ∈ {0, 1} where g stands for the number of units of the public provided - all equi-
librium outcomes of the BD system are also equilibrium outcomes of the anarchic system.
Moreover, the opposite is not true and the expected welfare associated with some equilibria
of the anarchic system is strictly higher than the expected welfare of any equilibrium of the
BD system. The second result is that if g ∈
{
0, 1k , ...,
k
k
}
for some integer k, there is some
2In the text, I justify this assumption and discuss its implications for the main results.
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integer k such that the anarchic system is preferred if k < k but the BD system is preferred
if k > k.
The intuition is as follows. Consider the case where g ∈ {0, 1} and there is complete
information. In this case, there are always Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcomes of the vol-
untary contribution game that maximize social welfare. This is because, given that W is
strictly concave, the socially optimal transfer vector is such that all agents have the same
utility. Therefore, all agents’ utility will be positive. That same transfer vector is also a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcome as no agent wishes to deviate to a different transfer: by
assumption, if the good is not being provided, each agent is not willing to provide it by
himself; if the good is being provided, there is no incentive in making a higher transfer (for
it would not increase the amount of units provided) or a lower transfer (as the good would
not be provided at all which would make the agent indifferent at best). This means that the
classical free-riding problem identified in Samuelson (1954) is not present when g ∈ {0, 1}.
It is the fact that the information is private that prevents socially optimal outcomes. The
first result can then be interpreted as corroborating Hayek’s argument, whenever the public
good provision problem is a merely informational one. However, as k increases, the classical
free riding problem starts to emerge. In particular, given the quasilinear assumption on the
agents’ utility function, the highest level of public good that can be provided in Anarchy
is 1k , as agents always have an incentive to undercut their contribution otherwise, which is
the basis of the second result.
By combining the two main results, the conclusion is that there is a trade-off associated
with the centralized provision of public goods. A BD is better equipped to deal with the
classical free riding problem described in Samuelson (1954), but is less capable of accom-
modating the private information held by the agents as described in Hayek (1945). The
relative strength of each of these two forces, which we measure by k, determines whether a
centralized provision of public goods improves upon an anarchic one.
I believe this paper makes contributions to three different areas of the economic litera-
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ture. First, to the literature on public goods. The classic literature on public good provision
with incomplete information, which includes Groves (1973), d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet
(1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979) among others, typically assumes the mediator/BD has
complete contracting ability. This paper relates more closely to the literature that reduces
the commitment power of the BD. Schmidt (1996) provides an argument for the privatiza-
tion of public firms. The idea is that, if the government is directly responsible for the firm
and is unable to commit, it will receive private information that will make it less able to
provide incentives for the agents employed by the firm to exert effort. Hence, the author
argues, privatization (and subsequent regulation) can be seen as a useful commitment de-
vice by the government. The main difference from Schmidt (1996) to this paper is that the
former focuses on the moral hazard problem rather than on the adverse selection problem
the government faces.
Second, this paper may be interpreted in light of the literature on the decentralization of
the government. It is possible to interpret the agents in our model as local representatives
of different regions and ask the question: should the decision about a public good that
affects all regions be made by a centralized government? Or should it be left to the local
representatives to reach an agreement? The classical analysis of this problem is due to
Oates (1972), where the author argues that decentralization will be preferred as long as
the provision of the public good in a given region does not generate large enough positive
spillovers on the other regions. Besley and Coate (2003) and Lockwood (2002) relax the
assumption made in Oates (1972) that a centralized government selects a uniform policy
for all its regions but still assume complete information. There are also several papers that
analyze the same question under incomplete information but do not allow for communication
among the regions (for example Kessler(2014) or Cho (2013)) which limits the benefits of
decentralization. Klibanoff and Poitevin (2013) is an exception in that the authors do
allow for some bargaining to occur between the regions. However, when modelling the
decentralized system, it is assumed that the regions are able to celebrate contracts among
themselves. As discussed above, if it is possible for the regions to celebrate contracts, then
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it seems reasonable to also allow the government to celebrate contracts with the regions,
which, by the revelation principle would be preferred. For this reason, in my analysis, the
regions (agents) are not allowed to celebrate contracts.
Finally, our analysis of the anarchic system builds on the notion that allowing agents
to communicate enhances considerably the set of allocations that form an equilibrium.
Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) show that, in a bilateral trade setting, the introduction
of a cheap talk stage, prior to having the traders participate in a double action, allows the
implementation of a much larger set of allocations. This paper also builds on Agastya et
al (2007) in that the construction of the anarchic system is very similar. The authors show
that, in a public good environment with private types, quasilinear individual utility func-
tions and a binary public good, even simple pre play communication (in that the message
set is restricted) enlarges the set of allocations that are implementable through a voluntary
provision game. They also show that, if we do not restrict the message set and under some
conditions, the anarchic system is able to implement the expected welfare maximizing allo-
cation, among all of those that are incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
In Proposition 32 of this paper I show that the same result holds in this framework, where
the welfare function is strictly concave (instead of it being linear), ex-post (rather than
interim) individually rational allocations are considered and there are N agents (instead of
only 2).3 The main differences from this paper, however, are that the comparison with the
BD system is absent and that we provide an analysis for the case when the public good
is not binary and show how this assumption affects the success of the anarchic system as
compared to the BD alternative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I formalize the setup of
the model. In section 3, I describe the BD system. I characterize the welfare maximizing
mechanism that could be implemented by a BD that is able to commit and analyze the
consequences of eliminating that commitment power. Section 4 introduces the anarchic
system and compares it with the BD system (with and without commitment power). Section
3In the text, I discuss in more detail why this result does not follow directly from Agastya et al (2007).
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5 extends the analysis to discrete but non-binary public goods. In section 6, I discuss
two extensions: first, I analyze whether the existence of a mediator could eliminate the
consequences associated with the loss of commitment power by the BD; and second, I
discuss the individual rationality assumption and its implications. Section 7 concludes.
3.2. Model
I consider a community with N > 1 agents. Each agent n is endowed with a private type
vn ∈ {v, v} where v > v > 0. We often refer to v as the high type, and v as the low type.
We assume vn is independent and identically distributed across n and denote by π ∈ (0, 1)
the probability that vn = v for all n.
I assume that the public good g is either produced or not and so g ∈ {0, 1}. The cost
of providing the public good is given by ĉ ≡ Nc, i.e. g =
 1 if
∑N
n=1 tn ≥ ĉ
0 otherwise
, where
c ∈ (v, v) denotes the average cost of providing the public good. I assume c ∈ (v, v) so
that, at least for v = (v, ..., v) it is at least possible to finance the public good, and for
v = (v, ..., v) it is not. The utility function of each agent n is given by un = vng − tn - it
depends on whether the public good is provided and on the transfer tn ∈ R agent n makes.
Allocations are evaluated based on a welfare function W : RN → R - a function of the
individual utilities u = (u1, ..., un). I normalize W (0, .., 0) = 0 and assume that W is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and symmetric.
I also assume v < v+ c. This assumption is convenient for two reasons. First, it implies
that v < ĉ which means that an individual is unable to provide the public good by himself.
Second, as I argue in the next section, the assumption guarantees that, in the first best
allocation to be defined, there are no negative transfers.
3.3. Benevolent Dictator
In this section, I assume the existence of a benevolent dictator (BD) who is responsible for
the provision of the public good. I assume the BD’s interests are aligned with those of the
society and so, the BD’s utility function is given by W .
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There are two periods in this framework. In the first period, the communication period,
each agent n simultaneously sends a message mn from an arbitrarily large message set Mn.
At the end of the first period, all messages become known to all agents, including the BD.
In the second period, the BD selects whether the good is provided or not - g ∈ {0, 1} - and
a transfer scheme t = (t1, ..., tN ), should the good be provided, such that
∑N
n=1 tn ≥ ĉ.4 I
assume that the BD may not inflict a loss on any agent as a result of financing of the public
good, i.e. I impose the BD faces ex-post individual rationality constraints.5
3.3.1. With Commitment Power
I start with the more traditional analysis of the BD’s problem when he has commitment
power - when he can commit not to alter the ex-ante optimal maps from the messages sent
by the agents to his own actions. Given the BD is able to commit, we can refer to the
Revelation Principle and restrict our attention to revelation mechanisms - Mn = {v, v} for
all n - where truthful reporting is an equilibrium. The BD’s problem is then to choose
ρ : {v, v}N → [0, 1] - the probability that the public good is provided, and t : {v, v}N → RN
- the contributions he demands from each agent should the good be provided, given any
possible truthful reports.6 Notice that lotteries over transfers are not optimal given that W
is strictly concave with un while un is linear with tn. Hence, the objective function of the
BD is
V (ρ, t) =
∑
v∈{v,v}N
Pr {v} ρ (v)W (v1 − t1 (v) , ..., vN − tN (v)) (3.1)
4If the public good is not provided I set t = (0, ..., 0).
5I discuss the implications of this assumption in section 6.2.
6This formulation assumes that it is only possible to impose transfers on the agents when the good is
provided.
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The BD also faces incentive constraints,
∑
v−n∈{v,v}N−1
Pr {v−n} ρ (vn, v−n) (vn − tn (vn, v−n)) (3.2)
≥
∑
v−n∈{v,v}N−1
Pr {v−n} ρ
(
v′n, v−n
) (
vn − tn
(
v′n, v−n
))
for all v′n, vn and n
ex-post participation constraints,
ρ (v) (vn − tn (v)) ≥ 0 for all n and v (3.3)
and feasibility constraints
ρ (v)
(
N∑
n=1
tn (v)− ĉ
)
≥ 0 for all v (3.4)
Condition (3.2) imposes that all agents prefer to truthfully report, rather than misreport
their type. Condition (3.3) guarantees that all agents have a positive ex-post utility, no
matter what the realization of v is. This condition effectively grants veto power on each
agent as no allocation that makes an agent worse off is allowed. Condition (3.4) guarantees
that the public good is fully funded by the agents whenever it gets provided.
We start by characterizing the first best allocation (ρ∗, t∗) - where we maximize (3.1)
subject to (3.4). Notice that it is efficient to provide the public good if and only if the sum
of the valuations of all agents exceeds the cost of providing it. Given the type space of each
agent is binary, it is efficient to provide the public good if and only if there are enough high
valuation agents. Notice also that, if v is such that ρ∗ (v) = 0, the choice of the transfer
vector is irrelevant so, WLOG, we set t∗n (v) = c for all n.
Let i (v) be the number of high reports in v (i (v) ≡
N∑
n=1
1 {vn = v}) and î ∈ N be the
smallest number of high type agents for which it is efficient to provide the public good (for
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all integers i ≥ î, iv+(N − i) v ≥ ĉ). For simplicity, we assume îv+
(
N − î
)
v > ĉ - if there
was complete information the BD would never be indifferent - which allows for a simpler
exposition of the results.
Proposition 21 For all v and n,
i) ρ∗ (v) =
 1 if i (v) ≥ î0 if i (v) < î and
ii) t∗n (v) =
 v −
i(v)v+(N−i(v))v
N + c if vn = v and ρ
∗ (v) > 0
v − i(v)v+(N−i(v))vN + c if vn = v and ρ
∗ (v) > 0
Proof. If ρ∗ (v) > 0 then
t∗ (v) ∈ arg max
t∈RN :
N∑
n=1
tn≥ĉ
W (v1 − t1, ..., vN − tN )
which implies ii) given the strict concavity of W . Notice also
max
t∈RN :
N∑
n=1
tn≥ĉ
W (v1 − t1, ..., vN − tN ) ≥W (0, ..., 0)
if and only if i (v) ≥ î.
In the first best allocation, the public good always gets provided as long as it is efficient
to do so. This is because if it is efficient to provide the public good, it is always possible to
find transfers that make all agents better than what they would have been had the public
good not been provided.
Given that W is strictly concave, the BD has equality concerns. This implies that,
conditional on each v, the BD selects transfers in order to equate all agents’ utilities. Given
that the agents have transferable utility, transferring utility from an agent with a high utility
to an agent with a low utility, through a reallocation of the transfers, is welfare increasing.
Hence, t∗ (v) is such that all agents have similar utilities given v. The assumption that
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v < v+c is used in this proposition as it guarantees that the BD does not choose a negative
transfer as a way to redistribute utility.7
Now, I analyze the original problem the BD faces: to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2),
(3.3) and (3.4). Even though there may be multiple solutions, I only discuss solution
(
ρ, t
)
,
that is characterized by the fact that it is the only solution where the probability of providing
the public good ρ only depends on the number of high and low agents, and not on their
identity.8 Formally, ρ is such that ρ (v) = ρ (v′) if i (v) = i (v′) for all v, v′.
The problem of finding
(
ρ, t
)
is a fairly standard one. The only novelty has to do with
the fact that W is strictly concave rather than linear, which makes it harder to implement
efficient allocations as I now explain. If the BD was to impose the first best solution (ρ∗, t∗),
low valuation agents would report truthfully, given that the transfer they would have to pay,
if they misreported, would be higher than their valuation. However, high type agents might
not. Hence, in order to provide incentives for high type agents to report truthfully, the BD
must either decrease the transfer that high type agents make and/or decrease the probability
the public good is provided if too many agents report low. If the BD is inequality averse,
there is a welfare cost associated with the former. Hence, the BD will prefer to distort ρ
more than what it would have if W was linear.
Proposition 27 characterizes
(
ρ, t
)
.
Proposition 22 i)
N∑
n=1
tn (v) = ĉ,
ii) tn (v) = tn′ (v) if vn = vn′ for all vn, vn′ , v.
iii) tn (vn, v−n) = tn
(
vn, v
′
−n
)
if i (vn, v−n) = i
(
vn, v
′
−n
)
for all vn, v−n, v
′
−n.
iv) tn (v) ≤ t∗n (v) if vn = v and tn (v) ≥ t∗n (v) if vn = v with both inequalities being
strict if (ρ∗, t∗) is not incentive compatible.
7If v < v + c then v + c > i(v)v+(N−i(v))v
N
for all v and N .
8The multiplicity of solutions has two reasons. First, if ρ (v) = 0 the decision on t (v) is irrelevant.
Following the same convention as with (ρ∗, t∗), WLOG, I set tn (v) = c for all n whenever ρ (v) = 0. Second,
there may be degrees of freedom in the decision of ρ (v) for the set of v that have a common i (v). By
imposing that ρ (v) = ρ (v′) if i (v) = i (v′) for all v, v′ we obtain ρ.
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v) There is i ∈
{̂
i, ..., N − 1
}
such that, ρ (v) =
 1 if i (v) > i0 if i (v) < i .
Proof. See appendix.
As I mention in the Introduction, and show in section 4, it is possible to implement(
ρ, t
)
in Anarchy. Property i), that states that there are no wasted transfers, plays a key
role in that argument. I will discuss that role in more detail in section 4. Properties ii)
and iii) taken together imply that transfers are anonymous, i.e. an agent’s transfer only
depends on his type and on how many high type agents there are; not on his index n.
This is guaranteed by the strict concavity of W and is a property of any solution of the
problem. Property iv) states that there is more inequality among the agents than in the
first best. As discussed above, the BD is forced to distort the optimal transfers it would
have wanted to implement in order to make high valuation agents less willing to misreport.
Given that the distortion decreases the transfers imposed on high valuation agents, this
means that low valuation agents are now contributing more and so the inequality is higher.
Finally, property v) states that there is less provision of the public good than the efficient
one for similar reasons. In order to create incentives for high valuation agents to report
truthfully, if there are too many agents reporting to have low valuations, the public good
is not provided, even though it would have been efficient to.
The last two properties also imply that the BD solution may not be ex-post welfare
maximizing. After knowing the agents’ truthful reports, the BD would rather provide the
public good if and only if it was efficient to do so and impose the ex-post optimal transfers.
But knowing this, agents would be reluctant to truthfully report in the first place. In the
next section, I describe the consequences of removing the commitment power of the BD.
3.3.2. Without Commitment Power
In this section, I study what would happen if the BD did not have commitment power. The
framework is the same as before except that, after the first period and once all messages
have been revealed, the BD has no choice but to behave optimally, given the beliefs he has
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at that time. As such, it is no longer possible to refer to the revelation principle, because
the beliefs the BD holds at the beginning of the second period constrain his decision. I refer
to this mechanism (and not any other mechanism that requires commitment power by the
BD) as the BD system in the remainder of the paper and it is this system that I compare
with the anarchic system, to be defined in the next section.
Let σn =
(
σvn, σ
v
n
)
denote a generic strategy of agent n where σvnn ∈ ∇ (Mn) for all vn ∈
{v, v} and let σ = (σ1, .., σN ). An agent’s strategy is a choice of a probability distribution
over the message space for each type.
Let ξ =
{
ξm : m ∈M ≡ {Mn}Nn=1
}
denote a generic strategy of the BD where ξm ∈
∇
(
RN
)
. A BD’s strategy is a choice of a probability distribution over the set of all possible
transfer vectors for each message vector received. Notice that I do not include a choice
over the probability that the public good is provided. In principle, it could be possible for
the BD to randomize between providing and not providing the public good, given some
message vector m, which would require the BD to specify a probability the public good is
provided and a transfer vector in case it did, just like in the previous section. However,
if the BD cannot commit, he must be indifferent between providing and not providing the
public good to be able to do this randomization. As I argue below, this does not happen
and the BD always strictly prefers one of the two options. Therefore, WLOG, it is enough
to specify a distribution over the transfer vector with the understanding that these are no
longer contingent transfers, which means that the public good is provided if and only if the
sum of the transfers exceeds the cost of providing the public good.
A BD equilibrium is a strategy profile (σ, ξ) and a set of beliefs that form a perfect
bayesian equilibrium (PBE): i) given the beliefs that follow message m, the choice of ξm is
optimal; ii) for all n, σn is chosen optimally anticipating all agents’ future play, iii) beliefs
are updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
If
(
ρ, t
)
= (ρ∗, t∗) (if the first best allocation is incentive compatible), then a BD without
commitment power can also implement
(
ρ, t
)
. This is because, if agents report truthfully,
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it will be in the BD’s best interest, given his beliefs at the end of the first period, to act
as specified by
(
ρ, t
)
. However, if
(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗), things are not as simple. Notice that,
in this case, truthful reporting is no longer an equilibrium for otherwise (ρ∗, t∗) would be
incentive compatible. Hence, there is no equilibrium that is fully informative. The ability
to obtain information from the agents is therefore hindered by the lack of commitment
power. In proposition 28, I show that this difficulty in obtaining information from the
agents generates a strict loss in the expected welfare of society, associated with the loss of
commitment power.
Proposition 23 If
(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗) the value of the BD system (the highest expected welfare
among all BD equilibria) is strictly smaller than V
(
ρ, t
)
.
Proof. Recall that, for any solution of the problem of the previous section (where the BD
had commitment power), the only incentive constraint that binds is one that imposes that
the sum across all agents of the expected utility of reporting truthfully, when they have
a high valuation, is higher than misreporting - see the proof of Proposition 27 for details.
Therefore, it follows that, for any solution of the problem of the previous section, we have
that, when all agents’ types are high, the public good is provided with probability 1 and
each agent makes a transfer of c, just like with
(
ρ, t
)
.
Suppose such solution is implementable by a BD without commitment power and take
any BD equilibrium that implements it. Consider any message m = (m1, ...,mN ) such that,
for all n, mn is played by type v of agent n. If that solution is implementable, it must
be that after m, the BD provides the public good and the transfer agent n must make
is equal to c. However, that is only possible if, for all n, mn is sent only by type v of
agent n, for otherwise agent n’s maximum transfer would be v < c (given that the BD is
unable to impose a transfer on any agent that makes his ex-post utility negative). This
implies that there must be truthful reporting by each agent. But that cannot be given that(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗).
I now provide a characterization of the set of BD equilibria. Notice that, for any
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BD equilibrium (σ, ξ), ξ reflects the optimal decision the BD makes, at the beginning of
the second period, and given his beliefs about the agents’ types. Such beliefs depend
on σ - the reporting strategies of the agents - and on m - the realized vector message.
Let pσ (m) ∈ [0, 1]N be such that pσn (m) represents the probability that the BD places
on agent n being of type v after observing message m and given reporting strategy σ. It
is also convenient to define iσ (m) to be the number of agents the BD is certain are of
type v (iσ (m) ≡
N∑
n=1
1 {pσn (m) = 1}) and xσ (m) to be the optimal transfer scheme for the
BD, after observing message m and conditional on providing the public good, i.e. xσ (m) =
arg maxx∈RN+
Ev|σ,m [W (v1 − x1, ..., vN − xN )] subject to the ex-post individual rationality
constraints (xn ≤ v if pσn (m) < 1) and feasibility constraints (
N∑
n=1
xn ≥ ĉ).
Lemma 3 For all BD equilibrium (σ, ξ) and for all m ∈M ,
i) If iσ (m) ≥ î then ξm (a) =
 1 if a = x
σ (m)
0 otherwise
,
ii) If iσ (m) < î then ξm (a) =
 1 if a = (0, ..., 0)0 otherwise ,
iii) If pσn′ (m
′) > pσn′ (m
′′) and pσn (m
′) = pσn (m
′′) for all n 6= n′, then xσn′ (m′) ≥ xσn′ (m′′).
The last inequality is strict if xσn′ (m
′) < v,
iv) xσn (m) < v if p
σ
n (m) = 0.
Proof. Properties i) and ii) follow from the fact that, if pσn (m) < 1, then x
σ
n (m) ≤ v given
the ex-post individual rationality constraint the BD faces. Hence, the maximum revenue
gathered is given by iσ (m) v + (N − iσ (m)) v which implies ii). If iσ (m) ≥ î, then it is
optimal for the BD to provide the good given that W is strictly increasing and that un is
linear with tn for all n. Property iii) follows from the strict concavity of W . The weak
inequality becomes strict if the ex-post participation constraint for player n′ does not bind
(and holds with an inequality) for message m′. Property iv) comes from the fact that the
highest transfer agent n has to pay if pσn (m) = 0 is when i
σ (m) = î and, for all n′ such
that pσn′ (m) < 1 it is the case that p
σ
n′ (m) = 0. In that case, m fully reveals the true v, and
so the transfers that follow are such that all agents have a strictly positive utility which
87
implies xσn (m) < v.
Notice that, given the ex-post individual rationality constraints, the BD cannot impose
a transfer above v on an agent unless he is certain that the agent has a high valuation. This
is because, if not, a low type agent could have a negative ex-post utility. Therefore, it is
only possible to fund the good if there are at least î ”certified” high valuation agents. Given
that the BD is inequality averse, he will select a transfer vector that makes high valuation
agents pay for most of the good, should he choose to provide it. This creates an additional
incentive for agents to misreport, as high valuation agents are reluctant to announce their
type knowing the BD’s intentions. Notice also that, regardless of his beliefs, the BD is
never indifferent - he always selects a unique transfer vector in the second period. This
uniqueness is due mainly to the strict concavity of W , which makes it such that xσ (m) is
unique for all σ and m, and also to the assumption made above that îv +
(
N − î
)
v > ĉ.
Now, I analyze the behavior of the agents. As discussed above, the loss of commitment
power makes extracting information from the agents harder. As a result, typically we
should not expect truthful reporting from an equilibrium (unless the first best is incentive
compatible) and, as result, there should be some amount of pooling in any equilibrium.9
In this framework, a high type agent is reluctant to reveal his type because he knows
that it will cause him to make a higher transfer. However, a high report also makes it more
likely the public good is provided. High valuation agents, by definition, value more the
provision of the public good, so they will be more willing to make a high report than low
valuation agents. This means that, even though full separation between the agents cannot
be achieved if there is no truthful equilibrium, some may.
Consider a strategy profile for each agent n where only two messages are played. Label
those messages as H and L. Let the strategy of the low type for any agent n to be to
only send message L while the high type sends message L with probability sn ∈ [0, 1]
9See, for example, Klibanoff and Poitevin (2013), where a similar problem is studied under the assumption
that agents have continuous types. It is shown that there is no truthfull equilibrium and an equilibrium is
characterized where each agent reveals only a range from where his type belongs to.
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and H with probability 1 − sn. We refer to this strategy profile for the agents as σ̃ (s) =
(σ̃1 (s1) , ..., σ̃N (sN )).
Proposition 24 There is s ∈ [0, 1]N and ξ̃ such that
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
is a BD equilibrium and
induces the highest expected welfare among all BD equilibrium profiles.
Proof. See appendix.
The BD equilibrium described above gives the choice to high valuation agents to reveal
their type by sending message H or to hide it by sending message L. High valuation agents
are indifferent between the two choices because, while the former leads to a higher provision
of the public good, the latter involves a smaller transfer.
Finally, there is one last feature of the BD system I want to highlight. Notice that there
is always some information transmission in the BD equilibrium that maximizes expected
welfare, i.e. the s referred to in proposition 30 is not (1, ..., 1). This is because having exactly
î agents truthfully reporting (reporting H when their valuation is high and L when their
valuation is low) while all other agents send a meaningless message (report L regardless
of type) is part of a BD equilibrium given that none of those î agents wants to misreport:
if an agent has a high valuation, reporting L would lead to the public good not being
provided at all; while if the agent has a low valuation, reporting H would lead to a transfer
that would exceed v in every event the public good gets provided. This equilibrium is
preferred to the ”no communication” BD equilibrium given that all agents have a strictly
positive expected utility, which is clearly an improvement to not providing the public good
at all. The implication of this feature is that the BD’s behavior is responsive to the private
information held by the agents. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that a centralized
government selects a ”one size that fits all” policy as sometimes is assumed in some of
the decentralization literature, in particular in Oates (1972). Nevertheless, the general
argument in favor of decentralization still follows in our framework because, even though
in a BD system there is still private information being utilized in the BD’s decision, the
amount of information transmitted is inferior to that of a decentralized system as I argue
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in the next section.
3.4. Anarchy
In this section, I consider what would happen if the BD was not involved in the provision of
public goods - if all agents were free to decide their own voluntary contribution in Anarchy.
I model this new system in a similar way as the system with a BD. There are still two
periods. The first one is a communication period, where each agent simultaneously sends a
message mn ∈Mn and all messages become publicly available at the end of the period. The
difference now is that, in the second period, agents individually and simultaneously choose
their own contribution to the public good, rather than having the BD impose its decision.
If the sum of the contributions exceeds ĉ the public good is provided; otherwise it is not.
A strategy profile for the agents is now composed of two elements - a reporting strategy
profile which is still denoted by σ - and a contribution strategy profile φ = (φ1, ..., φN )
where φn = {φvn,mn : vn ∈ {v, v} and m ∈M} and φvn,mn ∈ ∇ (R+). An agent’s contribution
strategy is a choice of a probability distribution over the set of possible individual transfers,
given the agents’ type and reported messages.
An anarchic equilibrium is a strategy profile (σ, φ) and a set of beliefs that form a PBE:
i) given any message and subsequent beliefs, φ induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the
second period game; ii) for all n, σn is chosen optimally anticipating all agents’ future play,
iii) beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
The first result in this section concerns the connection between the BD system and the
anarchic system. At first sight, it would appear as though the BD system should have an
advantage, as it does not require all agents to be willing to provide contributions for the
public good - it can simply enforce those transfers (notwithstanding the veto power each
agent has in the form of the ex-post individual rationality constraints). However, in the
context of binary public goods, such advantage ends up not mattering, as it is in the agents’
best interest to select the transfers a BD would have selected.
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Consider any BD equilibrium (σ, ξ) and let φ (ξ) be such that
φv,mn (ξ) (a) = ξ
m
n (a) for all a,m, n
and
φv,mn (ξ) (a) =

ξmn (a) if x
σ
n (m) ≤ v
1 if a = 0 and xσn (m) > v
0 otherwise
for all m,n
Now consider the anarchic strategy profile (σ, φ (ξ)). In this profile, agents report as
they did in the BD system and then choose the exact same transfers the BD would have
selected, in the path of play - recall that, in any BD equilibrium (σ, ξ), it must be that
xσn (m) ≤ v whenever pσn (m) < 1, which means that the only event where low type agent
n does not choose the same transfer as the BD would have is when he has deviated in the
first period (played a message such that σ
v
n (m) = 0). Hence, this anarchic strategy profile
induces the same outcome as the BD equilibrium (σ, ξ). In proposition 31, I show that
(σ, φ (ξ)) is indeed an anarchic equilibrium.
Proposition 25 For all BD equilibrium (σ, ξ), (σ, φ (ξ)) is an anarchic equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any (σ, ξ) BD equilibrium and the corresponding anarchic profile (σ, φ (ξ)).
First, notice that φ (ξ) induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the voluntary contribution
game that follows any message m. This is because the BD’s choice reflected in ξ does
not involve any randomization over the transfer vectors. For each m, the BD chooses one
and only one transfer vector - see Lemma 4. This means that the only strictly beneficial
deviation from an agent would be to make a 0 transfer. Given ξ, only low types would have
such incentives, which is accommodated in the definition of φ (ξ).
The last property (σ, φ (ξ)) has to have is that no agent wants to misreport. Because
(σ, ξ) is a BD equilibrium and because, on the path of play, no agents deviates from the
transfer the BD would have chosen, we know that it can only be beneficial for an agent to
misreport, if that agent also deviates in the second period. High valuation agents always
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select the transfers specified in ξ so they will not want to misreport. However, low valuation
agents, after some messages, will prefer to select a transfer of 0 rather than the transfer
specified by ξ. To complete the proof, I show that low valuation agents do not misreport.
Suppose low valuation agent nmisreports and sends any messagemn such that σ
v
n (mn) =
0. If mn is such that p
σ
n (mn,m−n) < 1 for all m−n ∈M−n, then that agent’s decision in the
second period would be to select the transfer the BD would have selected, which implies that
such deviation is not strictly preferred. The only other alternative is that pσn (mn,m−n) = 1
for all m−n ∈ M−n. In that case, the transfer the agent would select would be 0 and the
public good would not be provided. Hence, the expected utility of deviating to such message
would be 0, which is weakly smaller than playing according to σ
v
n.
For (σ, φ (ξ)) to be an anarchic equilibrium, it is necessary that agents do not deviate
in neither period. Typically, agents will not want to deviate in the second period. Recall
that, after receiving all messages, the BD decides one and only one transfer vector. Even
if an agent had the opportunity to choose a different transfer for himself he would not as
higher transfers would not lead to a higher provision of the good and a 0 transfer leads to
a 0 utility. It follows that if agents do not want to deviate in the second period, they also
will not want to deviate in the first period, for otherwise they would have also deviated in
a BD system and (σ, ξ) would not be a BD equilibrium.
It is also important to point out that this result does not depend on the linearity
assumption of the agents’ utility functions, nor on the private types assumption. What is
important is that, for given beliefs, the BD always has a strict preference for some transfer
vector and prefers to make agents with high valuations the primary contributors for the
public good (which, in my framework, is guaranteed by the strict concavity of W ).10
If (σ, φ (ξ)) is an anarchic equilibrium, then all BD equilibria can be ”replicated” in
Anarchy. As I show in the next section, this is a special feature of the binary public good
but an important one nonetheless. First, because there are many examples of interest of
10If W was linear, as in Agastya et al (2007), this result would not be true.
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binary public goods and the discussion of how to fund such projects is very much ongoing.11
And second, and perhaps more importantly, because it highlights the true benefit of having
government intervention in the provision of public goods. A government is valuable not
because it is more able to elicit information from the agents but because of the ”classical”
free riding problem. But not all public goods have the ”classical” free riding problem. Binary
public goods do not, which is why an anarchic provision of the public is superior.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the argument sketched in the Introduction, that
said that a BD can always replicate the outcome of an anarchic system, by referring to the
revelation principle, is completely reversed once we remove the commitment power. If the
BD is unable to commit, it is the anarchic system that is able to replicate any outcome
generated by the BD system.
The next result qualifies the anarchic system in the context of incentive compatible,
ex-post individually rational mechanisms.
Proposition 26 If Mn = {v, v} × [0, 1], there is an anarchic equilibrium
(
σ̂, φ̂
)
that im-
plements
(
ρ, t
)
.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 32 states that the optimal incentive compatible and ex-post individually ra-
tional allocation is implementable in Anarchy. The anarchic equilibrium
(
σ̂, φ̂
)
is described
in more detail in the proof of Proposition 32, but the idea is to have agents truthfully report
their type in the first period. This means that, at the beginning of the second period, the
realization of v would be known to all agents. In the second period, agents then select
transfers according to t whenever ρ (v) = 1 and select a transfer of 0 if ρ (v) = 0.
The reason why such an anarchic equilibrium is possible is similar to Proposition 31.
Typically, no agent wants to deviate from the transfer specified by
(
ρ, t
)
on the second
period, and because
(
ρ, t
)
is incentive compatible, no agent wishes to misreport. The only
additional difficulty that allocation
(
ρ, t
)
brings is that it is possible, for some v, that
11See, for example Barbieri and Malueg (2010), Makris (2009) among many others.
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ρ (v) ∈ (0, 1). One way to try to replicate such ρ (v) would be to make agents randomize in
their transfer decisions. However, that option would waste resources given that, for some
randomizations it could be that the sum of contributions exceeds ĉ or is between 0 and ĉ.
Instead, by extending the message space to incorporate a report over [0, 1] it is possible to
have the agents coordinate play. By coordinating, agents only provide the public good with
probability ρ (v) and, when they do, they select the proper transfers. I explain in more
detail how we can go from the reports over [0, 1] to attain coordination among the agents
in the proof of Proposition 32, but, for all purposes, it is equivalent to having a public
signal distributed uniformly in [0, 1].12 If the public signal is smaller than ρ (v) the agents
coordinate in making positive transfers that lead to the provision of the public good, while
if not they coordinate in not making any transfers.
In Agastya et al (2007) a similar result is derived, where the authors show that an
anarchic system can implement the welfare maximizing allocation among all incentive com-
patible and interim individually rational allocations. The fact that the individual rationality
constraint is imposed on the interim level and that the welfare function is linear allows the
problem of finding that optimal allocation to be simplified to the search for ρ only, as
transfers can always be found to make the allocation both incentive compatible and interim
individually rational. The authors show that the problem of finding such ρ in this context
always leads to ρ (v) ∈ {0, 1} for all v. The main difficulty in that framework is to find the
appropriate transfers than can be voluntarily be given in Anarchy.
In my framework, however, it is not enough to restrict the search of the optimal allo-
cation only to ρ, given that transfers enter non-linearly in the welfare function and there
are more individual rationality constraints to be satisfied. Hence, the difficulty is not to
find the transfers to be given in Anarchy (as they come directly from solving the BD with
commitment power problem) but rather how to deal with the fact that now there may be
v such that ρ (v) ∈ (0, 1), which is why agents must report on more than just their type, as
12The idea is that it is possible to create ”jointly controlled lotteries” following Matthews and Postlewaite
(1989) and, originally, Aumann et al (1968).
94
I describe above.
The implications of proposition 32 are simple. The anarchic system is optimal among
the set of incentive compatible and ex-post individual rational mechanisms. This fact gains
an even higher importance as Anarchy is costless - it simply involves agents communicating
and then making their own decisions. It may be that other systems are not. Any system
where a government has a role involves some costs associated with paying the government’s
employees. So even if, somehow, the government could commit to particular allocations, it
would still generate a smaller expected welfare if such costs were accounted for.
A key assumption in the results of Propositions 31 and 32 is the binary nature of the
public good. In the next section, I argue that the BD’s role becomes much more important
when this assumption is relaxed.
3.5. Discrete Public Good - general case
In this section, I make only one change with respect to the previous framework. I now
assume that g ∈
{
0, 1k ,
2
k , ..,
k
k
}
for some k ∈ N - even though g is still discrete it is no longer
binary. The cost of producing g units of the public good is gĉ while the benefit for agent n
of type vn is gvn.
This context brings about a new problem: a ”classical” free riding problem as identified
in Samuelson (1954). Now, even if there is complete information, the ex-post optimal
transfer vector may not be a Nash equilibrium of the voluntary contribution game. For any
v, the ex-post optimal decision is to provide the public good in 1 unit whenever i (v) ≥ î
and set up some transfers that make high valuation agents make higher transfers. However,
even if v was commonly known, there would be no Bayes Nash Equilibrium that would
provide more than 1k units of the public good. This is because, for more than
1
k units to be
provided, someone must be making a transfer of at least 2kc. That someone would be better
off by decreasing his transfer by 2kc given that that would lead, at most, to a decrease of
1
k
units of the public good. Given that 2c > v the agent prefers that outcome.
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This observation leads to the following result:
Proposition 27 The value of the anarchic system (the highest expected welfare among all
anarchic equilibria) is decreasing with k and converges to 0.
Proof. In the appendix, I show that the value of the anarchic system is decreasing with k.
It converges to 0 because the highest utility any given agent can obtain is bounded above
by v 1k which converges to 0 as k increases.
In this context, k may be interpreted as a measure of the ”classical” free riding problem.
Proposition 33 states that, as that ”classical” free riding problem becomes more severe, the
anarchic system becomes more ineffective.13 Proposition 34 states that, in contrast, the BD
system is unaffected by how large k is.
Proposition 28 The value of the BD system (the highest expected welfare among all BD
equilibria) is independent of k.
Proof. In the appendix, I show that the BD’s decision, for any given beliefs, is always to
provide either 1 or 0 units of the public good. Hence, his decision is independent of k.
Proposition 34 follows from the linearity assumption on both the utility functions of
the agents and on the cost structure imposed. Basically, if providing y < 1 units of the
public good is preferred to not provide it all all, providing 1 unit of the public good will be
optimal, as we are just scaling up the benefits of the agents.
By combining the two previous propositions and using the fact that there is a BD
equilibrium with a strictly positive expected welfare (one where exactly î agents report
truthfully while the rest sends a single message regardless of type), the following result
follows.
Proposition 29 There is some natural number k such that the value of the anarchic system
is higher than the value of the BD system if and only if k ≤ k.
13In a similar context, Barbieri (2012) also highlights some of the problems the voluntary provision of
public goods with pre-play communication may have with non-binary goods.
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Proposition 35 highlights the relative virtues of each of the two systems. Anarchy is
more effective when dealing with ”informational” free-riding, as agents are more willing to
share private information when they know there is no BD who has the power to enforce
transfers against their will. The BD system’s virtues lie on the reduction of ”classical”
free-riding. The parameter k measures the relative importance of each of the two free-riding
problems: if k is small, the ”informational” free-riding prevails and so Anarchy performs
better. But, for large k, the ”classical” free-riding problem becomes more important. The
BD system is unaffected by ”classical” free riding problems and so it will be preferred.
3.6. Extensions
In this section, I discuss two extensions of the model of binary public good provision. The
goal is to inquire how robust is the result that the anarchic system outperforms the BD
system. In the first extension, I allow the BD to use the services of a mediator that receives
the messages from the agents and then makes his own report to the BD, who still makes
all final decisions regarding transfers. In the second extension, I discuss the implications of
the ex-post individual rationality constraints.
3.6.1. Mediator
The question I attempt to answer in this section is whether the presence of a mediator
eliminates the advantage the anarchic system has over the centralized one when the public
good is binary. I define the mediator to be someone that receives the messages sent by the
agents and transmits its own message to the BD from an arbitrarily large message set that
WLOG can still be M . This means that the mediator can pool the information gathered
from the agents when communicating with the BD. I assume the mediator is indifferent
among all outcomes so that no additional incentive constraints are required.
Let ζ = {ζm : m ∈M} denote a generic strategy of the mediator where ζm ∈ ∇ (M) -
the mediator selects a probability distribution over the set of messages M , for every message
m he has received. A mediator equilibrium is a strategy profile (σ, ζ, ξ) such that, just like
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in the BD equilibrium, the agents and the BD choose their actions in order to maximize
their expected utility and beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
No behavior is imposed on the mediator.14
The first result is that the presence of a mediator does make a difference.
Proposition 30 There is a mediator equilibrium that has a strictly higher expected welfare
than the value of the BD system as long as
(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗).
Proof. See appendix.
The weak part of the proposition is straightforward. We can simply have a passive
mediator and replicate the BD equilibrium. The strict part comes from the fact that the
mediator can use all the information provided by the agents when communicating with the
BD. We illustrate the point with N = 2. Recall that, from proposition 30, we have that
the highest expected welfare BD equilibrium was defined by
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
for some s ∈ (0, 1)2.
If the first best allocation (ρ∗, t∗) is not incentive compatible, it must be that such that
s 6= (0, 0). In this mediator setting, we can replicate the exact same equilibrium by having
agents report truthfully their types to the mediator (so that an H (L) message is as if the
agent says he is of type v (v)) and then allowing the mediator to mix between the messages
to be sent to the BD as follows:
HH HL LH LL
(v, v) (1− s1) (1− s2) (1− s1) s2 (1− s2) s1 s1s2
(v, v) 0 (1− s1) 0 s1
(v, v) 0 0 (1− s2) s2
(v, v) 0 0 0 1
where the rows represent the messages received by the mediator, which are then mapped to
the messages in the columns that are received by the BD. Assume that î = 1, so that the
BD provides the public good if and only if the message he receives contains at least one H.
14Notice that the assumption that the mediator has no strict preference over any outcome increases the
set of possible mediator equilibria.
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This means that after LL the public good does not get provided. Then, instead of using
the previous strategy, we can have the mediator send the following:
HH HL LH LL
(v, v) (1− s1) (1− s2) +s1s2 (1− s1) s2 (1− s2) s1 0
(v, v) 0 (1− s1) 0 s1
(v, v) 0 0 (1− s2) s2
(v, v) 0 0 0 1
We can have the mediator send a HH message when he knows both agents are of
type v rather than sending LL. The payoffs after any message received by the BD do not
change. The only thing that changes is that the expected welfare of a high type agent is
now increased, provided he reports truthfully, as the public good is being provided more
often. Low valuation agents’ incentives to misreport are even smaller because after HH
the good is provided but they would have to contribute c > v. Hence, the fact that the
mediator can use all the information from both agents when communicating with the BD
does makes a difference and allows for a higher expected welfare.
The next result states that, even though the presence of the mediator strictly improves
upon the value of the BD system, it is still strictly worse than the anarchic alternative.
Proposition 31 If
(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗), there is no mediator equilibrium that can implement(
ρ, t
)
.
Proof. Notice that, WLOG, we can restrict our attention to truthful reporting by the
agents. This is because it is always possible to rewrite any other type of reporting profile
that is a part of a mediator equilibrium by having the mixing over the messages being
done by the mediator, rather than by the agents, as I showed in the proof of proposition
36. Assuming truthful reporting by the agents, consider the mediator’s choice. In order to
implement
(
ρ, t
)
it must be that the mediator fully reveals the agents’ types to the BD by
the same argument as in proposition 28. But it that was the case, high valuation agents
would prefer to misreport given that
(
ρ, t
)
6= (ρ∗, t∗).
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The mediator’s presence does not solve the informational free riding problem because
it is still not possible to use all the information gathered by the agents. Even with the
presence of the mediator, the agents know the BD will make all the final decisions, which
prevents them from communicating as much as they would have if the BD did not exist.
3.6.2. Individually Rationality Constraints
In my exposition so far I have assumed that the BD was not allowed to make any agent
worse off as a result of the provision of the public good. In this section, I discuss the reasons
such assumption is made, and the consequences of relaxing it.
The main argument for that assumption is that, if the BD imposes a loss on an agent,
the agent would have an incentive to simply not participate in the mechanism, which would
be somewhat equivalent to him leaving the community and looking for a different one where
the public good is not provided. Green and Laffont (1979, p.121) defend the assumption
by arguing that it represents the ”ethical precept that no one should have to be forced to
participate in the mechanism, and each has a right to withdraw from the system, abstain
from consuming any public goods, and live independently with his endowment intact”.
In this paper’s context, it is also possible to interpret the ex-post individual rationality
constraint as being part of the social welfare function. In particular, such constraint is
equivalent to having a strongly negative welfare in case one of the agents has a negative
utility - a rawlsian welfare function, for example, would have that property.
The imposition of this constraint only plays a role in the centralized system. In Anarchy,
the constraint must be satisfied by default given that every agent always has the opportunity
to simply not contribute, which guarantees that he cannot be made worse off. However,
it may be in the best interest of the BD to have some agent have a negative payoff when
he is unsure of the valuation of that agent. For example, if the BD believes the agent’s
type is high with a probability very close to 1, he will be very inclined to impose a high
transfer on such agent which, in the unlikely event that the agent ends up ends up having a
low valuation, may lead him to have a negative payoff. In this sense, the ability to impose
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negative utilities on the agents will be an extra tool the BD has that an anarchic system
cannot match.
The impact of the elimination of this constraint will depend very much on how heavily
penalized by the welfare function are negative individual utilities. If society (and the BD)
are relatively unfazed by the fact that agents are having a negative payoff it may be the
case that the centralized system will outperform the anarchic one. Consider, for example,
the case for which N is large. We know from Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that any
incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism will only be able to provide the
public good with a very small probability, so the expected welfare from Anarchy will be
close to 0. However, for a large N , the BD will know whether the good should be provided
or not due to the law of large numbers. As long as π (the prior probability that vn = v
for all n) is large the BD could simply impose that the public good is to be provided by
having all agents make a transfer of c, without soliciting any information. This means that
the removal of the individual rationality constraint may make a BD system more appealing
than the anarchic one.
3.7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have compared two systems of provision of public goods: a centralized
system where the BD has the ultimate power to decide transfers; and an anarchic system
where agents are free to communicate and select their own transfers. The main result is that
the preferred system depends on how important is the ”informational” free riding problem
relative to the ”classical” free riding problem, which is measured by the parameter k in
this analysis. If k is small, and the ”informational” free riding problem dominates, then the
anarchic system is preferred; but as k grows and the ”classical” free riding problem becomes
more important, the BD system will dominate.
One aspect of this analysis that is interesting is that, when we think of the BD as lacking
commitment power, it may be better to have a non-benevolent dictator. The problem that
the absence of commitment power brings to the BD is that he cannot help but to take his
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preferred action whenever the opportunity presents itself. So, if, for example, the dictator
is indifferent among all alternatives available, he will not have such problems and will be
able to act as if he had commitment power. Of course, thinking of a government that is
indifferent to all alternatives does not seem to be very reasonable. However, there are other
more reasonable preferences that could allow for a better outcome. Say that the dictator
only cares about efficiency, even though the welfare function is still inequality averse. In
that case, the dictator is able to commit, at least with respect to the transfers in the event
that the public good is provided, which would allow him to extract more information from
the agents.
The idea I wish to convey is that, if we are to have centralized provision of public
goods, it may be desirable to have a government who does not feel the need to make the
high valuation agents the ones that pay for most of the good. The problem is how that
would happen. What political structure would have to be in place so that agents with
these specific preferences would end up the rulers? The answer to this question does not
seem trivial as the purpose of government is not exhausted by the administration of public
goods and inequality aversion seems to be an important property of a successful government
particularly in issues like wealth redistribution.
Finally, for future research, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent it is
possible to construct other systems of public good provision that do not rely on commitment
power. One possibility is to explore the idea of allowing agents to delegate their transfer
decisions to representatives. Even though a more thorough analysis is required, it seems
that this system would be able to go around the individual rationality constraints that limit
the effectiveness of the anarchic system. For example, in a system with N representatives,
as long π is large, it would always be possible to provide the public good fully by having
agents sending uninformative messages to their representatives, which, after communicating
with all other representatives, would then decide the agent they represent should contribute
c, because they believe the agent they represent is likely to have a high valuation. Such
outcome would not be possible in the anarchic system as low valuation agents would prefer
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not to make such contribution. A system that incorporates representatives could then
preserve the idea that decentralization leads to more information sharing while, at the same
time, be less constrained by the need to have positive utilities for all agents, regardless of
their type.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Notice that, for all n and for all θ ∈ Θ, xTrn (θ) = 1 if and only if
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n, θ) ≥ α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n, θ)⇔
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)π (θ|g, t−n) ≥ α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)π (θ|i, t−n)⇔
l (θn) ≥ α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
∏
ñ6=n
π (θñ|tñ)∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π (θñ|tñ)
⇔
θn ≤ l−1
α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π (θñ|tñ)∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π (θñ|tñ)

A.1.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that the simplified nth agent problem is one of selecting xn (i, t−n, θ) ∈ [0, φ] for all
t−n ∈ T−n and θ ∈ Θ, in order to maximize
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ∈Θ
(π (g, t−n, θ)− απ (i, t−n, θ))xn (i, t−n, θ) dθ
subject to ∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ∈Θ
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
xn (i, t−n, θ) dθ ≤ 1
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Denote by λ̂n ≥ 0 the lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint and let
ζ̂ (t−n, θ) ≥ 0 and η̂ (t−n, θ) ≥ 0 be the multipliers associated with xn (i, t−n, θ) ≤ φ and
xn (i, t−n, θ) ≥ 0 respectively. It follows that the optimal solution xSBn must be such that,
for all t−n ∈ T−n and θ ∈ Θ,
π (g, t−n, θ)− απ (i, t−n, θ) + η̂ (t−n, θ) = λ̂n
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
+ ζ̂ (t−n, θ)
which can be written as
π (g, t−n) l (θn) (1− λn)− απ (i, t−n) = ζ (t−n, θ)− η (t−n, θ) (A.1)
where λn =
λ̂n
π(tn=g)
, ζ (t−n, θ) =
ζ̂(t−n,θ)
π(θn|tn=i)
∏
ñ6=n
π(θñ|tñ)
and η (t−n, θ) =
η̂(t−n,θ)
π(θn|tn=i)
∏
ñ6=n
π(θñ|tñ)
.
Notice that, for a fixed t−n ∈ T−n, the LHS is strictly increasing with θn, which means
that there is a threshold θSBn (t−n) such that
xn (i, t−n, θ) =
 φ if θn > θ
SB
n (t−n)
0 otherwise
where ties are resolved in favor of an acquittal. The threshold θSBn (t−n) is such that
π (g, t−n) l
(
θSBn (t−n)
)
(1− λn)− απ (i, t−n) = 0
and so
θSBn (t−n) = l
−1
(
α
1− λn
π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
)
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As for λn, it is equal to 0 whenever the constraint does not bind. Let
Bn (φ, λn) = φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
π (tn = g)
1∫
l−1
(
α
1−λn
π(i,t−n)
π(g,t−n)
) π (θn|tn = g) dθ
which represents the expected punishment of the guilty agent under threshold θSBn (t−n),
given that he is indifferent between reporting truthfully and misreporting. Then, it follows
that
λn =
 0 if Bn (φ, 0) ≤ 1λ∗n otherwise
where λ∗n is such that Bn (φ, λ
∗
n) = 1. Notice that, for any φ, λn always exists and is strictly
increasing for all φ ≥ φn > 1 where φn is such that Bn
(
φn, 0
)
= 1.
A.1.3. Proof of Proposition 5
Let φ = max
{
φn
}N
n=1
, so that, for all φ > φ and for all n,
Bgn
(
xSBn
)
= φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
π (tn = g)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = g) dθn = 1 (A.2)
and
Bin
(
xSBn
)
= φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
π (tn = i)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = i) dθn (A.3)
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Given (A.2) we have that (A.3) is equivalent to
Bin
(
xSBn
)
=
φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π(i,t−n)
π(tn=i)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = i) dθn
φ
∑
t−n∈T−n
π(g,t−n)
π(tn=g)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = g) dθn
=
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = i) dθn
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = g) dθn
<
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
∑
t−n∈T−n

π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = i) dθn
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
π (θn|tn = g) dθn

<
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
∑
t−n∈T−n
 π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
1∫
θSBn (t−n)
1
l (θn)
dθn

<
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
1
l (θSBn (t−n))
where the last inequality follows from the monotone likelihood ratio property on l. The last
step is to realize that limφ→∞ θ
SB
n (t−n) = 1 for all t−n ∈ T−n (for otherwise the expected
punishments would become arbitrarily large, violating the constraints), which implies that
limφ→∞ l
(
θSBn (t−n)
)
=∞, and so limφ→∞ Bin
(
xSBn
)
= 0 for all n.
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A.1.4. Proof of Lemma 8
Take any system (x, σ) where, for some n, there are m′n and m
′′
n such that
rn
(
m′n
)
≡ σn (g,m
′
n)
σn (i,m′n)
=
σn (g,m
′′
n)
σn (i,m′′n)
≡ rn
(
m′′n
)
The goal of the proof is to show that it is possible to eliminate one such message. In this
way, the set of messages only needs to be large enough as R+ ∪ {c} because the range of
rn (·) is R+ to which one adds the confessing message c.
Consider the alternative system (x, σ) that is equal to (x, σ) except that:
i) σn (tn,m
′
n) = σn (tn,m
′
n) + σn (tn,m
′′
n) for tn = i, g,
ii) x (m′n,m−n, θ) =
 σn(tn,m′n)σn(tn,m′n)+σn(tn,m′′n)x (m′n,m−n, θ)
+ σn(tn,m
′′
n)
σn(tn,m′n)+σn(tn,m
′′
n)
x (m′′n,m−n, θ)
 for tn = i, g,
iii) x (m′′n,m−n, θ) = (1, ..., 1).
The new system merges the two messages and effectively eliminates message m′′n by
making it undesirable to agent n. I want to show that the new system (x, σ) is still incentive
compatible, renegotiation proof and leaves the expected utility of the principal unchanged.
Notice that
Btnn (x, σ) =
(
σn (tn,m
′
n)
σn (tn,m′n) + σn (tn,m
′′
n)
+
σn (tn,m
′′
n)
σn (tn,m′n) + σn (tn,m
′′
n)
)
Btnn (x, σ) = B
tn
n (x, σ)
for tn = i, g.
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As for n̂ 6= n, notice that we can write,
Btn̂n̂ (x, σ) =
∫
θ∈Θ
∫
m−n̂∈M−n̂
πσ (m−n̂, θ|tn̂)xn (mn̂,m−n̂, θ) dm−ndθ
for some mn̂ such that σn̂ (tn̂,mn̂) > 0. Notice also that π
σ
(
m′n,m−n̂,n, θ|tn̂
)
is equal to
∑
tn∈{i,g}
σn (tn,m′n)π (θn|tn)π (θn̂|tn̂) ∑
t−n̂,n
π
(
tn̂, tn, t−n̂,n|tn̂
) ∏
ñ 6=n,n̂
π (θñ|tñ)σñ (mñ, tñ)

Given that
πσ
(
m′n,m−n̂,n, θ|tn̂
)
xn
(
mn̂,m
′
n,m−n̂,n, θ
)
+ πσ
(
m′′n,m−n̂,n, θ|tn̂
)
xn
(
mn̂,m
′′
n,m−n̂,n, θ
)
= πσ
(
m′n,m−n̂,n, θ|tn̂
)
xn
(
mn̂,m
′
n,m−n̂,n, θ
)
+ πσ
(
m′′n,m−n̂,n, θ|tn̂
)
xn
(
mn̂,m
′′
n,m−n̂,n, θ
)
it follows that Btn̂n̂ (x, σ) = B
tn̂
n̂ (x, σ) for all tn̂ and for all n̂ 6= n, which implies that
V (x, σ) = V (x, σ).
The system (x, σ) is incentive compatible as sending message m′′n is not strictly preferred
to any other message and the expected punishment of sending any other message remains
unchanged. It is also renegotiation proof because, for all m−n, θ and for all n̂ (including n)
xn̂
(
m′n,m−n, θ
)
≤ max
{
xn̂
(
m′n,m−n, θ
)
, xn̂
(
m′′n,m−n, θ
)}
≤ γσn̂
(
m′n,m−n, θ
)
= γσn̂
(
m′n,m−n, θ
)
A.1.5. Proof of Lemma 9
First, I start by showing that, for all σ, (xσ, σ) is incentive compatible and renegotiation
proof. Notice that all non-confessing reports involve the same punishment, which means
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that agents are indifferent between sending any non-confessing message. By the definition
of ϕn, guilty agents are indifferent between confessing and not confessing. Hence, it is only
necessary to show that innocent agents do not strictly prefer to confess which is equivalent
to showing that the innocent’s expected punishment of sending message mσn is smaller or
equal to that of the guilty agent.
Notice that it is possible to write
xσn (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) =
 1 if α
σn(i,mσn)
σn(g,mσn)
π(tn=i)
π(tn=g)
π(m−n,θ|tn=i)
π(m−n,θ|tn=g) < 1
0 otherwise
Define En ≡
{
(m−n, θ) ∈M−n × [0, 1]N : xσn (mσn,m−n, θ) = 1
}
. If En = ∅ or eEn = ∅
then the expected punishment of the agent when sending message mσn is independent of his
type. If π(en|tn=i)π(en|tn=g) < 1 for all en ∈ En then
∫
en∈En
π (en|tn = g) den >
∫
en∈En
π (en|tn = i) den
and so the expected punishment of the agent when sending message mσn is higher if he is
guilty. Finally, if there is e′n ∈ En such that
π(e′n|tn=i)
π(e′n|tn=g)
≥ 1 and given that xσn (mσn,m−n, θ)
is decreasing with π(en|tn=i)π(en|tn=g) , then it must be that
π(en|tn=i)
π(en|tn=g) > 1 for all en /∈ En. Hence,∫
en /∈En
π (en|tn = g) den <
∫
en /∈En
π (en|tn = i) den which implies that
∫
en∈En
π (en|tn = g) den >∫
en∈En
π (en|tn = i) den and so, also in this case, the expected punishment of the agent when
sending message mσn is higher if he is guilty. Hence, it follows that the system (x
σ, σ) is
incentive compatible.
To guarantee the system is renegotiation proof I set the beliefs after any message that is
not sent in equilibrium to be as if the agent’s ”guiltiness” ratio is equal to rn (m
σ
n), except
for message c, where the agent is always believed to be guilty with certainty. Hence, it
follows that the system is renegotiation proof because γσn (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) ≤ γσn (mn,m−n, θ)
for all mn ∈ R+.
110
Now, I show that there is no other incentive compatible and renegotiation proof system
that induces a strictly higher expected utility for the principal, i.e. for all σ and for any
x : M ×Θ→ RN+ , V̂ (xσ, σ) ≥ V̂ (x, σ).
Take any system (x, σ) and assume it is incentive compatible and renegotiation proof.
Now consider the alternative system (x′, σ) such that, for all m−n, θ and n,
i) x′n (c,m−n, θ) = xn (c,m−n, θ) and
ii) x′n (mn,m−n, θ) = γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ) for all mn ∈ R+.
Notice that one can write
V̂n
(
x′, σ
)
=
∫
m∈M
∫
θ∈Θ
πσ (m, θ)κσn
(
m, θ, x′n (m, θ)
)
dθdm
where πσ (m, θ) denotes the joint density of m and θ, given strategy profile σ and
κσn
(
m, θ, x′n (m, θ)
)
= (πσ (tn = g|m, θ)− πσ (tn = i|m, θ))x′n (m, θ)
Given that, by definition,
κσn (m
σ
n,m−n, θ, γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ)) ≥ κσn (mσn,m−n, θ, xn (mσn,m−n, θ))
and because κσn (m, θ, ·) is single peaked around γσn (m, θ), we have that
κσn (mn,m−n, θ, γ
σ
n (m
σ
n,m−n, θ)) ≥ κσn (mn,m−n, θ, xn (mn,m−n, θ))
Hence, it follows that V̂ (x′, σ) ≥ V̂ (x, σ). However, (x′, σ) may not be incentive compat-
ible given that the punishments after message mσn have increased with respect (x, σ) but
punishments after a confession stayed the same.
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Finally, compare (xσ, σ) with (x′, σ). Notice that the expected punishment after sending
non-confessing messages is equal in both systems, so the difference between the two lies on
the fact that punishments after confessions are higher in xσ in order to satisfy incentive
compatibility. Hence, it must be that
∫
m−n
∫
θ
πσ (c,m−n, θ)κ
σ
n (c,m−n, θ, x
σ
n (c,m−n, θ)) dθdm−n
≥
∫
m−n
∫
θ
πσ (c,m−n, θ)κ
σ
n
(
c,m−n, θ, x
′
n (c,m−n, θ)
)
dθdm−n
and so V̂ (xσ, σ) ≥ V̂ (x′, σ) ≥ V̂ (x, σ).
A.1.6. Proof of Proposition 10
Take any optimal strategy profile σ̃ and suppose the statement is false: system
(
xσ̃, σ̃
)
is
not a CIS. This means that, under σ̃, there is at least one agent that sends a second non-
confessing message. Without loss of generality, assume that agent 1 is the agent that sends
this second non-confessing message m′1 /∈
{
c,mσ̃1
}
. In particular, assume that r1
(
mσ̃1
)
<
r1 (m
′
1) < ∞ because, otherwise, by the logic of Lemma 8, the proposition would follow
trivially.
Consider system
(
xσ̂, σ̂
)
where σ̂ = σ̃ except that σ̂1 (g,m
′
1) = σ̃1 (g,m
′
1)−v, σ̂1 (g, c) =
σ̃1 (g, c) + v, where v is such that
σ̃1 (i,m
′
1)
σ̃1 (g,m′1)− v
=
σ̃1
(
i,mσ̃1
)
σ̃1
(
g,mσ̃1
)
I show that system
(
xσ̂, σ̂
)
is strictly preferred to system
(
xσ̃, σ̃
)
which is a contradiction
with
(
xσ̃, σ̃
)
being optimal and so shows the statement of the proposition.
Write V (σ) ≡ V̂ (xσ, σ) for all σ. Notice that V 1 (σ̂) = V 1 (σ̃). It also follows that, for
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all n,
V n (σ̂)− V n (σ̃)
=
∫
mn,m−1,n,θ
∑
t−1,n∈T−1,n
B
 ∏
ñ 6=1,n
σ̃ñ (tñ,mñ)π (θñ|tñ)
 d (mn,m−1,n, θ)
where B is equal to
v
 π (g, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|tn = g)π (θ1|t1 = g)
−απ (i, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i)π (θ1|t1 = g)
 γσ̃n ((mσ̃n, c,m−1,n) , θ)+


π (g, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|tn = g) (σ̃1 (g,m′1)− v)π (θ1|t1 = g)
+π (g, i, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|tn = g) σ̃1 (i,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = i)−
απ (i, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i) (σ̃1 (g,m′1)− v)π (θ1|t1 = g)
−απ (i, i, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i) σ̃1 (i,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = i)

∗γσ̃n
((
mσ̃n,m
σ̃
1 ,m−1,n
)
, θ
)

−


π (g, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|tn = g) σ̃1 (g,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = g)
+π (g, i, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|tn = g) σ̃1 (i,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = i)
−απ (i, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i) σ̃1 (g,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = g)
−απ (i, i, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i) σ̃1 (i,m′1)π (θ1|t1 = i)

∗γσ̃n
((
mσ̃n,m
′
1,m−1,n
)
, θ
)

Notice that by replacing γσ̃n
((
mσ̃n,m
σ̃
1 ,m−1,n
)
, θ
)
by γσ̃n
((
mσ̃n,m
′
1,m−1,n
)
, θ
)
in the sec-
ond line, it is possible to write that
B >

v
 π (g, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (g,mn)π (θn|t1 = g)π (θ1|t1 = g)
−απ (i, g, t−1,n) σ̃n (i,mn)π (θn|tn = i)π (θ1|t1 = g)

∗
 γσ̃n ((mσ̃n, c,m−1,n) , θ)
−γσ̃n
((
mσ̃n,m
′
1,m−1,n
)
, θ
)


> 0
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by the definition of mσ̃n and γ
σ̃
n (m, θ) for all (m, θ) and n. This implies that, for all n,
V n (σ̂) > V n (σ̃) which completes the proof.
1
A.1.7. Proof of Proposition 11
In a CIS, only two messages are sent: c and c for each agent n. Denote the optimal CIS
by
(
xσ
CIS
, σCIS
)
and let τ ∈ [0, 1]N be such that σCISn (g, c) = τn for all n. Also, let V (τ)
denote the corresponding expected utility of the principal. A trial system is characterized
by τ = τ ≡ (0, ..., 0).
I show the statement by showing that
∂V n
∂τn
(τ) = 0 for all n (A.4)
and
∂V n̂
∂τn
(τ) ≥ 0 for all n and n̂ (A.5)
with the inequality being strict for at least one pair (n̂, n), unless the types of the agents
are independent.
Notice that it is possible to write V (τ) =
N∑
n=1
V n (τ) where
V n (τ) =
∫
m−n∈M−n
∫
θ−n∈Θ−n
1∫
θCISn (m−n,θ−n)
ACIS (m−n, θn, θ−n) dθndθ−ndm−n
1Recall that γσn (m, θ) ∈ arg maxx∈[0,1] {(π (tn = g|m, θ)− απ (tn = g|m, θ))x}, which is equal to
arg maxx∈[0,1] {(π (tn = g,m, θ)− απ (tn = g,m, θ))x}.
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where
ACIS (m−n, θn, θ−n) =
∑
t−n∈T−n
 π (g, t−n)π (θn|tn = g)−
απ (i, t−n)π (θn|tn = i)
∏
ñ6=n
π (θñ|tñ)σCISñ (tñ,mñ)
and
θCISn (m−n, θ−n) = l
−1
 α1− τn
∑
t−n∈T−n
π (i, t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π (θñ|tñ)σCISñ (tñ,mñ)∑
t−n∈T−n
π (g, t−n)
∏
ñ 6=n
π (θñ|tñ)σCISñ (tñ,mñ)

The threshold θCISn (m−n, θ−n) is such that
xCISn (c,m−n, θ−n) =
 1 if θn > θ
CIS
n (m−n, θ−n)
0 otherwise
.
As for (A.4), notice that
∂V n
∂τn
= −
∫
m−n,θ−n
ACIS
(
m−n, θ
CIS
n (m−n, θ−n) , θ−n
) dθCISn (m−n, θ−n)
dτn
dθ−ndm−n
Given that, when τn = 0,
ACIS
(
m−n, θ
CIS
n (m−n, θ−n) , θ−n
)
= 0
it must be that ∂V n∂τn (τ) = 0.
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Now, consider (A.5). Notice that one can write V n̂ (τ) as
∫
m−n̂,n,θ−n̂

1∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θn̂, θ−n̂
)
dθn̂
+
1∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θn̂, θ−n̂
)
dθn̂

dθ−n̂dm−n̂,n
Therefore, ∂V n∂τn̂ is equal to
∫
m−n̂,n,θ−n̂

−ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ
CIS
n̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
, θ−n̂
)
∗
dθCISn̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
dτn
−ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ
CIS
n̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
, θ−n̂
)
∗
dθCISn̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
dτn

dθ−n̂dm−n̂,n
(A.6)
+
∫
m−n̂,n,θ−n̂

1∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
dACIS(mn=c,m−n̂,n,θn̂,θ−n̂)
dτn
dθn̂
+
1∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
dACIS(mn=c,m−n̂,n,θn̂,θ−n̂)
dτn
dθn̂

dθ−n̂dm−n̂,n (A.7)
Notice that (A.6) is equal to 0 when τn̂ = 0 given that
ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ
CIS
n̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
, θ−n̂
)
=
ACIS
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ
CIS
n̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
, θ−n̂
)
= 0
Let
Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂ =
{
θ−n̂ ∈ Θ−n̂ : θCISn̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
< θCISn̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)}
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and
Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂ =
{
θ−n̂ ∈ Θ−n̂ : θCISn̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
> θCISn̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)}
Then, condition (A.7) can be written as
∫
m−n̂,n∈M−n̂,n
∫
θ−n̂∈Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂
θCISn̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
BCIS
(
m−n̂,n, θn̂, θ−n̂
)
dθn̂dθ−n̂dm−n̂,n
−
∫
m−n̂,n∈M−n̂,n
∫
θ−n̂∈Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂
θCISn̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)∫
θCIS
n̂ (mn=c,m−n̂,n,θ−n̂)
BCIS
(
m−n̂,n, θn̂, θ−n̂
)
dθn̂dθ−n̂dm−n̂,n
where BCIS
(
m−n̂,n, θn̂, θ−n̂
)
is equal to
∑
t−n̂,n∈T−n̂,n
 π (g, g, t−n̂,n)π (θn̂|tn̂ = g)π (θn|tn = g)−
απ
(
i, g, t−n̂,n
)
π (θn̂|tn̂ = i)π (θn|tn = g)
 ∏
ñ6=n̂,n
π (θñ|tñ)σCISñ (tñ,mñ)
which is strictly positive when τn̂ = 0, given that
BCIS
(
θn̂, θ−n̂,m−n̂,n
)
> 0 if and only if θn > θ
CIS
n̂
(
mn = c,m−n̂,n, θ−n̂
)
This implies that ∂V n∂τn̂ (τ) > 0 unless Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂ and Θ
m−n̂,n
−n̂ are empty for all m−n̂,n ∈M−n̂,n.
But if that happens for all n, then the agents’ types must be independent.
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A.1.8. Proof of Proposition 14
The problem the principal faces is one of selecting xn (θ) ∈ R+ for all n and θ ∈ Θ in order
to maximize
∫
θ∈Θ
(π (tn = i, θ)u
p
n (i, xn (θ)) + π (tn = g, θ)u
p
n (g, xn (θ))) dθ
The derivative of the objective function with respect to xn (θ) is given by
π (tn = i, θ)
∂upn (i, xn (θ))
∂xn
+ π (tn = g, θ)
∂upn (g, xn (θ))
∂xn
Given that both upn (i, ·) and upn (g, ·) are strictly concave and that
π (tn = i, θ)
∂upn (i, 0)
∂xn
+ π (tn = g, θ)
∂upn (g, 0)
∂xn
> 0
it follows that xTrn (θ) is such that
π (tn = i, θ)
∂upn
(
i, xTrn (θ)
)
∂xn
+ π (tn = g, θ)
∂upn
(
g, xTrn (θ)
)
∂xn
= 0
and so it is continuous. Notice that the previous equation can be rewritten as
∂upn
(
i, xTrn (θ)
)
∂xn
+
π (tn = g)
π (tn = i)
π (θ−n|tn = g)
π (θ−n|tn = i)
l (θn)
∂upn
(
g, xTrn (θ)
)
∂xn
= 0
Given that l (θn) is strictly increasing it follows that x
Tr
n (θ) is strictly increasing. Further-
more, given that limθn→0 l (θn) = 0 it must be that, for all θ−n ∈ Θ−n,
lim
θn→0
xTrn ((θn, θ−n)) = 0
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and given that limθn→1 l (θn) =∞ it must be that, for all θ−n ∈ Θ−n,
lim
θn→1
xTrn ((θn, θ−n)) = 1.
A.1.9. Proof of Proposition 15
If αui (xn) = u
p
n (i, xn) the innocent’s incentive constraints do not bind for the same reason
as in the main text. Hence, the nth problem becomes one of maximizing
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ∈Θ
π (g, t−n, θ)u
p
n (g, xn (g, t−n, θ)) + απ (i, t−n, θ)u
i (i, xn (i, t−n, θ)) dθ
subject
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ
π (g, t−n, θ)u
g (xn (g, t−n, θ)) dθ ≥
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ
π (g, t−n, θ)u
g (xn (i, t−n, θ)) dθ
where the constraint must bind for otherwise the first best solution would be incentive
compatible. The first order condition with respect to xn (g, t−n, θ) can be written as
π (g, t−n, θ)
∂upn (g, xn (g, t−n, θ))
∂xn
+ λnπ (g, t−n, θ)
∂ug (g, xn (g, t−n, θ))
∂xn
= ζgn (t−n, θ)− ηgn (t−n, θ)
where λn > 0 denotes the lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint above, while
ζgn (t−n, θ) ≥ 0 and ηgn (t−n, θ) ≥ 0 denote the lagrange multiplier associated with
{xn (g, t−n, θ) ≥ 0}
and
{xn (g, t−n, θ) ≤ φ} .
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Given that
∂2upn (g, ·)
∂ (xn)
2 + λn
∂2ug (g, ·)
∂ (xn)
2 < 0
and
∂upn (g, 1)
∂xn
+ λn
∂ug (g, 1)
∂xn
< 0
and
∂upn (g, 0)
∂xn
+ λn
∂ug (g, 0)
∂xn
> 0
it follows that x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ) uniquely solves
∂upn
(
g, x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ)
)
∂xn
+ λn
∂ug
(
g, x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ)
)
∂xn
= 0
Hence, x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ) is independent of t−n and θ and must be equal to
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
ug
(
x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ)
)
dθ
because the incentive constraint binds.
A.1.10. Proof of Proposition 16
The first order condition with respect to xn (i, t−n, θ) is given by
απ (i, t−n, θ)
∂ui (xn (i, t−n, θ))
∂xn
− λnπ (g, t−n, θ)
∂ug (xn (i, t−n, θ))
∂xn
= ζgn (t−n, θ)− ηgn (t−n, θ)
which can be written as −απ (i, t−n)π (θn|tn = i)ωi (xn (i, t−n, θ))ωi−1
+λnπ (g, t−n)π (θn|tn = g)ωg (xn (i, t−n, θ))ωg−1
 = ζgn (t−n, θ)− ηgn (t−n, θ)
π (θ−n|t−n)
120
Let ψn (t−n, θn) be the unique value of xn (i, t−n, θ) such that the left hand side is equal to
0, i.e.
ψn (t−n, θn) =
(
λnωg
αωi
π (g, t−n)
π (i, t−n)
l (θn)
) 1
ωi−ωg
Notice that
απ (i, t−n, θ)
∂2ui (ψn (t−n, θn))
∂ (xn)
2 − λnπ (g, t−n, θ)
∂2ug (ψn (t−n, θn))
∂ (xn)
2
is strictly negative if and only if ωi > ωg in which case x̃
SB
n (i, t−n, θ) = ψn (t−n, θn)
if ψn (t−n, θn) ≤ φ. Otherwise, x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ) = φ. It follows that θ̃
SB(i)
n is such that
ψn
(
t−n, θ̃
SB(i)
n
)
= φ. In particular, θ̃
SB(i)
n is such that
θ̃SB(i)n = l
−1
(
φωi−ωg
αωi
λnωg
π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
)
This shows i).
If ωi ≤ ωg, then it follows that x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ) is a corner and so it is either 0 or φ. In
particular, it is φ if and only if
απ (i, t−n, θ)u
i (φ)− λnπ (g, t−n, θ)ug (φ) > 0
which implies that
θn > l
−1
(
α
λn
π (i, t−n)
π (g, t−n)
φωi−ωg
)
≡ θ̃SB(g)n
Therefore, ii) follows.
The variable λn is such that
ϕ̃n =
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
θ
π (g, t−n, θ)
π (tn = g)
ug
(
x̃SBn (i, t−n, θ)
)
dθ
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holds where ϕ̃n is such that
∂upn (g, ϕ̃n)
∂xn
+ λn
∂ug (g, ϕ̃n)
∂xn
= 0
and x̃SBn (g, t−n, θ) = ϕ̃n.
A.1.11. Proof of Proposition 17
An optimal allocation must maximize the principal’s expected utility subject to the agents’
incentive constraints. Unlike in the main text, there are many incentive constraints per
agent as the number of extended types is now larger. My approach to solving this problem
is to relax some of the incentive constraints and show that the solution of the relaxed
problem satisfies the relaxed constraints. In particular, the relaxed problem is to select an
allocation x : T̂ ×Θ→ [0, 1]N in order to maximize the principal’s expected utility subject
to the constraint that, for all n and for all t̂n 6= i,
B t̂nn ≤
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t̂−n∈T̂−n
π
(
t̂−n, θ|t̂n
)
xn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
dθ
Each constraint states that the guilty agent of extended type t̂n does not want to report to
be innocent.
Notice that, by definition, any t̂ ∈ L does not enter the principal’s expected utility
function. Therefore, punishments that follow reports belonging to L should be chosen to
minimize deviations which is achieved by setting them to 1.
A lot of the next steps are the same as in the main text. First, transform the problem
into N independent problems. Second, all constraints must hold with equality for other-
wise it would be possible to increase B t̂nn on the constraint that holds with strict inequality
and make the strictly principal better off while still satisfying that constraint. This means
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that it is possible to write the problem solely in terms of the punishment that innocent
agents receive. Guilty agents simply need to be made indifferent between reporting truth-
fully and reporting to be innocent. Hence, the new nth problem becomes one of selecting
xn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
∈ [0, 1] for all t̂−n ∈ T̂−n and θ ∈ Θ in order to maximize
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t̂−n∈T̂−n
∑
t̂n 6=i
π
(
t̂n, t̂−n, θ
)
− απ
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)xn (i, t̂−n, θ) dθ
which implies that it is optimal to select xn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
= x̂SBn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
. By definition of
x̂SBn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
and for each t̂−n and θ there is θn
(
t̂−n
)
∈ [0, 1] such that
x̂SBn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
=
 1 if θn > θn
(
t̂−n
)
0 otherwise
Notice that θn
(
t̂−n
)
does not depend on θ−n because it is not informative given the principal
also knows t̂−n.
In order to guarantee that guilty agents are indifferent to reporting to be innocent it is
enough to set
ϕ̂n
(
t̂−n
)
=
1∫
θn(t̂−n)
π (θ|tn = g) dθn
so that, for all t̂n,
B t̂nn =
∫
θ∈Θ
∑
t̂−n∈T̂−n
π
(
t̂−n, θ|t̂n
)
x̂SBn
(
i, t̂−n, θ
)
=
∑
t̂−n∈T̂−n
π
(
t̂−n|t̂n
)
ϕ̂n
(
t̂−n
)
As for the relaxed incentive constraints it is easy to see that they are satisfied under
allocation x̂SB. In particular, the punishment a guilty agent receives is independent of his
own report, which means that he has no strict incentive to deviate.
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A.1.12. Proof of Proposition 18
Action c represents the choice of confessing, while action c represents the choice of not
confessing. I divide the proof into two lemmas.
Lemma 18.1 For all n, there is
(
βgn, βin
)
∈ [0, 1]N such that either
A) for all (tn, βn),
sn (tn, βn) =
 c if βn ≥ β
tn
n
c otherwise
or B) for all (tn, βn),
sn (tn, βn) =
 c if βn ≤ β
tn
n
c otherwise
Proof of Lemma 18.1 Let pair (tn, βn) denote the agent n’s extended type. Notice
that a CIS is determined by the pair (s, x) where s =
{
{sn (tn, βn)}βn∈[0,1]
}
tn∈Tn
and
x : {Tn × [0, 1]}Nn=1 × Θ → [0, 1]. For all n, let Btnn (βn) denote the expected punishment
that agent n receives if his extended type is (tn, βn). Divide the set of agent n’s extended
types into 6 smaller sets. In particular, for tn ∈ {i, g}, let Γtnc denote the set of βn ∈ [0, 1]
such that the agent strictly prefers c, Γtnc denote the set of βn ∈ [0, 1] such that the agent
strictly prefers c and Γtn= denote the set of βn ∈ [0, 1] such that the agent is indifferent.
Also, let β = (β1, .., βN ) and m−n to be the set of actions (c or c) that all other agents
choose.
The principal chooses punishments in order to maximize the following objective function
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π (tn = g)π (βn ∈ Γgc ∪ Γg=|tn = g)xn (c)− απ (tn = i)π
(
βn ∈ Γic ∪ Γi=|tn = i
)
xn (c)
+
∫
βn∈Γgc
∫
β−n
∫
θ
∑
t−n
∑
m−n
π (g, t−n)π (β|tn = g, t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β)xn (c,m−n, θ) dθdβ
− α
∫
βn∈Γic
∫
β−n
∫
θ
∑
t−n
∑
m−n
π (i, t−n)π (β|tn = i, t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β)xn (c,m−n, θ) dθdβ
subject to the respective incentive constraints - agents that choose message c prefer it to
message c and vice-versa. Agents that are not indifferent have loose constraints - a slight
change in the punishments still leaves them strictly preferring the same action. Hence, the
only constraints that might bind are the ones of agents that are indifferent. In particular,
it must be that, for all βn ∈ Γg=,
xn (c)π (tn = g)
=
∫
β−n
∫
θ−n
∑
t−n
∑
m−n
π (g, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β)xn (c,m−n, θ) dθ−ndβ−n
and for all βn ∈ Γi=,
xn (c)π (tn = i)
=
∫
β−n
∫
θ−n
∑
t−n
∑
m−n
π (i, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β)xn (c,m−n, θ) dθ−ndβ−n
For all βn ∈ Γg= and βn ∈ Γi= let λg (βn) and λi (βn) denote the lagrange multipliers
of the conditions above respectively. Also, for all βn ∈ Γgc and βn ∈ Γic, write λg (βn) =
λi (βn) = 1.
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For all m−n and θ, the first order condition with respect to xn (c,m−n, θ) is given by
∫
βn∈Γg=∪Γgc
π (βn|tn = g)λg (βn)
∫
β−n
∑
t−n
π (g, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β) dβ
− α
∫
βn∈Γi=∪Γic
π (βn|tn = i)λi (βn)
∫
β−n
∑
t−n
π (i, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (m−n, θ|t−n, β) dβ
= ζcn (m−n, θ)− ηcn (m−n, θ)
where ζcn (m−n, θ) ≥ 0 and ηcn (m−n, θ) ≥ 0 denote the lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints {xn (c,m−n, θ) ≥ 0} and {xn (c,m−n, θ) ≤ 1} respectively.
The left hand side (LHS) has the following property:
LHS

> 0 if k (m−n, θ−n)h (θn) > 1
= 0 if k (m−n, θ−n)h (θn) = 1
< 0 if k (m−n, θ−n)h (θn) < 1
where
h (θn) =
∫
βn∈Γg=∪Γgc
π (βn|tn = g)λg (βn)π (θn|βn) dβn
∫
βn∈Γi=∪Γic
π (βn|tn = i)λi (βn)π (θn|βn) dβn
and
k (m−n, θ−n) =
∫
β−n
∑
t−n
π (g, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (θ−n|β−n)π (m−n|t−n, β−n) dβ−n
α
∫
β−n
∑
t−n
π (i, t−n)π (β−n|t−n)π (θ−n|β−n)π (m−n|t−n, β−n) dβ−n
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Notice that
h′ (θn)

> 0 if A > B
= 0 if A = B
< 0 if A < B
where
A =
∫
βn∈Γg=∪Γgc
π (βn|tn = g)λg (βn)βndβn
∫
βn∈Γi=∪Γic
π (βn|tn = i)λi (βn) (1− βn) dβn
and
B =
∫
βn∈Γi=∪Γic
π (βn|tn = i)λi (βn)βndβn
∫
βn∈Γg=∪Γgc
π (βn|tn = g)λg (βn) (1− βn) dβn
Given that A and B are independent of θn, it follows that h is either a constant or
strictly monotone. If it is a constant, then the punishment an agent receives is independent
of the evidence he produces. In that case, an agent’s βn is irrelevant. Therefore, if this is the
case, the statement follows with βtnn being either equal to 0 or 1. If it is strictly monotone
it means that there is a strict ordering over βn and so there is at most one indifferent βn
per type and the statement follows.
In the next lemma, I show that A) follows.
Lemma 18.2 For all n, there is
(
βgn, βin
)
∈ [0, 1]N such that for all (tn, βn),
sn (tn, βn) =
 c if βn ≥ β
tn
n
c otherwise
Proof of Lemma 18.2 Suppose not. Following the previous lemma, it must be that
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h (·) is strictly decreasing and
sn (tn, βn) =
 c if βn ≤ β
tn
n
c otherwise
This implies that
1∫
βin
π (βn|tn = i)βndβn
1∫
βin
π (βn|tn = i) dβn
>
1∫
βgn
π (βn|tn = g)βndβn
1∫
βgn
π (βn|tn = g) dβn
where, without loss of generality, λtn (βn) = 1 for all tn and βn because there are only
two pairs
(
i, βin
)
and (g, βgn) that are indifferent and they have a 0 measure. Notice that
if βin = β
g
n the condition does not hold because the right hand side is strictly larger. So it
follows that βin > β
g
n.
To complete the proof I show that an innocent agent with βn = β
g
n prefers to go to trial
(or is indifferent). I do this by showing that, for any fixed βn, the expected punishment
of going to trial is higher if the agent is guilty. The proof is the analogous to the one of
Lemma 9. Notice that
xn (c,m−n, θ) =

1 if α
π(tn=i,βn≥βin)
π(tn=g,βn≥βgn)
π(θn|βn≥βin)
π(θn|βn≥βgn)
π(m−n,θ−n|tn=i)
π(m−n,θ−n|tn=g) < 1
0 otherwise
and let Eθnn = {(m−n, θ−n) : xn (c,m−n, θn, θ−n) = 1}. Notice that the expected punishment
of an agent of type (tn, βn) of going to trial is given by
∫
θn∈[0,1]
π (θn|βn)
∫
en∈Eθnn
π (en|tn) dendθn
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Take any βn and any θn. I want to show that
∫
en∈Eθnn
π (en|tn = g) den ≥
∫
en∈Eθnn
π (en|tn = i) den
If Eθnn = ∅ or Eθnn = ∅ then the statement is trivially true. If
π(en|tn=i)
π(en|tn=g) < 1 for all
en ∈ Eθnn , then the statement follows by definition. Finally, suppose there is e′n ∈ Eθnn such
that π(en|tn=i)π(en|tn=g) ≥ 1. Then, it must be that for all en /∈ E
θn
n ,
π(en|tn=i)
π(en|tn=g) > 1, which implies
that
∫
en /∈Eθnn
π (en|tn = i) den >
∫
en /∈Eθnn
π (en|tn = g) den which implies the statement.
A.1.13. Proof of Proposition 19
Suppose the principal waits until he receives evidence θ and then makes a proposal yθ :
T × Θ → RN+ such that it is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for all agents to tell the truth. We
will show that xy (t, θ) satisfies (IC) - the relevant incentive constraint when the principal
acts before observing the evidence.
Given each proposal yθ and their type own tn, agents form some posterior belief about
t and θ whose joint density we denote by πyθ (t, θ|tn). Given that yθ is incentive compatible
for all θ it must be that, for all θ̂, tn ∈ {i, g} and n, for all t′n,
−
∑
t∈T
∫
θ∈Θ
πyθ̂ (t, θ|tn) yθ̂ (tn, t−n, θ) dθ ≥ −
∑
t∈T
∫
∈Θ
πyθ̂ (t, θ|tn) yθ̂
(
t′n, t−n, θ
)
dθ
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Given that the previous expression holds for all θ̂, it follows that, for all t′n,
−
∫
θ̂∈Θ
π
(
θ̂|tn
)∑
t∈T
∫
θ∈Θ
πyθ̂ (t, θ|tn) yθ̂ (tn, t−n, θ) dθdθ̂
≥ −
∫
θ̂∈Θ
π
(
θ̂|tn
)∑
t∈T
∫
θ∈Θ
πyθ̂ (t, θ|tn) yθ̂
(
t′n, t−n, θ
)
dθdθ̂
where π
(
θ̂|tn
)
refers to the density of θ̂ conditional of the agent’s type tn. Now, I want
to group into disjoint sets the evidence that, given the strategy of the principal, induces
the same posterior on the agent. More formally denote by χ
θ̂
≡
{
θ ∈ Θ : yθ = yθ̂
}
and
Θ̂ ≡
{
θ̂ ∈ Θ : for all θ such that π
θ̂
= πθ then θ̂ ≺l θ
}
where ≺l denotes the lexicographic
ordering2. Finally, let Υ =
{
χ
θ̂
for θ̂ ∈ Θ̂
}
. Notice that Υ represents a set of disjoint sets
of θ̂, where each set contains elements that induce the same posterior. It follows that the
left hand side of the inequality above can be written as
−
∑
t∈T
∫
χ
θ̂
∈Υ
π
(
θ ∈ χ
θ̂
|tn
) ∫
θ∈χ
θ̂
π
(
t, θ|tn, θ ∈ πθ̂
)
xy (tn, t−n, θ) dθdχθ̂
= −
∑
t∈T
∫
χ
θ̂
∈Υ
∫
θ∈χ
θ̂
π (t, θ|tn)xy (tn, t−n, θ) dθdχθ̂
= −
∑
t∈T
∫
θ
π (t, θ|tn)xy (tn, t−n, θ) dθ
By following the same steps with the right hand side, condition (IC) follows.
A.1.14. Proof of Proposition 20
I implement allocation xIP by considering strategy y for the principal where y
θ̂
(t, θ) =
xy (t, θ) for all θ̂ ∈ Θ. I start by specifying beliefs in case the principal proposes a different
mechanism than xIP . Given that such a proposal is off the equilibrium path, I have the
freedom to specify any beliefs for the agents. Hence, I set the agents’ beliefs to be such
2I could have used any other ordering. In fact, I only order the evidence for expositional convenience.
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that, whenever any other proposal is made, the agents believe that (0, ..., 0) is the realized θ
with probability 1. This means that each agent will put probability 1 in every other agent
being guilty, regardless of their own type, which implies that, for the deviation proposal ŷ
θ̂
to be incentive compatible for some θ̂, it must be that, for all n, ŷ
θ̂,n
(i, (g, .., g) , (0, .., 0)) =
ŷθ,n (g, (g, .., g) , (0, .., 0)). As for ŷθ̂,n (t, θ) for all other t and θ it is irrelevant as the agents
will put no weight into these events occurring.
It follows the maximum deviation payoff the principal can get from each agent n, given
the observed θ̂, is
max
β∈[0,1]

 ∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
− α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
i, t−n|θ̂
)β
− ∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
By definition of xIP , it follows that the payoff of proposing xIP for a given θ̂ is given
by ∑
t−n∈T−n
max
β∈[0,1]
{(
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
− απ
(
i, t−n|θ̂
))
β
}
−
∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
Given that
∑
t−n∈T−n
max
β∈[0,1]
{(
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
− απ
(
i, t−n|θ̂
))
β
}
≥ max
β∈[0,1]

 ∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
g, t−n|θ̂
)
− α
∑
t−n∈T−n
π
(
i, t−n|θ̂
)β

the principal has no incentive to deviate.
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A.2. Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1. Proof of Proposition 21
By Bayesian updating the agent’s beliefs, it follows that y|s1, s2 ∼ N
(
µ̂y, σ̂
2
y
)
, where
µ̂y = σ
2
y
s2 − hµx +
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
s1
σ2y + (h
2σ2x + 1)
(
σ2y + 1
)
and
σ̂2y =
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
σ2y
σ2y + (h
2σ2x + 1)
(
σ2y + 1
)
Therefore,
Pr {µ̂y ≥ 0} = Pr {q ≥ 0} =
∞∫
−∞
fs1 (s̃1) Pr {q ≥ 0|s1 = s̃1} ds̃1
where
q (s1, s2) = s2 − hµx +
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
s1
Given that s1 is symmetric distributed around 0 it follows that
Pr {µ̂y ≥ 0} =
∞∫
0
fs1 (s̃1)
 Pr {q (s1, s2) ≥ 0|s1 = s̃1}
+ Pr {q (s1, s2) ≥ 0|s1 = −s̃1}
 ds̃1
Notice that, because y|s1, x|s1 and ε2|s1 are independent and normally distributed, it
follows that s2|s1 is also normally distributed, which implies that
q|s1 ∼ N
((
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ h2σ2x + 1
)
s1,
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ h2σ2x + 1
)
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Therefore,
Pr {q ≥ 0|s1 = s̃1}+ Pr {q ≥ 0|s1 = −s̃1}
= 2− Φ
(
−s̃1
√
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ Ψ2 (s̃1)σ2x + 1
)
− Φ
(
s̃1
√
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ Ψ2 (−s̃1)σ2x + 1
)
Given that √
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ h2σ2x + 1
is strictly increasing with h and Ψ is increasing it follows that
Φ
(
−s̃1
√
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ Ψ2 (s̃1)σ2x + 1
)
+ Φ
(
s̃1
√
σ2y
σ2y + 1
+ Ψ2 (−s̃1)σ2x + 1
)
≤ 1
for all s̃1 ≥ 0, which proves the result. If h is not constant, it follows that the above
inequality will be strict for all s̃1 ≥ s1 for some s1, which implies that Pr {µ̂y ≥ 0} > 12 .
A.2.2. Proof of Proposition 22
Notice that
µ̃y = δ
2
y
s2 − hµx +
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
s1
δ2y + (h
2σ2x + 1)
(
δ2y + 1
)
and so
õ = δ2y
s2 − hµx +
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
s1
δ2y + (h
2σ2x + 1)
(
δ2y + 1
) − y
I start by showing the first part of the result. Notice that it is enough to show that
E (µ̃y) ≥ 0
if Ψ is increasing, with the inequality being strict if Ψ is strictly increasing.
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Notice that
E (µ̃y) = Es1 (E (µ̃y|s1))
where
E (µ̃y|s1) = d (h) s1
and
d (h) =
δ2y
σ2y + 1
σ2y +
(
h2σ2x + 1
) (
σ2y + 1
)
δ2y + (h
2σ2x + 1)
(
δ2y + 1
)
Notice that d (h) is strictly increasing with h if δy > σy, strictly decreasing if δy < σy and
constant if δy = σy.
If δy > σy and Ψ is increasing, it follows that
E (d (Ψ (s1)) s1) =
∞∫
−∞
fs1 (s̃1) d (Ψ (s̃1)) s̃1ds̃1
=
∞∫
0
fs1 (s̃1) (d (Ψ (s̃1))− d (Ψ (−s̃1))) s̃1ds̃1
≥ 0
where the inequality is strict if Ψ is strictly increasing.
As for the second part, notice that one can write
Pr {õ ≥ 0} = Pr {p ≥ 0}
where
p = δ2yh (x− µx) + δ2yε2 + δ2y
(
h2σ2x + 1
)
s1 −
(
h2σ2x + 1
) (
δ2y + 1
)
y
Notice that
Pr {p ≥ 0} =
∞∫
0
fs1 (s̃1)
 Pr {p ≥ 0|s1 = s̃1}
+ Pr {p ≥ 0|s1 = −s̃1}
 ds̃1
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Because x|s1, y|s1 and ε2|s1 are all independent and normally distributed, it follows that
p|s1 ∼ N
(
µp
(
h2
)
s1, σ
2
p
(
h2
))
where
µp
(
h2
)
=
(
h2σ2x + 1
)(
δ2y − σ2y
δ2y + 1
σ2y + 1
)
and
σ2p
(
h2
)
= δ4yh
2σ2x + δ
4
y +
(
h2σ2x + 1
)2 (
δ2y + 1
)2 σ2y
σ2y + 1
Therefore,
Pr {p ≥ 0|s1 = s̃1}+Pr {p ≥ 0|s1 = −s̃1} = 2−Φ
(
−
µp
(
Ψ2 (s1)
)
σp (Ψ2 (s1))
s̃1
)
−Φ
(
µp
(
Ψ2 (−s1)
)
σp (Ψ2 (−s1))
s̃1
)
Notice that if δy > σy, it follows that
µp(h)
σp(h)
is strictly increasing with h, if δy < σy it is
strictly decreasing and if δy = σy it is constant and equal to 0.
Therefore, if Ψ is increasing and δy > σy, it is the case that
Φ
(
−
µp
(
Ψ2 (s1)
)
σp (Ψ2 (s1))
s̃1
)
+ Φ
(
µp
(
Ψ2 (−s1)
)
σp (Ψ2 (−s1))
s̃1
)
≤ 1
for all s̃1 > 0, which shows the result. It is also clear that if Ψ is not a constant there will
be some s1 > 0 such that the previous inequality holds for all s̃1 ≥ s1.
A.2.3. Proof of Proposition 23
The problem of the adviser is to select Ψ (s1) for all s1 such that
Ψ (s1) ∈ arg max
h∈[0,h]
E (g (y + hx+ ε2) |s1)− ch
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Notice that it must be that, for all s1, Ψ (s1) ∈
{
0, h
}
because, if not, it would have to
be that
E
(
xg′ (y + Ψ (s1)x+ ε1) |s1
)
= c
and
E
(
x2g′′ (y + Ψ (s1)x+ ε1) |s1
)
≤ 0
which is not true because g′′ > 0.
Therefore, it follows that Ψ (s1) = h if
E
(
g
(
y + hx+ ε2
)
|s1
)
− E (g (y + ε2) |s1) ≥ ch
and Ψ (s1) = 0 otherwise (where the assumption is that if there is a tie help is provided).
The RHS is independent of s1 so the proof is completed by showing the LHS is strictly
increasing with s1.
The LHS can be written as
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
fε2 (ε̃2) fy|s1 (ỹ) fx (x̃)
(
g
(
ỹ + hx̃+ ε̃2
)
− g (ỹ + ε̃2)
)
dx̃dỹdε̃2
By doing a change of variables where ŷ = ỹ − σ2
σ2+1
s1 and x̂ = x̃ − µx it follows that the
LHS is proportional to
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
 fε2 (ε̃2) exp
− ỹ2
2
σ2y
σ2y+1
 exp(− x̃2
2σ2x
)
∗(
g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 + hx̂+ hµx + ε2
)
− g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 + ε2
))
 dx̂dŷdε̃2
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which is equal to
∞∫
−∞
f
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
0

fε2 (ε̃2) exp
− ỹ2
2
σ2y
σ2y+1
 exp(− x̃2
2σ2x
)
∗ g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 + hx̂+ hµx + ε2
)
− g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 + ε2
)
+g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 − hx̂+ hµx + ε2
)
− g
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y+1
s1 + ε2
)


dx̂dŷdε̃2
Therefore, the derivative of the previous expression with respect to s1 is strictly positive if
g′′ > 0 because, for all x̂ > 0, for all ŷ and ε̃2
g′
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y + 1
s1 + hx̂+ hµx + ε2
)
+ g′
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y + 1
s1 − hx̂+ hµx + ε2
)
> 2g′
(
ỹ +
σ2y
σ2y + 1
s1 + ε2
)
which concludes the proof.
A.2.4. Proof of Proposition 24
The parent’s problem is to choose hn ≥ 0 for all n = 1, ..., N such that
N∑
n=1
hn ≤ h in order
to maximize E
[
N∑
n=1
g (sn2 ) | {sn1}
N
n=1
]
.
First, I show that
∂E
[
N∑
n=1
g (sn2 ) | {sn1}
N
n=1
]
∂hn̂
> 0
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for all n̂, which implies that
N∑
n=1
Ψn = h. Notice that
∂E
[
N∑
n=1
g (sn2 ) | {sn1}
N
n=1
]
∂hn̂
= E
(
xn̂g′
(
yn̂ + hn̂xn̂ + εn̂
)
|sn̂1
)
= E
[
E
(
xn̂g′
(
yn̂ + hn̂xn̂ + εn̂
)
|yn̂, εn̂, sn̂1
)
|sn̂1
]
Notice that letting x̃n̂ = xn̂ − µxn̂ it follows that
E
(
xn̂g′
(
yn̂ + hn̂xn̂ + εn̂
)
|yn̂, εn̂, sn̂1
)
is proportional to
∞∫
0

exp
(
−(x̃
n̂)
2
σ2x
)
∗ x̃n̂g′ (yn̂ + hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + εn̂)+ µxn̂g′ (yn̂ + hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + εn̂)
−x̃n̂g′
(
yn̂ − hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + εn̂
)
+ µxn̂g
′ (yn̂ − hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + εn̂)

 dx̃
>
∞∫
0
 exp
(
−(x̃
n̂)
2
σ2x
)
∗
x̃n̂
(
g′
(
yn̂ + hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + ε
n̂
)
− g′
(
yn̂ − hn̂x̃n̂ + hn̂µxn̂ + εn̂
))
 ≥ 0
for all yn̂, εn̂, sn̂1 , where the last inequality follows from the fact that g
′′ > 0. This implies
that
∂E
[
N∑
n=1
g (sn2 ) | {sn1}
N
n=1
]
∂hn̂
> 0
and that
N∑
n=1
Ψn = h.
Now I show that, for any arbitrary n̂, Ψn̂ ∈
{
0, h
}
. Suppose not. Then there must be
at least n′, n′′ such that Ψn
′ ∈ (0, 1) and Ψn′′ ∈ (0, 1). WLOG, say n′ = 1 and n′′ = 2. Let
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h̃ = h−
N∑
n=3
Ψn. It follows that
Ψ1 ∈ arg max
h1∈[0,h̃]
E
[
g
(
y1 + h1x1 + ε12
)
|s11
]
+ E
[
g
(
y2 + h̃x2 − h1x2 + ε22
)
|s21
]
Given that Ψ1 /∈
{
0, h̃
}
it follows that
E
[
x1g′
(
y1 + Ψ1x1 + ε12
)
|s11
]
− E
[
x2g′
(
y2 + Ψ2x2 + ε22
)
|s21
]
= 0
and
E
[(
x1
)2
g′′
(
y1 + Ψ1x1 + ε12
)
|s11
]
+ E
[(
x2
)2
g′′
(
y2 + Ψ2x2 + ε22
)
|s21
]
≤ 0
The second inequality is false given that g′′ > 0 which is a contradiction. Therefore,
Ψn̂ ∈
{
0, h
}
.
Finally, given that, for all n, Ψn ∈
{
0, h
}
and
N∑
n=1
Ψn = h, it must be that the parents
choose some ñ for which Ψñ = h such that
ñ ∈ arg max
n=1,...,N
{
E
[
g
(
yn + hxn + εn2
)
|sn1
]
− E [g (yn + εn2 ) |sn1 ]
}
Therefore, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that, for all n,
{
E
[
g
(
yn + hxn + εn2
)
|sn1
]
− E [g (yn + εn2 ) |sn1 ]
}
is increasing with sn1 , which I have on the proof of Proposition 23.
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A.3. Appendix to Chapter 3
A.3.1. Proof of Proposition 27
To characterize the solution for the BD with commitment power problem I first solve a
relaxed version of the same problem. Then, I show that
(
ρ, t
)
is a solution of that relaxed
problem and satisfies all constraints of the original problem, which implies that
(
ρ, t
)
is also
a solution of the original problem.
I start by summing all v and v incentive constraints which results in the following two
conditions:
vA (ρ) ≥ B (ρ, t) (A.8)
and
B (ρ, t) ≥ vA (ρ) (A.9)
where
A (ρ) =
N∑
n=1
∑
v−n∈{v,v}N−1
Pr {v−n} (ρ (v, v−n)− ρ (v, v−n))
and
B (ρ, t) =
N∑
n=1
∑
v−n∈{v,v}N−1
Pr {v−n} (ρ (v, v−n) tn (v, v−n)− ρ (v, v−n) tn (v, v−n))
The relaxed problem that I consider is one where: a) the v incentive constraints are
relaxed and b) the v incentive constraints are replaced by condition (A.8) - the relaxed v
incentive constraint. The individual rationality constraints and the feasibility constraints
are still part of this relaxed problem.
Consider first the case where (ρ∗, t∗) solves the relaxed problem. That implies that
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condition (A.9) - the relaxed v incentive constraint - is also satisfied because ρ∗ (v, v−n) ≥
ρ∗ (v, v−n) for all v−n ∈ {v, v}N−1 which implies that A (ρ∗) ≥ 0. Given that (ρ∗, t∗) does
not depend on the identity of the agents it follows that condition (3.2) holds. Conditions
(3.3) and (3.4) also trivially hold. Then, it must be that (ρ∗, t∗) =
(
ρ, t
)
which means that
conditions i) through v) in the statement of proposition 27 hold.
Now consider the case where (ρ∗, t∗) does not solve the relaxed problem. That must
be because (ρ∗, t∗) does not satisfy condition (A.8) and so, condition (A.8) must bind. Let
(ρr, tr) be a solution of the relaxed problem.
Observation 1 : trn (v) = c for all n if ρ
r (v) = 0.
It is irrelevant what the transfer vector if the good is not provided, so I arbitrarily set
each transfer equal to c.
Observation 2 :
N∑
n=1
trn (v) = ĉ.
If not, it would be possible to decrease the transfers of v type agents. This would
increase welfare and would satisfy conditions (A.8), (3.3) and (3.4).
Observation 3 : t
r
n (v) = t
r
n′ (v) if vn = vn′ .
If t
r
n (v) > t
r
n′ (v), decreasing the former and increasing the latter in such a way that the
sum is the same would still satisfy all constraints while increasing expected welfare given
that W is strictly concave. The increase in the expected welfare is strict if ρr (v) > 0.
Observation 4 : ρr (v) = 0 if i (v) v + (N − i (v)) v < ĉ.
If not, some agent’s ex post utility would be negative.
Observation 5 : ρr (v, ..., v) = 1.
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If not, it would be possible to increase ρr (v, ..., v) and still satisfy condition (A.8) while
increasing the expected welfare.
Notice that observations 2 and 3 imply statements i) and ii) of the proposition as long
(ρr, tr) =
(
ρ, t
)
. Following observation 3 we denote t
r
n (v) by τ
r
v (v) whenever vn = v and by
τ rv (v) whenever vn = v. Then, following observation 2, we have that
i (v) τ rv (v) + (N − i (v)) τ rv (v) = Nc if ρr (v) > 0
which implies that
τ rv (v) =
N
(N − i (v))
c− i (v)
(N − i (v))
τ rv (v) if ρ
r (v) > 0
I am now able to write condition (A.8) simply as a function of ρr and of τ rv as follows:
pN−1N (v − c) ≥
∑
v/∈{(v,...,v),(v,...,v)}
ρr (v) pi(v)−1 (1− p)N−i(v)−1 (pN (v − c)− i (v) (v − τ rv (v)))
(A.10)
Notice that the ex-post individual rationality constraints on v type agents do not bind
and the v type agents’ can be written as
τ rv (v) ≥
N
i (v)
c− (N − i (v))
i (v)
v (A.11)
Fix any v /∈ {(v, ..., v) , (v, ..., v)}. By analyzing the FOC associated with the choice of
τ rv (v) we get that, whenever ρ
r (v) > 0,
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p (1− p)
(
∂W
∂uv
− ∂W
∂uv
)
− µ+ η (v)
pi(v)−1 (1− p)N−i(v)−1 ρr (v) i (v)
= 0 (A.12)
where ∂W∂uv ≡
∂W
∂un
for n : vn = v,
∂W
∂uv
≡ ∂W∂un for n : vn = v, µ > 0 is the multiplier associated
with (A.10) and η (v) ≥ 0 is the multiplier associated with (A.11).
Notice that, given that W is strictly concave there is a unique τ̂ (µ) such that
(
∂W
∂uv
− ∂W
∂uv
)
@

 i (v)⊗ (v − τ̂ (µ))⊕
(N − i (v))⊗
(
v − N(N−i(v))c+
i(v)
(N−i(v)) τ̂ (µ)
)

 = µ
p (1− p)
where W
(
i⊗ uv ⊕ (N − i)⊗ uv
)
is interpreted as the welfare when there are i high val-
uation agents with utility uv and N − i low valuation agents with utility uv. Hence, if
τ̂ ≥ Ni(v)c −
(N−i(v))
i(v) v then, τ
r
v (v) = τ̂ ; otherwise τ
r
v (v) =
N
i(v)c −
(N−i(v))
i(v) v. Either way,
τ rv (v) only depends on i (v) as long as ρ
r (v) > 0.
In an arbitrary optimal solution of the relaxed problem, it is possible that ρr (v) > 0
and ρr (v′) = 0 while i (v) = i (v′). However, by shifting half of the weight in ρr (v) to ρr (v′)
(so that they both have the same weight) we keep the expected welfare constant and all
constraints of the relaxed problem hold. Hence, we define as ρ the solution of the relaxed
problem that is such that ρ (v) = ρ (v′) whenever i (v) = i (v′).
Given that τ rv (v) only depends on i (v) property iii) follows. Property iv) follows by
noticing that τ̂ (0) = t∗n (v) for n such that vn = v.
Now consider the FOC associated with ρ we get
 p (1− p)W (i (v)⊗ uv ⊕ (N − i (v))⊗ uv)
−µ (pN (v − c)− i (v) (v − τ rv (v))) +
ξ(v)−ξ(v)
pi(v)−1(1−p)N−i(v)−1
 = 0 (A.13)
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Given condition (A.13) ρ will have the form of a threshold rule. Given that τ rv (v) ≥
τ rv (v
′) for all v, v′ such that i (v) > i (v′) and W
(
i (v)⊗ uv ⊕ (N − i (v))⊗ uv
)
is increasing
with i (v), ρ is increasing. Notice that the threshold by i ≥ î given that µ ≥ 0. These
observations imply property v).
Finally, the only thing left is to show that
(
ρ, t
)
is also the solution of the original
problem. For that it is enough to show that it satisfies all incentive constraints that are
given by condition (3.2). Notice that A (ρ) ≥ 0 which implies that condition (A.9) holds.
Given that
(
ρ, t
)
does not depend on the identity of the agents, the individual incentive
constraints are also met which shows that
(
ρ, t
)
is indeed a solution of the original problem.
A.3.2. Proof of Proposition 30
First, I show that it is enough to consider one ”high” and one ”low” message for any
agent n, where ”high” messages are messages that are sent only by high types and ”low”
messages are sent only by low types. Take an agent n and suppose he is sending two high
messages. Each of the two messages imply the same posterior belief over all agents’ types
so we can simply treat those two messages as a single one. The same argument follows for
low messages.
Now, I show that it is enough to consider a single ”mixed” message per agent, where
”mixed” messages are messages that are sent by both types - v and v. Take any agent n and
suppose he sends two mixed messages. If the two mixed messages induce the same posterior,
then the previous argument follows. Suppose not and say that pn (m
′
n) > pn (m
′′
n). Because
both messages are mixed, the probability the public good is provided is the same under both
messages. So, for agent n to be indifferent between the two, it must be that the expected
transfer of both messages is exactly the same. This means that, as long as the public good
gets provided, the transfer player n pays regardless of whether he sends messages m′n or m
′′
n
is always v. I now propose to join the two messages into one message m̃n. In particular, say
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that smnn (vn) is the probability that player n with type vn plays message mn. Then have
sm̃nn (vn) = s
m′n
n (vn) + s
m′′n
n (vn) for vn ∈ {v, v}. Notice that pn (m̃n) ∈ [pn (m′′n) , pn (m′n)].
This means that all transfers associated with m̃n are the same as with m
′
n and with m
′′
n
which means that such a switch to m̃n leaves all agents the same and the expected welfare
unchanged.
Finally, I show that we cannot have low types sending both a low message and a mixed
message. The argument is similar to the previous one except that, by lemma 29)iv), the
expected transfer associated with a low message is always strictly smaller than with a mixed
message and so the low message strictly dominates the mixed one.
The last point is to make sure that an equilibrium always exists which is guaranteed
by the fact that if s = (1, ..., 1) then
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
is a BD equilibrium, where ξ̃ is described in
Lemma 29.
A.3.3. Proof of Proposition 32
Notice that the message space for each agent consists of a report about his type and a choice
of a real number from the interval [0, 1]. In this framework we can define, for each m ∈M ,
r (m) ∈ {v, v}N to be the report part of message m and z (m) ∈ [0, 1]N to be the part of
message m that refers to the real number choice so that m = (r (m) , z (m)).
Let
(
σ̂, φ̂
)
be such that:
σ̂vnn (a, b) =
 1 if a = vn for all b ∈ [0, 1]0 otherwise for all vn ∈ {v, v} and for all n
which means that agents report their type truthfully and choose all real numbers in [0, 1]
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with equal probability. Also let
φ̂v,mn (a) =

1 if a = tn (r (m)) and g (z (m)) ≤ ρ (r (m))
1 if a = 0 and g (z (m)) > ρ (r (m))
0 otherwise
for all m and n
and
φ̂v,mn (a) =

1 if a = tn (r (m)) , mn = v and g (z (m)) ≤ ρ (r (m))
1 if a = 0 and either mn = v or g (z (m)) > ρ (r (m))
0 otherwise
for all m and n
where g : [0, 1]N → [0, 1] is an extension of the binary matching function in Matthews and
Postlewaite (1989). The idea is that we are able to replicate ρ without resorting to mixing
the contributions each agent makes as that would lead to the waste of resources, i.e. the
sum of contributions would sometimes exceed ĉ or be in between 0 and ĉ.
Now, I explain what the g function’s role is. Let f : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] be defined as in
Matthews and Postlewaite (1989): f (z1, z2) is equal to the number whose binary expansion
has a ”1” in the nth position if and only if the binary expansion of z1 has the same digit
in nth position as does the binary expansion of z2. The idea is that the distribution of f is
uniform on [0, 1] as long as either z1 or z2 are also uniform on [0, 1] and are independent.
We define g to be composite function of all these binary functions as follows:
Define ĝ2 = f and ĝn : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] such that
ĝn (z1, .., zn−1, zn) = f
(
ĝn−1 (z1, .., zn−1) , zn
)
for all n ∈ {3, ..., N}. Then g ≡ ĝN . Notice that, if zn ∼ U (0, 1) for at least N −1 elements
and all zn are independent then g’s distribution is also uniform on (0, 1).
To see that the profile
(
σ̂, φ̂
)
implements
(
ρ, t
)
, notice that σ̂ implies there is truthful
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reporting among the agents. In order for the probability the public good is provided to
match the one specified in ρ we have agents reporting a real number in [0, 1]. By combining
all the numbers reported through function g we are able to coordinate play and match ρ.
To match t we define the second period transfers accordingly.
Now I argue that the profile
(
σ̂, φ̂
)
is indeed an anarchic equilibrium. Given any m,
it follows that φ̂ induces a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the contribution game. As for the
reporting stage, notice that if an agent with type v chooses to report they are of type v, they
would act as if they really were of type v in the second period. This means that, because(
ρ, t
)
is an incentive compatible allocation, such misreport would not be strictly preferred.
Agents with type v have an expected payoff of 0 if they misreport. Hence, they too choose
not to misreport, given they would always select a transfer of 0 in the second period. Finally,
the specific g function also guarantees that all agents are indifferent between selecting any
number from [0, 1] as long as everyone else is selecting all numbers with equal probability.
A.3.4. Proof of Proposition 33
First, I show that, for any k > 1 and for any message m, contributing tn̂ ≥ 2kc is strictly
dominated by t′n̂ = tn̂−
2
kc for any agent n̂, regardless of his type. Notice that, by reducing
his transfer in 2kc, the expected units of the public good that are provided go down at most
by 1k . This is because, for g units to be provided, it must be that tn̂ +
∑
n6=n̂
tn ≥ gĉ which
implies that tn̂ +
∑
n6=n̂
tn − 2kc ≥
(
g − 1k
)
ĉ because N ≥ 2. Hence, the difference in the
expected utility of agent n̂ is given by 2c− vn > 0 for all vn ∈ {v, v}.
If a transfer of tn̂ ≥ 2kc is strictly dominated it means that there are only two types of
messages: the ones after which 1k units of the good are provided and the ones after which
there is no provision of the public good. Hence, WLOG, it is possible to treat the problem
of finding the highest expected welfare anarchic equilibrium as having only 2 possibilities
for the public good - 0 or 1k . But that was the problem I have solved in the previous section
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- see Propositions 27 and 32. The property of the solution that is of relevance for this proof
is that, after any message m, all agents select a unique transfer, i.e. they do not randomize.
Fix any integer
−→
k > 1 and profile
(
σ,
−→
φ
)
such that
(
σ,
−→
φ
)
is the highest expected
welfare anarchic equilibrium when k =
−→
k and
−→
φ is such that agents do not randomize over
transfers in the second stage.
I show that, for all integers
←−
k <
−→
k , there is always a profile
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
such that
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
is an anarchic equilibrium when k =
←−
k and its outcome induces a higher expected welfare
than
(
σ,
−→
φ
)
, which shows the result.
Define
←−
φ as follows. Let
←−
φ vn,mn (a) =
−→
φ vn,mn
(−→
k←−
k
a
)
for all vn, m and n - all transfers
after any message are multiplied by a factor of
−→
k←−
k
. Now I show that
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
is an anarchic
equilibrium.
First, I show that no agent wants to deviate on the second period by selecting a different
transfer than the one specified in
←−
φ . Consider the payoff agent n receives by choosing
transfer
←−
t n after observing message m, given profile
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
:
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
t n
)
where
←−
Pr stands for the probability given the beliefs induced by
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
. Now take
−→
t n such
that
←−
t n =
−→
k←−
k
−→
t n. Notice that
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
t n
)
=
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|m,−→t n
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
t n
)
because
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t n
}
=
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|m,−→t n
}
where
−→
Pr stands for the probability given the beliefs induced by
(
σ,
−→
φ
)
.
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Suppose agent n, after some message m, strictly prefers to deviate in the second stage
and make a transfer
←−
t ′n such that
←−
φ
(←−
t ′n
)
= 0. Then, it must be that
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
t n
)
<
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t ′n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
t ′n
)
=
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|m,−→t ′n
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
t ′n
)
≤
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|m,−→t n
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
t n
)
=
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m,←−t n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
t n
)
where
−→
t ′n is such that
←−
t ′n =
−→
k←−
k
−→
t ′n. Given that the previous derivation leads to a contra-
diction, no agent wants to deviate in the second period.
Finally, using a similar argument, I show that no agent wishes to misreport. Notice
that by playing a given message mn, agent n’s expected utility is given by
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|mn
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
E n (tn|mn)
)
=
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|mn
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
E n (tn|mn)
)
where
←−
E n and
−→
E n stand for the expected value agent n forms, given the beliefs induced by(
σ,
←−
φ
)
and
(
σ,
−→
φ
)
respectively. Suppose agent n deviates and strictly prefers to report
m′n such that σ (m
′
n) = 0. Then it must be that
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|mn
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
E n (tn|mn)
)
<
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|m′n
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
E n
(
tn|m′n
))
=
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|m′n
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
E n
(
tn|m′n
))
≤
−→
k
←−
k
−→
Pr
{
g =
1
−→
k
|mn
}(
1
−→
k
vn −
−→
E n (tn|mn)
)
=
←−
Pr
{
g =
1
←−
k
|mn
}(
1
←−
k
vn −
←−
E n (tn|mn)
)
which is a contradiction. Hence,
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
is an anarchic equilibrium if k =
←−
k .
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Finally, given that
−→
k←−
k
> 1 the utility each agent receives after any message sent is higher
under
(
σ,
←−
φ
)
which proves the result given that W is increasing.
A.3.5. Proof of Proposition 34
The only thing I need to show is that, for any beliefs, the BD’s decision is independent of
k. Recall that, from i) and ii) of Lemma 29, we have that, when k = 1, the BD provides
1 unit of the good after any message m such that i (m) ≥ î and 0 units of the public good
after all other messages. Notice that, for the latter ones, the BD will still not provide the
public good as he has no way of funding them because
iv + (N − i) v < ĉ⇒ 1
k
(iv + (N − i) v) < 1
k
ĉ
for any k.
Now consider all messages m such that i (m) ≥ î and suppose that the BD chooses to
provide k̂k units of the public good, where k > 1 and k̂ < k. Let ŷ (m) denote the optimal
transfer scheme chosen by the BD in that case. Notice that
k̂
k
vn − ŷn (m) ≤
k
k̂
(
k̂
k
vn − ŷn (m)
)
= vn −
k
k̂
ŷn (m)
where the inequality follows from the fact that k̂kvn−ŷn (m) ≥ 0 due to the ex-post individual
rationality constraints and must be strict for some agent n. Hence, by providing 1 unit of
the public good and setting a transfer of k
k̂
ŷn (m) on each agent n, we make all agents better
off (and at least one strictly so) and are able to fully fund the provision the public good,
given that
N∑
n=1
k
k̂
ŷn (m) = ĉ. We then have a contradiction because W is strictly increasing.
Therefore, the BD always makes the same decision, for given beliefs, independently of k.
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A.3.6. Proof of Proposition 36
In proposition 30, I show that
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
is a BD equilibrium that maximizes the expected
welfare among all the BD equilibria for some s ∈ [0, 1]N where s 6= (0, ...0) (for otherwise(
ρ, t
)
= (ρ∗, t∗)). In this proof, I present a mediator equilibrium
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
that strictly
improves upon that BD equilibrium.
First, I present an intermediate step, where I show that there is a mediator equilib-
rium
(
σ̂, ζ̃, ξ̃
)
with truthful reporting that induces the same expected welfare as the BD
equilibrium
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
.
Let Mn = {L,H} and set
σ̂vnn (a) =

1 if vn = v and a = H
1 if vn = v and a = L
0 otherwise
so that agents are fully revealing their type to the mediator. Then have, for all m,
ζ̃m (a) =
N∏
n=1
 1 {an = H} 1 {mn = H} (1− sn)
+1 {an = L} (1 {mn = H} sn + 1 {mn = L})

Notice that
(
σ̂, ζ̃, ξ̃
)
is a mediator equilibrium, where the distribution of messages the
BD receives is equal to the BD equilibrium
(
σ̃ (s) , ξ̃
)
. The difference now is that the mixing
between the messages is done not by the agents but by the mediator.
Now, I show there is a mediator equilibrium
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
that strictly improves upon the
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mediator equilibrium
(
σ̂, ζ̃, ξ̃
)
. Let
ζ̂(H,...,H) (a) =

ζ̃(H,...,H) (a) +
∑
b∈Γ ζ̃
(H,...,H) (b) if a = (H, ...,H)
0 if
N∑
n=1
1 {an = H} < î
ζ̃(H,...,H) (a) otherwise
where
Γ =
{
b ∈M :
N∑
n=1
1 {bn = H} < î
}
and ζ̂m = ζ̃m for all m 6= (H, ...,H). I claim that
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
is a mediator equilibrium that
induces a strictly higher expected welfare. To see that the profile
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
is a mediator
equilibrium notice that the posterior beliefs the BD holds for any message m are the same
as with
(
σ̂, ζ̃, ξ̃
)
whenever the BD decided to provide the public good. For messages where
the public good did not get provided, the BD now believes that all agents are more likely to
have a low type which means he still does not provide the good in
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
. So the payoffs
per message the BD receives are the same. Finally, the expected utility of reporting L did
not change while the expected utility of reporting H increased only for agents with a high
type (because v > c > v) which means that all agents prefer to reveal their type then to
misreport. The equilibrium
(
σ̂, ζ̂, ξ̃
)
has a higher expected welfare because whenever all
agents have a high type there is an increase of
∑
b∈Γ ζ̃
(H,...,H) (b) in the probability that the
good is provided and the transfers are ex-post optimal, as opposed to the good not being
provided.
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